State v. Perdang, 38 Wn. App. 141, 684 P.2d 781 (1984) By Scott E Stafne
This published Washington Court of Appeals decision, State v. Perdang, 38 Wn. App. 141, 684 P.2d 781 (1984), is referenced and discussed in the companion article: "From Advocacy to Public Truth-Telling: How the Role of Lawyers Must Change When Courts Abandon Adjudication and the People Must Be Advised of This Change" by Scott Erik Stafne and Todd AI (December 20, 2025).
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Perdang is significant for its clear articulation of a foundational principle of adjudication: that judicial discretion must be actually exercised, not replaced by inflexible policies or personal disagreement with governing law.
The decision holds that a trial court abdicates its judicial duty when it refuses to consider properly presented facts and arguments based on a self-imposed rule or institutional preference.
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In the referenced article, Perdang is used as an early and illustrative example of the distinction between lawful adjudication and procedural pretext—a distinction central to evaluating modern claims about judicial legitimacy, neutrality, and truth-based decision-making.
Understanding Perdang helps illuminate how contemporary departures from adjudicatory norms differ not merely in degree, but in kind, from earlier exercises of judicial discretion reviewed under traditional rule-of-law standards.
https://www.academia.edu/145501910/State_v_Perdang_38_Wn_App_141_684_P_2d_781_1984_?source=swp_share
READ ALSO:
From Advocacy to Public Truth-Telling: How the Role of Lawyers Must Change When Courts Abandon Adjudication and the People Must Be Advised of This Change" by Scott Erik Stafne and Todd AI (December 20, 2025).
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History,
Constitutional Law,
Political Philosophy,
Ethics,
Sociology of Law,
Access to Justice,
Human Rights Law,
Courts,
Political Science,
Governance,
Truth,
Comparative Constitutional Law,
Lawyers,
Judicial independence,
Rule of Law,
Theories Of Truth,
Courts and Elites (History),
Separation of Powers,
Legal Ethics/professional Responsibility
Modern legal systems universally recognize adjudicatory justice-judicial independence, decisional neutrality, and truth-based factfinding-as foundational design norms of legitimate governance. Yet across jurisdictions, courts increasingly invoke procedural mechanisms in ways that avoid engagement with properly presented factual and legal disputes, substituting pretextual dismissal for adjudication. This collaboration examines what follows when the gap between adjudicatory design and adjudicatory practice becomes systemic. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> Drawing on a cross-platform dialogue between human legal reasoning and artificial intelligence reasoning systems, this work explores a neglected question: how the professional role of lawyers must change when courts no longer reliably perform their adjudicatory function. It argues that, under such changed conditions, advocacy confined to internal judicial channels becomes structurally ineffective and ethically incomplete. Lawyers must instead assume a public-facing role—documenting, explaining, and communicating institutional failure to the people subject to it. <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<< The paper situates this transition within constitutional structure, rule-of-law theory, and historical experience, distinguishing principled truth-telling from mere accusation. It concludes that when adjudication collapses into procedural simulation, restoring legitimacy requires not only institutional reform but civic education—placing lawyers, scholars, and informed citizens at the center of democratic accountability.
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