quarta-feira, 15 de julho de 2026

BEGIN THE DAY IN THE LIGHT OF PRAYER AND DIVINE PROTECTION: CEFP PUBLIC MEETING — DOCTRINAL STUDIES — WITHOUT CHARITY THERE IS NO SALVATION: THE PARABLE OF THE WEDDING FEAST COMECE O DIA À LUZ DA ORAÇÃO E DA PROTEÇÃO DIVINA : CEFP - REUNIÃO PÚBLICA Estudos Doutrinarios Fora da Caridade Não há Salvação: Parabola do Festim das Núpcias

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IMPERDIVEL

Leitura de preparação do ambiente:

Livros de Emmanuel: Psicografia de Francisco Cândido Xavier:

Fonte Viva - Capítulo 112

Segue-me

Capítulo 32 - Atos 22:10

Então, perguntei: que farei, Senhor? E o Senhor me disse: Levanta-te, entra em Damasco, pois ali te dirão acerca de tudo o que te é ordenado fazer.

Que farei?

Tema principal

“Que farei?” — Paulo. (ATOS, 22.10)

Milhares de companheiros aproximam-se do Evangelho para o culto inveterado ao comodismo.

² Como dominarei? — Interrogam alguns.

³ Como descansarei? — Indagam outros.

⁴ E os rogos se multiplicam, estranhos, reprováveis, incompreensíveis…

⁵ Há quem peça reconforto barato na carne, quem reclame afeições indébitas, quem suspire por negócios inconfessáveis e quem exija recursos para dificultar o serviço da paz e do bem.

⁶ A pergunta do apóstolo Paulo, no justo momento em que se vê agraciado pela Presença Divina, é padrão para todos os aprendizes e seguidores da Boa Nova.

⁷ O grande trabalhador da Revelação não pede transferência da Terra para o Céu e nem descamba para sugestões de favoritismo ao seu círculo pessoal. Não roga isenção de responsabilidade, nem foge ao dever da luta.

— Que farei? — Disse a Jesus, compreendendo o impositivo do esforço que lhe cabia.

⁸ E o Mestre determina que o companheiro se levante para a sementeira de luz e de amor, através do próprio sacrifício.

⁹ Se foste chamado à fé, não recorras ao Divino Orientador suplicando privilégios e benefícios que justifiquem tua permanência na estagnação espiritual.

¹⁰ Procuremos com o Senhor o serviço que a sua Infinita Bondade nos reserva e caminharemos, vitoriosos, para a sublime renovação. Emmanuel

Leitura do EVANGELHO SEGUNDO O ESPIRITISMO Aberto ao acaso "A PACIÊNCIA"

II – A Paciência

UM ESPÍRITO AMIGO

Havre, 1862

7 – A dor é uma benção que Deus envia aos seus eleitos. Não vos aflijais, portanto, quando sofrerdes, mas, pelo contrário, bendizei a Deus todo poderoso, que vos marcou com a dor neste mundo, para a glória no céu.

Sede paciente, pois a paciência é também caridade, e deveis praticar a lei de caridade, ensinada pelo Cristo, enviado de Deus. A caridade que consiste em dar esmolas aos pobres é a mais fácil de todas. Mas há uma bem mais penosa, e conseqüentemente bem mais meritória, que é a de perdoar os que Deus colocou em nosso caminho para serem os instrumentos de nossos sofrimentos e submeterem à prova a nossa paciência.

A vida é difícil, bem o sei, constituindo-se de mil bagatelas que são como alfinetadas e acabam por nos ferir. Mas é necessário olhar para os deveres que nos são impostos, e para as consolações e compensações que obtemos, pois então veremos que as bênçãos são mais numerosas que as dores. O fardo parece mais leve quando olhamos para o alto, do que quando curvamos a fronte para a terra.

Coragem, amigos: o Cristo é o vosso modelo. Sofreu mais que qualquer um de vós, e nada tinham de que se acusar, enquanto tendes a expiar o vosso passado e de fortalecer-vos para o futuro.

Sede, pois, paciente, sede cristãos: esta palavra resume tudo.

Estudo doutrinário Evangelho Segundo o Espiritismo

EXPOSITORA: ANA PAULA ASSAIFE

Evangelho Segundo o Espiritismo

FORA DA CARIDADE NÃO HA SALVAÇÃO :

Parábola do Festim das Núpcias

Qual é o maior mandamento ?

Amar a Deus sobre todas as coisas e amar ao próximo como a si mesmo

Parábola do Festim das Núpcias

Passes aos assistentes

Irradiação para pessoas encarnadas

Preces pelos desencarnados

Prece de encerramento e agradecimento

Avisos da casa

Assista agora, ao vivo ( a reunião pública começou as 09 hs e terminou as 10 hs no horário de Brasília- GMT-3)

A gravação pode ser vista no YouTube clicando no link abaixo

Comece o dia a Luz da Oração e da Proteção Divina

Destacar

Assista e compartilhe

( em português )

Veja outras reuniões no canal da Congregação Espírita Francisco de Paula

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Clique aqui

https://www.youtube.com/live/adTIRJ24Ums?is=WW80I-6ofcE7ZXMC

Referências:

Francisco Cândido. Segue-me. 1. ed. [S. l.]: Federação Espírita Brasileira, [s. d.]. cap. 32. Disponível em:

https://bibliadocaminho.com/ocaminho/TX/Sg/Sg32.htm

⁠ Acesso em: 15 jul. 2026.

O Evangelho segundo o Espiritismo > Capítulo XVIII — Muitos os chamados, poucos os escolhidos > Parábola do festim de bodas.

Parábola do festim de bodas.

1. Falando ainda por parábolas, disse-lhes Jesus: O reino dos céus se assemelha a um rei que, querendo festejar as bodas de seu filho — despachou seus servos a chamar para as bodas os que tinham sido convidados; estes, porém, recusaram ir. — O rei despachou outros servos com ordem de dizer da sua parte aos convidados: Preparei o meu jantar; mandei matar os meus bois e todos os meus cevados; tudo está pronto; vinde às bodas. — Eles, porém, sem se incomodarem com isso, lá se foram, um para a sua casa de campo, outro para o seu negócio.

— Os outros pegaram dos servos e os mataram, depois de lhes haverem feito muitos ultrajes. — Sabendo disso, o rei se tomou de cólera e, mandando contra eles seus exércitos, exterminou os assassinos e lhes queimou a cidade.

Então, disse a seus servos: O festim das bodas está inteiramente preparado; mas, os que para ele foram chamados não eram dignos dele. Ide, pois, às encruzilhadas e chamai para as bodas todos quantos encontrardes. — Os servos então saíram pelas ruas e trouxeram todos os que iam encontrando, bons e maus; a sala das bodas se encheu de pessoas que se puseram à mesa.

Entrou, em seguida, o rei para ver os que estavam à mesa, e, dando com um homem que não vestia a túnica nupcial — disse-lhe: Meu amigo, como entraste aqui sem a túnica nupcial? O homem guardou silêncio. — Então, disse o rei à sua gente: Atai-lhe as mãos e os pés e lançai-o nas trevas exteriores: aí é que haverá prantos e ranger de dentes, — porquanto muitos há chamados, mas poucos escolhidos. (S. Mateus, 22:1 a 14.)

2. O incrédulo sorri a esta parábola, que lhe parece de pueril ingenuidade, por não compreender que se possa opor tanta dificuldade para assistir a um festim e, ainda menos, que convidados levem a resistência a ponto de massacrarem os enviados do dono da casa. “As parábolas”, diz ele, o incrédulo, “são, sem dúvida, imagens; mas, ainda assim, mister se torna que não ultrapassem os limites do verossímil”.

Outro tanto pode ser dito de todas as alegorias, das mais engenhosas fábulas, se não lhes forem tirados os respectivos envoltórios, para ser achado o sentido oculto. Jesus compunha as suas com os hábitos mais vulgares da vida e as adaptava aos costumes e ao caráter do povo a quem falava. A maioria delas tinha por objeto fazer penetrar nas massas populares a ideia da vida espiritual, parecendo muitas ininteligíveis, quanto ao sentido, apenas por não se colocarem neste ponto de vista os que as interpretam.

Na de que tratamos, Jesus compara o reino dos céus, onde tudo é alegria e ventura, a um festim. Falando dos primeiros convidados, alude aos hebreus, que foram os primeiros chamados por Deus ao conhecimento da sua lei. Os enviados do rei são os profetas que os vinham exortar a seguir a trilha da verdadeira felicidade; suas palavras, porém, quase não eram escutadas; suas advertências eram desprezadas; muitos foram mesmo massacrados, como os servos da parábola. Os convidados que se escusam, pretextando terem de ir cuidar de seus campos e de seus negócios, simbolizam as pessoas mundanas que, absorvidas pelas coisas terrenas, se conservam indiferentes às coisas celestes.

Era crença comum aos judeus de então que a nação deles tinha de alcançar supremacia sobre todas as outras. Deus, com efeito, não prometera a Abraão que a sua posteridade cobriria toda a Terra? Mas, como sempre, atendo-se à forma, sem atentarem ao fundo, eles acreditavam tratar-se de uma dominação efetiva e material.

Antes da vinda do Cristo, com exceção dos hebreus, todos os povos eram idólatras e politeístas. Se alguns homens superiores ao vulgo conceberam a ideia da unidade de Deus, essa ideia permaneceu no estado de sistema pessoal, em parte nenhuma foi aceita como verdade fundamental, a não ser por alguns iniciados que ocultavam seus conhecimentos sob um véu de mistério, impenetrável para as massas populares. Os hebreus foram os primeiros a praticar publicamente o monoteísmo; é a eles que Deus transmite a sua lei, primeiramente por via de Moisés, depois por intermédio de Jesus. Foi daquele pequenino foco que partiu a luz destinada a espargir-se pelo mundo inteiro, a triunfar do paganismo e a dar a Abraão uma posteridade espiritual “tão numerosa quanto as estrelas do firmamento”. Entretanto, abandonando de todo a idolatria, os judeus desprezaram a lei moral, para se aferrarem ao mais fácil: a prática do culto exterior. O mal chegara ao cúmulo; a nação, além de escravizada, era esfacelada pelas facções e dividida pelas seitas; a incredulidade atingira mesmo o santuário. Foi então que apareceu Jesus, enviado para os chamar à observância da lei e para lhes rasgar os horizontes novos da vida futura. Dos primeiros a serem convidados para o grande banquete da fé universal, eles repeliram a palavra do Messias celeste e o imolaram. Perderam assim o fruto que teriam colhido da iniciativa que lhes coubera.

Fora, contudo, injusto acusar-se o povo inteiro de tal estado de coisas. A responsabilidade tocava principalmente aos fariseus e saduceus, que sacrificaram a nação por efeito do orgulho e do fanatismo de uns e pela incredulidade dos outros. São, pois, eles, sobretudo, que Jesus identifica nos convidados que recusam comparecer ao festim das bodas. Depois, acrescenta: “Vendo isso, o Senhor mandou convidar a todos os que fossem encontrados nas encruzilhadas, bons e maus.” Queria dizer desse modo que a palavra ia ser pregada a todos os outros povos, pagãos e idólatras, e estes, acolhendo-a, seriam admitidos ao festim, em lugar dos primeiros convidados.

Mas não basta a ninguém ser convidado; não basta dizer-se cristão, nem sentar-se à mesa para tomar parte no banquete celestial. É preciso, antes de tudo e sob condição expressa, estar revestido da túnica nupcial, isto é, ter puro o coração e cumprir a lei segundo o espírito. Ora, a lei toda se contém nestas palavras: Fora da caridade não há salvação. Entre todos, porém, que ouvem a palavra divina, quão poucos são os que a guardam e a aplicam proveitosamente! Quão poucos se tornam dignos de entrar no reino dos céus! Eis por que disse Jesus: Chamados haverá muitos; poucos, no entanto, serão os escolhidos.

terça-feira, 14 de julho de 2026

AI ANALYSIS: JUSTICE FORGIVES A JUDGE WHO USED NONEXISTENT PRECEDENTS PRODUCED BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, WHILE LAWYERS ARE FINED, REPORTED TO BAR ASSOCIATIONS, AND SUBJECTED TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR THE SAME CONDUCT

JUSTICE FORGIVES A JUDGE WHO USED NONEXISTENT PRECEDENTS PRODUCED BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, WHILE LAWYERS ARE FINED, REPORTED TO BAR ASSOCIATIONS, AND SUBJECTED TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR THE SAME CONDUCT

Analysis by Márcia Almeida, with artificial intelligence assistance subject to human and documentary review

July 14, 2026

Watch the video of the Reporting Judge’s opinion here — audio in English and Spanish

The case that exposed disciplinary inequality
What has been established by documentary evidence
What still remains concealed
The São Paulo Court of Justice’s justification: “We are learning”
The legal issue is not limited to the judge’s intent
Nonexistent precedents are not rhetorical ornaments
The underlying case cannot be deemed irrelevant without public scrutiny
The denial of oral argument and the possible denial of the right to be heard
The judge’s personal and nondelegable responsibility
CNJ Resolution No. 615/2025
The National Code of Judicial Ethics
LOMAN and judges’ official duties
The treatment imposed on lawyers in Brazil
Regional Labor Court of the 23rd Region: fine and referral to the Brazilian Bar Association
Paraná Court of Justice: bad-faith litigation and referral to the Brazilian Bar Association
Regional Labor Court of the 7th Region: false case law and violation of procedural ethics
Superior Court of Justice: referral to the Brazilian Bar Association because of possible AI hallucinations
The leading United States precedent: Mata v. Avianca
Other United States precedents
United Kingdom, Canada, and other countries
The objective comparison
The false distinction between “judicial error” and “official misconduct”
Intent is not a prerequisite for every form of disciplinary liability
Proportionality does not mean impunity
Judicial independence does not mean judicial irresponsibility
Violation of equality, impartial public administration, and legitimate expectations
Risks to objective impartiality
The institutional responsibility of the Office of the Chief Judicial Inspector and the Special Body
Necessary measures
Conclusion
References

1. THE CASE THAT EXPOSED DISCIPLINARY INEQUALITY

On July 14, 2026, the Brazilian legal news website Migalhas reported that the Special Body of the São Paulo State Court of Justice upheld the dismissal of a disciplinary complaint against a judge who used nonexistent judicial precedents generated by an artificial intelligence tool in a judicial decision.

The complaint was filed by the Brazilian Bar Association, São Paulo Section — OAB/SP.

According to the report, the Chief Judicial Inspector of the São Paulo judiciary, Appellate Judge Silvia Rocha, expressly acknowledged that:

“There was, in fact, an undesirable error by the judge in reproducing certain judicial precedents, certain decisions, generated by an artificial intelligence tool.”

The Reporting Judge also stated that the tool “hallucinated and created a judicial decision that did not exist.”

Despite this objective finding, she concluded that the incident did not justify the commencement of disciplinary administrative proceedings because, in her words:

“At this time, when we are learning how to use artificial intelligence, [the error] was not intentional and did not interfere with the analysis of the facts or the outcome of the adjudication.”

The Special Body followed this reasoning and denied the appeals filed against the dismissal.

The decision raises an unavoidable question:

Why is the argument that “we are learning” used to shield a judge from disciplinary liability, while lawyers who submit nonexistent precedents are fined, found liable for bad-faith litigation, reported to the Brazilian Bar Association, and subjected to disciplinary proceedings?

2. WHAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

Consultation of the São Paulo Court of Justice’s official sources made it possible to identify the following elements:

2.1. Number of the disciplinary proceeding

The matter was processed under No.:

0000376-49.2026.2.00.0826

The numbering indicates an administrative proceeding registered within the Office of the Judicial Inspector/PJeCor environment.

2.2. Adjudication on July 1, 2026

At the administrative session of the Special Body held on July 1, 2026, Appellate Judge Silvia Rocha voted to deny the appeals.

The adjudication was adjourned at the request of Appellate Judge Campos Mello.

2.3. Final adjudication on July 8, 2026

At the session held on July 8, 2026, the Special Body unanimously denied the appeals.

Appellate Judge Campos Mello issued Concurring Opinion No. 87,263.

2.4. Lawyers who acted in the appeals

The official publications identify:

Rosana Gibowski — OAB/SP Registration No. 136,957;
Thais Pires de Camargo Rêgo Monteiro — OAB/SP Registration No. 205,657.

The participation of these professionals is consistent with the fact that the complaint involved the OAB/SP and a possible violation of the professional prerogatives of the legal profession.

The official source confirms proceeding No. 0000376-49.2026.2.00.0826, the opinion issued by Chief Judicial Inspector Silvia Rocha, the July 1 adjournment, the unanimous adjudication on July 8, and the participation of lawyers Rosana Gibowski and Thais Pires de Camargo Rêgo Monteiro.

TJSP · 2

The name of the judge and the original judicial proceeding were not disclosed in the public notices, in the Migalhas report, or in the indexed OAB/SP results. The full record is probably linked to PJeCor, and attributing the conduct to a named judge without access to the proceeding would be speculation. The Migalhas report also does not provide documentary proof of how the Office of the Judicial Inspector concluded that the false precedents did not affect the outcome.

Migalhas · 1

The addresses listed above were actually located and accessed during this research on July 14, 2026. Some judicial websites may subsequently change their routes, require a digital certificate or CAPTCHA, or block automated access.

2.5. Facts acknowledged by the Office of the Judicial Inspector itself

The Reporting Judge acknowledged:

that the judge used an artificial intelligence tool;
that the tool produced nonexistent judicial decisions;
that the false precedents were reproduced in the judicial decision;
that the judge had a duty to verify the cited authorities;
that such verification was not performed.

This is therefore not a mere journalistic suspicion. The use of nonexistent precedents was admitted during the administrative adjudication itself.

3. WHAT STILL REMAINS CONCEALED

Despite the institutional seriousness of the incident, the following information was not located on the public pages consulted:

the judge’s name;
the trial court or judicial unit in which the judge served;
the number of the original judicial proceeding;
the full nature of the underlying case;
the decision containing the nonexistent citations;
the complete list of fabricated precedents;
the Office of the Judicial Inspector’s dismissal decision;
the appeals submitted by the OAB/SP and by the lawyer;
the full opinion issued by Appellate Judge Silvia Rocha;
the full text of Concurring Opinion No. 87,263;
the analytical demonstration that the false precedents did not influence the outcome.

This opacity prevents public scrutiny of a decisive conclusion: the assertion that the nonexistent precedents “did not interfere” with the adjudication.

Without access to the original decision and the false authorities, this assertion cannot be audited by society, the legal community, or the injured party.

4. THE SÃO PAULO COURT OF JUSTICE’S JUSTIFICATION: “WE ARE LEARNING”

The expression “we are learning” may justify training, institutional improvement, or the gradual adoption of new technologies.

By itself, however, it cannot eliminate preexisting legal duties.

Long before the widespread adoption of generative artificial intelligence, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, public defenders, and court personnel were already required to:

verify the existence of the sources they cited;
reproduce judicial decisions accurately;
refrain from attributing nonexistent holdings to courts;
refrain from inserting false facts into procedural acts;
act in good faith, with loyalty and diligence;
preserve the reliability of the administration of justice.

Artificial intelligence neither created nor revoked these duties.

The use of a new tool does not render acceptable conduct that, had it resulted from manual research, would be regarded as gross negligence.

5. THE LEGAL ISSUE IS NOT LIMITED TO THE JUDGE’S INTENT

The Office of the Judicial Inspector centered its reasoning on the absence of intent.

That reasoning is insufficient.

Disciplinary liability is not limited to deliberate fraud. It may also result from:

gross negligence;
recklessness;
professional incompetence;
breach of official duty;
a lack of care incompatible with judicial office;
conduct that undermines public confidence in the judiciary.

The fact that a judge did not intend to fabricate false case law does not eliminate the obligation to verify the content before signing and issuing the decision.

A judicial signature represents the personal assumption of authorship and responsibility for the judicial act.

The fact that the text may initially have been prepared by a law clerk, court employee, or artificial intelligence system does not sever the judge’s chain of responsibility.

6. NONEXISTENT PRECEDENTS ARE NOT RHETORICAL ORNAMENTS

A judicial decision is not merely a private opinion.

It is a coercive manifestation of state power and may:

deprive a person of property;
restrict liberty;
dissolve family relationships;
remove children from their parents;
order evictions;
deny medical treatment;
uphold enforcement proceedings;
terminate cases;
foreclose appellate review;
create res judicata.

When a judicial decision attributes to a court a holding that never existed, it presents as positive law what is merely an algorithmic fabrication.

The seriousness of the conduct does not disappear because the judge claims to have relied on other grounds.

Precedents are cited precisely in order to:

reinforce the authority of the conclusion;
demonstrate consistency with existing case law;
persuade the parties that the outcome is not arbitrary;
permit appellate review;
bind or guide future adjudications;
publicly legitimize the exercise of judicial power.

Had the precedents been entirely useless, they would not have been included in the decision.

7. THE UNDERLYING CASE CANNOT BE DEEMED IRRELEVANT WITHOUT PUBLIC SCRUTINY

The Reporting Judge stated that the nonexistent decisions did not interfere with the analysis of the facts or the outcome.

That conclusion requires a demonstration, not a mere assertion.

It would be necessary to compare:

the genuinely existing independent grounds;
the grounds supported by the false authorities;
the substance of the dispute;
the arguments presented by the party;
the possible influence of the citations on the other judges;
the subsequent use of the decision in other proceedings;
the possibility that the party was induced to abandon or alter its appellate strategy.

Without publication of the underlying decision and the disciplinary opinion, the premise adopted by the court cannot be verified.

Moreover, even if the same outcome could have been reached on other grounds, false legal information would still have been inserted into an official state act.

8. THE DENIAL OF ORAL ARGUMENT AND THE POSSIBLE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD

The disciplinary complaint did not concern only the nonexistent case law.

According to the report, it also challenged the denial of a request for synchronous oral argument.

This fact increases the seriousness of the context.

The party simultaneously alleged:

that the judge used precedents that did not exist;
that her lawyer was not permitted to present synchronous oral argument;
that there was a possible denial of the right to be heard and to present a defense.

The disciplinary analysis fragmented these issues and classified them as purely jurisdictional matters.

However, the combination of reasoning based on false authorities and restrictions on the exercise of the right to present a defense may reveal a structural due process problem.

Oral argument is not a favor granted to counsel. It is an instrument of participation, adversarial proceedings, and effective influence on the formation of the judicial decision.

The OAB/SP itself has published studies arguing that, once requested, synchronous oral argument must be guaranteed, particularly when a virtual or asynchronous adjudication eliminates real-time interaction between counsel and the judges.

9. THE JUDGE’S PERSONAL AND NONDELEGABLE RESPONSIBILITY

Artificial intelligence may assist in organizing information, linguistic review, preliminary research, and preparation of draft decisions.

It cannot assume the constitutional function of adjudication.

A judge who signs a decision institutionally declares that he or she:

examined the case file;
knows the grounds employed;
verified the authorities;
agrees with the content;
assumes legal and ethical responsibility for the ruling.

The response that “the artificial intelligence hallucinated” describes the mechanism of the error, but it does not eliminate human responsibility.

AI does not hold public office, has not passed a competitive public examination, possesses no decisional independence, takes no constitutional oath, and cannot be subjected to disciplinary liability.

Responsibility must rest with the person who decided to use its output without verification.

10. CNJ RESOLUTION NO. 615/2025

CNJ Resolution No. 615 of March 11, 2025, establishes rules governing the development, governance, auditing, monitoring, and responsible use of artificial intelligence within the Brazilian judiciary.

The Resolution requires compliance with the principles of:

transparency;
explainability;
contestability;
auditability;
reliability;
security;
human oversight;
protection of fundamental rights.

The Resolution also requires secure, traceable, and auditable sources.

A nonexistent judicial precedent is not:

secure;
traceable;
auditable;
reliable;
explainable;
compatible with the duty of transparency.

The matter should therefore not have been examined merely as an individual failure in learning to use technology, but as a possible violation of the national rules governing artificial intelligence in the judiciary.

11. THE NATIONAL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

The National Code of Judicial Ethics imposes upon judges duties of:

independence;
impartiality;
knowledge and professional competence;
courtesy;
transparency;
prudence;
diligence;
professional and personal integrity;
dignity, honor, and decorum.

Prudence requires a judge to rationally assess the consequences of judicial decisions.

Diligence requires careful and timely performance of judicial duties.

Integrity requires consistency between the extensive authority entrusted to judicial office and the reliability of the information contained in judicial acts.

The insertion of AI-fabricated case law may simultaneously violate all three duties.

12. LOMAN AND JUDGES’ OFFICIAL DUTIES

Article 35 of the Organic Law of the National Judiciary — Complementary Law No. 35/1979 — establishes, among other duties, the obligation to:

comply with and enforce statutory provisions and official acts;
refrain from unjustifiably exceeding procedural deadlines;
take the measures necessary to ensure that procedural acts are performed regularly;
treat the parties, lawyers, and other participants with courtesy;
maintain irreproachable conduct in public and private life.

Procedural regularity includes the issuance of legally verifiable decisions.

A state ruling that presents as existing a judicial decision that was never issued is not procedurally regular.

13. THE TREATMENT IMPOSED ON LAWYERS IN BRAZIL

While the São Paulo Court of Justice concluded that the judge was “learning,” Brazilian courts have imposed the following consequences on lawyers in similar circumstances:

fines for bad-faith litigation;
liability for procedural expenses;
refusal to entertain appeals;
dismissal of actions;
referral to the Brazilian Bar Association;
orders for disciplinary investigation;
findings of violation of procedural good faith;
accusations of attempting to mislead the judiciary.

It is legitimate to hold professionals accountable for submitting false precedents.

The problem lies in the absence of an equivalent standard for those exercising judicial authority.

14. REGIONAL LABOR COURT OF THE 23RD REGION: FINE AND REFERRAL TO THE BRAZILIAN BAR ASSOCIATION

In July 2026, the Regional Labor Court of the 23rd Region, in the State of Mato Grosso, reported a case in which five nonexistent precedents attributed to the Superior Labor Court and other courts were identified.

The court held that submitting false references violated the duties of loyalty, caution, and procedural good faith.

The court ordered:

the imposition of a fine;
referral to the Brazilian Bar Association for investigation of the professional conduct.

The official report issued by the Regional Labor Court of Mato Grosso did not adopt the rationale that the lawyers were “learning” to use artificial intelligence.

The failure to verify the authorities was treated as professional responsibility.

Summary of the holding

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. NONEXISTENT PRECEDENTS. FAILURE OF PROFESSIONAL VERIFICATION. BAD-FAITH LITIGATION. The use of artificial intelligence tools without human supervision does not relieve counsel of responsibility for the contents of a filing. The submission of nonexistent precedents violates the duties of good faith, loyalty, and caution, authorizing the imposition of a fine and referral to the Brazilian Bar Association.

15. PARANÁ COURT OF JUSTICE: BAD-FAITH LITIGATION AND REFERRAL TO THE BRAZILIAN BAR ASSOCIATION

The Paraná State Court of Justice examined an interlocutory appeal in which nonexistent precedents, apparently produced by AI, were cited.

The appellate decision held that:

“By using an artificial intelligence tool without the necessary review and verification, the appellants violated their duty of care.”

It also concluded that the submission of nonexistent case law constituted conduct capable of misleading the judiciary.

The following measures were upheld or ordered:

a fine for bad-faith litigation;
an official referral to the Paraná Section of the Brazilian Bar Association;
investigation of the professional conduct.

Essential headnote — Paraná Court of Justice

INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL. USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE. CITATION OF NONEXISTENT PRECEDENTS. VIOLATION OF THE DUTY OF CARE. BAD-FAITH LITIGATION. REFERRAL TO THE BRAZILIAN BAR ASSOCIATION. The use of an artificial intelligence tool without human review and the submission of nonexistent judicial decisions violate procedural good faith and justify the imposition of a fine and referral to the Brazilian Bar Association.

In another adjudication, the Paraná Court of Justice imposed a fine equivalent to one minimum monthly wage, although it acknowledged that the false precedents did not affect the principal issue raised in the appeal.

This fact is especially important.

In the Paraná case, the fact that the false case law was not outcome-determinative did not eliminate the sanction.

In the case of the São Paulo judge, the same argument was used to prevent the commencement of any disciplinary proceeding.

16. REGIONAL LABOR COURT OF THE 7TH REGION: FALSE CASE LAW AND VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL ETHICS

In June 2025, the Regional Labor Court of the 7th Region reported a finding of bad-faith litigation against a lawyer who submitted nonexistent or altered case law.

The court emphasized that the use of nonexistent or deliberately modified precedents violates fundamental principles of procedural ethics.

It also ordered referral of the matter to the Ceará Section of the Brazilian Bar Association.

Summary of the holding

NONEXISTENT OR ALTERED CASE LAW. ATTEMPT TO MISLEAD THE COURT. BAD-FAITH LITIGATION. The submission of false precedents undermines confidence in the judicial process, violates procedural loyalty, and authorizes sanctions, without prejudice to disciplinary investigation by the Brazilian Bar Association.

17. SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE: REFERRAL TO THE BRAZILIAN BAR ASSOCIATION BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE AI HALLUCINATIONS

In May 2026, the Brazilian Superior Court of Justice reported a decision issued by Justice Rogerio Schietti Cruz in a habeas corpus proceeding.

The Reporting Justice identified serious defects in the application, including:

incorrect citations;
nonexistent judicial decisions;
material apparently produced by artificial intelligence without verification.

In addition to denying interim relief, he ordered that the matter be referred to the Brazilian Bar Association.

Once again, the absence of deliberate intent did not prevent the adoption of disciplinary measures.

18. THE LEADING UNITED STATES PRECEDENT: MATA v. AVIANCA

The best-known international precedent is Mata v. Avianca, Inc., decided in 2023 by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The lawyers submitted a brief containing nonexistent decisions produced by ChatGPT.

When the court questioned the references, they provided fabricated texts purporting to be complete judicial opinions.

Judge P. Kevin Castel concluded that the lawyers had abandoned their gatekeeping function and submitted to the court:

nonexistent judicial opinions;
false citations;
fabricated quotations;
misleading statements.

The court imposed financial sanctions of US$5,000, together with other measures, including notification of the judges falsely identified as authors of the fabricated decisions and notification of the client.

The court emphasized that there is no absolute prohibition against using artificial intelligence, but that lawyers serve a gatekeeping role and must ensure the accuracy of everything they submit.

Central passage of the decision

There is nothing inherently improper about using a reliable artificial intelligence tool for assistance. Existing rules, however, impose a gatekeeping role on attorneys to ensure the accuracy of their filings.

The court also listed the harms caused by fabricated decisions:

wasting the opposing party’s time;
wasting the court’s time;
harming the client;
damaging the reputations of judges falsely identified as authors;
damaging the reputations of parties falsely associated with fictional facts;
eroding confidence in the judicial process.

These harms apply equally when the person responsible for the act is a judge.

In fact, the harm may be even greater because the false authority appears within an official state decision carrying a presumption of legitimacy.

19. OTHER UNITED STATES PRECEDENTS

Following Mata v. Avianca, United States federal and state courts began imposing or considering:

monetary sanctions;
costs and attorneys’ fees;
rejection or striking of filings;
orders to show cause;
disciplinary referrals;
formal admonishments;
certification requirements confirming that cited authorities were verified.

In Garner v. Kadince, the Utah Court of Appeals reaffirmed that artificial intelligence does not alter the professional obligation to verify legal authorities.

In Cassata v. Michael Macrina Architect, P.C., a New York court observed that a substantial body of decisions already recognizes the following conduct as sanctionable:

citing nonexistent cases;
using nonexistent quotations;
attributing false propositions of law to real cases.

In federal decisions issued in 2026, courts warned that the problem has evolved: AI does not always fabricate an entire case; it frequently attributes to a real case a quotation, legal proposition, or outcome that the case never contained.

This form of falsity is even more difficult to detect.

20. UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES

20.1. United Kingdom

English courts have warned that lawyers have a professional duty to verify every authority they submit.

In cases involving false AI-generated case law, courts have considered:

contempt of court;
the lawyer’s personal liability;
referral to professional regulatory bodies;
adverse costs orders;
possible interference with the administration of justice.

The fundamental position is that unfamiliarity with the technology is not a sufficient excuse.

20.2. Canada

In Canada, cases involving negligent use of AI have already resulted in:

adverse costs awards;
special costs imposed against lawyers;
proceedings before professional law societies;
orders requiring reimbursement of expenses caused by false research.

In the disciplinary proceeding involving lawyer Javad Mazaheri, the negligent use of artificial intelligence contributed to increasing the complexity of the proceeding. The panel imposed costs of approximately CAD 31,150 in favor of the professional regulatory body.

20.3. International trend

The comparative international trend is clear:

the use of AI is not prohibited;
responsibility remains human;
failure to verify is subject to censure;
intentional misconduct may aggravate the violation but is not a prerequisite for every consequence;
prompt correction and transparency may mitigate the sanction;
an attempt to conceal the error aggravates responsibility;
false authorities undermine the integrity of justice.

21. THE OBJECTIVE COMPARISON

Element	Sanctioned lawyers	São Paulo judge
Use of AI	Acknowledged or inferred	Acknowledged
Nonexistent precedents	Yes	Yes
Failure to verify	Treated as a professional violation	Expressly acknowledged
Requirement of intent	Frequently unnecessary for a fine or referral to the Bar	Absence of intent used to dismiss the matter
Effect on the merits	Not always required	Alleged lack of effect used to avoid investigation
Consequence	Fine, bad-faith finding, costs, Bar referral, disciplinary proceedings	No disciplinary proceedings
“Learning” justification	Generally rejected	Accepted
Transparency	Proceedings and headnotes frequently public	Judge’s name and original case concealed

The difference is not merely quantitative.

It is a difference of principle.

For a lawyer, failure to review constitutes sanctionable negligence.

For a judge, the same failure to review was treated as a tolerable stage in the learning process.

22. THE FALSE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “JUDICIAL ERROR” AND “OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT”

It is correct to state that the Office of the Judicial Inspector cannot operate as an appellate tribunal to correct every mistaken interpretation of law.

This case, however, does not involve only an interpretive disagreement.

The question was not whether the judge correctly interpreted a real precedent.

The issue was the use of precedents that did not exist.

There is an essential difference between:

misinterpreting a real decision; and
representing an imaginary decision as real.

The first may constitute judicial error.

The second may constitute a lack of diligence, violation of the duty of truthfulness, noncompliance with AI-governance rules, and impairment of public confidence.

Automatically classifying the episode as a jurisdictional matter creates a zone of disciplinary immunity for any falsehood inserted into the reasoning of a judicial decision.

23. INTENT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE FOR EVERY FORM OF DISCIPLINARY LIABILITY

The absence of fraudulent intent is relevant to the determination of the appropriate sanction.

It does not necessarily eliminate the violation.

A rational disciplinary system distinguishes among:

an isolated clerical error that is immediately corrected;
ordinary negligence;
gross negligence;
repeated conduct;
deliberate blindness;
knowing falsity;
an attempt to conceal the conduct.

The commencement of disciplinary proceedings is not equivalent to a finding of guilt.

Its purpose is precisely to determine:

which tool was used;
who prepared the draft;
which prompts or instructions were entered;
how many precedents were false;
whether any verification was performed;
whether the decision was corrected;
whether the parties were formally notified;
whether other cases were affected;
whether the conduct was repeated;
whether confidential information was transmitted to an external system;
whether the tool was authorized by the court;
whether CNJ Resolution No. 615/2025 was violated.

Dismissing the matter before conducting that investigation means replacing fact-finding with a presumption of harmlessness.

24. PROPORTIONALITY DOES NOT MEAN IMPUNITY

The principles of reasonableness and proportionality do not require every error to result in the most severe sanction.

Nor do they authorize treating every judicial failure as irrelevant.

Between removal of the judge from office and outright dismissal of the complaint, several possible responses exist:

admonishment;
censure;
formal recommendation;
mandatory training;
auditing of decisions produced with AI assistance;
public retraction or correction;
notice to the affected parties;
review of other similar judicial acts;
temporary prohibition on the use of external tools;
a requirement that the use of AI be transparently documented;
binding institutional guidance.

Proportionality requires a graduated response.

It does not require the absence of any response.

25. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE DOES NOT MEAN JUDICIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

Judicial independence protects judges against improper pressure.

It does not protect:

fabrication of sources;
technological negligence;
failure to verify;
irresponsible use of systems;
concealment of the decision-making method;
violation of procedural rights.

Judicial independence exists for the benefit of litigants and the rule of law, not as a personal privilege of the judge.

The greater the governmental power, the greater the responsibility governing its exercise.

26. VIOLATION OF EQUALITY, IMPARTIAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS

Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution guarantees equality before the law.

Article 37 subjects public administration to the principles of legality, impartiality, morality, publicity, and efficiency.

Although the legal regimes governing judges and lawyers are not identical, functionally equivalent situations must be assessed according to coherent standards.

The submission of a nonexistent legal authority creates the same epistemic risk regardless of who submits it:

a lawyer;
a prosecutor;
a public defender;
a court employee;
a trial judge;
an appellate judge;
a justice of a higher court.

When the system severely punishes a person who attempts to persuade a judge with false case law, but tolerates the judge’s reliance on the same falsehood in the judicial decision itself, it conveys the message that procedural truth depends on the official position of the person who makes the error.

This destroys legitimate confidence in institutional neutrality.

27. RISKS TO OBJECTIVE IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is not limited to the absence of a personal interest.

It also requires the public appearance of neutrality and equal treatment.

A reasonable observer may ask:

why the judge received institutional understanding;
why lawyers receive fines and disciplinary referrals;
why the judge’s name remained protected;
why the false decisions were not publicly identified;
why no transparent audit was conducted;
why the same Bar Association that files complaints against lawyers was unsuccessful when it requested an investigation of a judge.

The appearance of double standards is itself harmful to the legitimacy of the judiciary.

28. THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUDICIAL INSPECTOR AND THE SPECIAL BODY

The issue extends beyond the individual conduct of the judge.

By acknowledging the use of nonexistent case law and nevertheless dismissing the complaint on the ground that the judiciary is learning to use the technology, the court established an administrative precedent.

That precedent may be invoked in the future by other judges.

For the sake of consistency, lawyers could also argue:

that they were learning;
that the AI hallucinated;
that they lacked intent;
that the legal position could have been supported on other grounds;
that the false reference did not change the outcome.

If these arguments are rejected when raised by lawyers, the court must objectively explain why they were sufficient when raised on behalf of a judge.

Institutional credibility requires an answer.

29. NECESSARY MEASURES

In light of the public interest involved, the following measures would be justified:

29.1. Publication of the opinions

The São Paulo Court of Justice should make available, subject to legally required safeguards:

the opinion issued by Appellate Judge Silvia Rocha;
Concurring Opinion No. 87,263;
the full reasoning supporting dismissal of the matter.

29.2. Identification of the underlying judicial proceeding

The number of the original judicial proceeding should be disclosed unless a concrete and legally justified confidentiality order applies.

Even in a confidential case, it would be possible to anonymize the parties without concealing:

the procedural classification;
the judicial unit;
the content of the false authorities;
the nature of the error;
the corrective measures adopted.

29.3. Publication of the nonexistent precedents

The court must disclose:

which cases were fabricated;
which docket numbers were false;
which courts were improperly identified;
which legal propositions were attributed to the imaginary decisions.

29.4. Audit

Other decisions produced through the same method should be audited, while preserving the presumption of regularity but determining whether the conduct was repeated.

29.5. Notice to the parties

The parties to the original case should receive formal notice and an opportunity to request:

correction;
retraction;
a new adjudication;
reopening of a procedural deadline;
clarification;
preservation of technological records.

29.6. Equal disciplinary standards

The National Council of Justice and the courts should adopt a national protocol establishing equivalent standards for judges, lawyers, prosecutors, public defenders, and court personnel.

29.7. Documentation of AI use

Every judicial decision produced with substantial assistance from generative AI should contain an auditable internal record identifying:

the tool used;
the date;
the version;
the purpose;
the person responsible for the review;
confirmation that the sources were verified.

30. CONCLUSION

The problem is not the use of artificial intelligence.

The problem is the substitution of technological excuses for human responsibility.

When a lawyer submits nonexistent case law, courts correctly state that the tool did not sign the filing and that the professional is responsible for verifying its content.

The same principle must apply to judges.

AI did not sign the São Paulo judge’s decision.

AI does not exercise judicial authority.

AI possesses no decisional independence.

AI cannot impose obligations, restrict rights, or create res judicata.

The person who signed the decision was a state official invested with enormous constitutional authority.

For society to trust judicial decisions, it must have the minimum assurance that the cases cited in those decisions actually exist.

Dismissal without a transparent investigation, based on the assertion that “we are learning,” stands in direct contrast to the fines, findings of bad faith, and disciplinary referrals imposed on lawyers for the same errors.

Equality before the law cannot end at the door of the Office of the Judicial Inspector.

Judicial integrity requires a simple rule:

The same artificial intelligence cannot be treated as evidence of negligence when used by a lawyer and as a mere learning tool when used by a judge.

Without consistency, transparency, and accountability, technological innovation does not modernize justice.

It merely automates and expands its inequalities.

31. REFERENCES

31.1. São Paulo Court of Justice case

MIGALHAS. Judge cites nonexistent case law and the São Paulo Court of Justice imposes no punishment: “We are learning.” São Paulo, July 14, 2026. Available at:
https://www.migalhas.com.br/quentes/460324/juiz-cita-jurisprudencia-inexistente-e-corregedora-vota-contra-punicao
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

SÃO PAULO. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo [São Paulo State Court of Justice]. Agenda and Composition of the Special Body — July 1, 2026. Administrative proceeding No. 0000376-49.2026.2.00.0826. São Paulo, June 19, 2026. Available at:
https://www.tjsp.jus.br/OrgaoEspecial/Comunicados/Comunicado?codigoComunicado=70024&pagina=1
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

SÃO PAULO. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo [São Paulo State Court of Justice]. Results of the Special Body — July 1, 2026. Administrative proceeding No. 0000376-49.2026.2.00.0826. São Paulo, July 3, 2026. Available at:
https://www.tjsp.jus.br/OrgaoEspecial/Comunicados/Comunicado?codigoComunicado=71364&pagina=1
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

SÃO PAULO. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo [São Paulo State Court of Justice]. Agenda and Composition of the Special Body — July 8, 2026. Administrative proceeding No. 0000376-49.2026.2.00.0826. São Paulo, June 30, 2026. Available at:
https://www.tjsp.jus.br/OrgaoEspecial/Comunicados/Comunicado?codigoComunicado=70930&pagina=1
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

SÃO PAULO. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo [São Paulo State Court of Justice]. Results of the Special Body — July 8, 2026. Administrative proceeding No. 0000376-49.2026.2.00.0826. São Paulo, July 13, 2026. Available at:
https://www.tjsp.jus.br/OrgaoEspecial/Comunicados/Comunicado?codigoComunicado=71754&pagina=1
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

SÃO PAULO. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo [São Paulo State Court of Justice]. Special Body — Session of July 1, 2026. YouTube. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/@tjspoficial
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

SÃO PAULO. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado de São Paulo [São Paulo State Court of Justice]. Special Body — Session of July 8, 2026. YouTube. Available at:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LOKQsQIxolc
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

ORDEM DOS ADVOGADOS DO BRASIL — SEÇÃO DE SÃO PAULO [BRAZILIAN BAR ASSOCIATION — SÃO PAULO SECTION]. Studies on Virtual Hearings and Adjudications. São Paulo, 2026. Available at:
https://www.oabsp.org.br/upload/4232881259.pdf
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

31.2. Brazilian rules governing artificial intelligence and judicial responsibility

BRAZIL. Conselho Nacional de Justiça [National Council of Justice]. Resolution No. 615 of March 11, 2025. Establishes rules governing the development, governance, auditing, monitoring, and responsible use of artificial intelligence solutions in the judiciary. Brasília, Federal District: CNJ, 2025. Available at:
https://atos.cnj.jus.br/atos/detalhar/6001
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

BRAZIL. Conselho Nacional de Justiça [National Council of Justice]. National Code of Judicial Ethics. Brasília, Federal District: CNJ. Available at:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/codigo-de-etica-da-magistratura/
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

BRAZIL. Complementary Law No. 35 of March 14, 1979. Provides for the Organic Law of the National Judiciary. Brasília, Federal District: Office of the President of the Republic. Available at:
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp35.htm
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

BRAZIL. Conselho Nacional de Justiça [National Council of Justice]. The Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence in the Brazilian Judiciary. Brasília, Federal District: CNJ, 2024. Available at:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/cnj-relatorio-de-pesquisa-iag-pj.pdf
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

31.3. Brazilian decisions and cases involving lawyers

BRAZIL. Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 23ª Região [Regional Labor Court of the 23rd Region]. Regional Labor Court of Mato Grosso Fines Lawyer for Using False Precedents and Requests Investigation by the Brazilian Bar Association. Cuiabá, July 2026. Available at:
https://portal.trt23.jus.br/portal/noticias/trtmt-multa-advogado-por-uso-de-precedentes-falsos-e-solicita-apuracao-na-oab
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

PARANÁ. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado do Paraná [Paraná State Court of Justice]. Appellate decision in Case No. 0032636 — nonexistent precedents produced by artificial intelligence, bad-faith litigation, and referral to the Paraná Section of the Brazilian Bar Association. Curitiba, June 25, 2025. Available at:
https://portal.tjpr.jus.br/jurisprudencia/j/4100000032876741/Ac%C3%B3rd%C3%A3o-0032636-
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

PARANÁ. Tribunal de Justiça do Estado do Paraná [Paraná State Court of Justice]. Interlocutory Appeal No. 0147209-78.2025.8.16.0000 — improper use of artificial intelligence, nonexistent precedents, fine, and referral to the Brazilian Bar Association. Curitiba, 2026. Available at:
https://portal.tjpr.jus.br/jurisprudencia/j/4100000036373321/Ac%C3%B3rd%C3%A3o-0147209-78.2025.8.16.0000
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

BRAZIL. Tribunal Regional do Trabalho da 7ª Região [Regional Labor Court of the 7th Region]. Lawyer Who Fabricated Case Law Is Found Liable for Bad-Faith Litigation and the Case Is Referred to the Ceará Bar Association. Fortaleza, June 12, 2025. Available at:
https://www.trt7.jus.br/index.php/noticias/todas-as-noticias/15649-advogado-que-falsificou-jurisprudencia-e-condenado-por-litigancia-de-ma-fe-e-caso-vai-a-oab-ce
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

BRAZIL. Superior Tribunal de Justiça [Superior Court of Justice]. Decision Identifying Possible AI Defects in a Habeas Corpus Application Is Featured in STJ News. Brasília, Federal District, May 26, 2026. Available at:
https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/2026/26052026-Decisao-que-apontou-possiveis-falhas-de-IA-em-pedido-de-habeas-corpus-e-destaque-no-STJ-Noticias.aspx
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

BRAZIL. Justiça do Trabalho [Labor Judiciary]. Case No. 0000433-19.2025.5.06.0201 — artificial intelligence and the use of nonexistent precedents. Falcão System. Available at:
https://jurisprudencia.jt.jus.br/jurisprudencia-nacional/pesquisa/numero/0000433-19.2025.5.06.0201?abaSelecionada=acordaos
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

31.4. United States

UNITED STATES. United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d 443, No. 1:22-cv-01461-PKC, Document 54. New York, June 22, 2023. Available at:
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/new-york/nysdce/1%3A2022cv01461/575368/54/
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES. Utah Court of Appeals. Garner v. Kadince, 2025 UT App 88. Utah, May 22, 2025. Available at:
https://law.justia.com/cases/utah/court-of-appeals-published/2025/20250188-ca.html
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES. Supreme Court of the State of New York. Cassata v. Michael Macrina Architect, P.C., 2026 NY Slip Op 26014. New York, January 27, 2026. Available at:
https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2026/2026-ny-slip-op-26014.html
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES. Supreme Court of the State of New York. Torres v. Spraker, 2026 NY Slip Op 26077. New York, 2026. Available at:
https://law.justia.com/cases/new-york/other-courts/2026/2026-ny-slip-op-26077.html
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES. United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. McCarthy v. Drug Enforcement Administration, No. 24-2704. Philadelphia, March 27, 2026. Available at:
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca3/24-2704/24-2704-2026-03-27.html
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES. United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Fletcher v. Experian Information Solutions, No. 25-20086. New Orleans, February 18, 2026. Available at:
https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca5/25-20086/25-20086-2026-02-18.html
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES. Department of Justice. Executive Office for Immigration Review. Guidance Concerning Hallucinated or Erroneous AI-Generated Content in Filings. Washington, D.C., August 8, 2025. Available at:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1410621/dl?inline=
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

UNITED STATES. Department of Justice. Executive Office for Immigration Review. United States v. Gold Mountain, Inc., doing business as Casa de Oro No. 4, 22 OCAHO No. 1700. Washington, D.C., April 30, 2026. Available at:
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/media/1439181/dl?inline=
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

31.5. Canada and comparative law

CANADIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE. Do the Canadian Practical and Legal Frameworks on AI Meet the Needs of the Justice System? CanLII, 2025. Available at:
https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2025CanLIIDocs1958
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

CANADIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE. Artificial Intelligence & Criminal Justice: Cases and Commentary. CanLII, 2024. Available at:
https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2024CanLIIDocs3035
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

CANADIAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE. Artificial Intelligence & Criminal Justice: A Primer. CanLII, 2024. Available at:
https://www.canlii.org/en/commentary/doc/2024CanLIIDocs2727
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

CANLII BLOG. Mazaheri — Costs — Negligent and Irresponsible Use of Artificial Intelligence. Ottawa: CanLII. Available at:
https://blog.canlii.org/author/canliiadmin/
Accessed on: July 14, 2026.

AI CHATGPT TECHNICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS : THE CNJ’S NATIONAL NETWORK OF JUDGES WITH JURISDICTION OVER ORGANIZED CRIME: MONEY LAUNDERING, THE SALE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND THE NEED TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME WITHIN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM ITSELF

THE CNJ’S NATIONAL NETWORK OF JUDGES WITH JURISDICTION OVER ORGANIZED CRIME: MONEY LAUNDERING, THE SALE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS, AND THE NEED TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME WITHIN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM ITSELF

CNJ Holds First Meeting of the Network of Judges with Jurisdiction over Organized Crime

Post published: July 13, 2026
Post category: CNJ News / CNJ News Agency

Official source:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/cnj-realiza-primeira-reuniao-da-rede-de-magistrados-com-competencia-em-criminalidade-organizada/

The President of the National Council of Justice (CNJ) and of the Federal Supreme Court (STF), Justice Edson Fachin, will launch on Tuesday, July 14, the National Network of Judges with Jurisdiction over Organized Crime.

The inaugural meeting, from 10:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m., will mark the operational establishment of the Network, which brings together judges appointed by the State Courts of Justice and Federal Regional Courts, as well as auxiliary judges of the CNJ and of the National Office of the Inspector General of Justice.

At the meeting, the operating guidelines of the initiative and the structuring of joint actions to overcome the challenges posed by organized crime will be aligned.

In addition, the meeting intends to organize support mechanisms for the management of complex cases related to the subject.

Created by Ordinance No. 142/2026, the collegiate body has a collaborative and consultative nature and seeks to integrate judges into coordinated and strategic action by standardizing routines and protocols, strengthening institutional security, and encouraging innovation and continuing education, in order to consolidate the role of the Judiciary in confronting organized crime.

Last Wednesday, July 8, Justice Edson Fachin participated in the ceremony establishing the new State Courts specialized in Criminal Organizations and the Laundering of Assets, Rights, and Values of the São Paulo State Court of Justice.

The implementation of these units is a concrete response by the Judiciary to the advance of criminal factions in the country, strengthening the specialization of Criminal Justice with a public commitment to criminal jurisdiction and democracy.

During the event in São Paulo, the Justice emphasized that organized crime is not merely a public-security problem, but a threat to the Rule of Law, because it corrodes institutions, finances violence, and challenges the State’s capacity to ensure the effectiveness of Justice.

CNJ News Agency

Official source:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/cnj-realiza-primeira-reuniao-da-rede-de-magistrados-com-competencia-em-criminalidade-organizada/

Number of views: 269

Tags: Edson Fachin; organized crime; National Network of Judges with Jurisdiction over Organized Crime.

CNJ Creates National Network of Judges to Confront the Advance of Organized Crime in the Country

July 14, 2026
Post category: CNJ News / CNJ News Agency

Official source:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/cnj-cria-rede-nacional-de-magistrados-para-enfrentar-avanco-do-crime-organizado-no-pais/

The National Council of Justice launched, on Tuesday, July 14, 2026, the National Network of Judges with Jurisdiction over Organized Crime.

The initiative seeks to expand cooperation among judges throughout the country to confront increasingly sophisticated criminal organizations.

Created by CNJ Ordinance No. 142/2026, the National Network was established to promote the permanent exchange of experiences among judges working in criminal matters and to disseminate solutions developed in different regions of the country.

The initiative provides for the sharing of information, strategies, best practices, and continuing-education activities.

At the opening of the collegiate body’s first meeting, held at the headquarters of the National Council of Justice in Brasília, the President of the CNJ and of the Federal Supreme Court, Justice Edson Fachin, stated that organized crime now operates in complex ways through digital platforms, using cryptoassets, apparently lawful corporate structures, and electronic-betting markets to move illicit resources.

Fachin stated that the clandestine electronic-betting market has been used as an instrument by criminal organizations that engage in money laundering, concealment of assets, and the financing of crimes such as drug trafficking, smuggling, and corruption, in addition to having a strong transnational dimension.

“Confronting this phenomenon requires financial intelligence, cooperation among the Federal Revenue Service, the Council for Financial Activities Control (COAF), the Central Bank, the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the police, in addition to the tracing of cryptoassets. The State’s response to networked criminality necessarily requires a Justice system that is also articulated as a network,” he said.

The Justice announced that he would receive the Minister of Finance, Dario Carnevalli Durigan, in his chambers at the Supreme Court on July 15 to discuss the subject.

“The fight against organized crime, in its most sophisticated technological and financial expression, transcends the isolated action of any single institution,” Fachin added.

Protection and Independence

The President of the CNJ also warned about the risks faced by judges who work on cases related to organized crime.

According to Fachin, decisions concerning the freezing of assets, seizure of property, and investigative measures may make those professionals targets of threats, affecting their personal security and the independence of the Justice system.

“When fear interferes with the freedom to decide, the true target is the independence of the Judiciary and the Democratic Rule of Law itself,” he stated.

The creation of the Network also seeks to give greater speed and effectiveness to judicial proceedings, reduce the duplication of efforts among judicial units, and prevent the loss of evidentiary elements that are sensitive to the passage of time.

Among the group’s priorities is the technical improvement of the Judiciary’s understanding of the modus operandi of organized crime.

Topics to be studied and exchanged among participants include the tracing of digital assets, instant-payment systems, digital straw-man accounts used to conceal funds, and betting platforms licensed in countries or jurisdictions with weak regulation.

The Justice further stated that national protocols are expected to be developed with a view to possible jurisprudential and methodological standardization on the subject.

“The construction of a national protocol reduces possible asymmetries of treatment among judicial districts and federal judicial sections,” he stated. “It is through technical and institutional cooperation that we will build increasingly qualified responses for society.”

Text: Regina Bandeira
Editing: Beatriz Borges
Review: Ilana Arrais
CNJ News Agency

Macro-Challenge: Improvement of the Management of Criminal Justice

Number of views: 89

Tags: Edson Fachin; organized crime; National Network of Judges with Jurisdiction over Organized Crime.

FULL TEXT OF CNJ PRESIDENCY ORDINANCE NO. 142 OF MARCH 31, 2026

Judicial Branch

National Council of Justice

PRESIDENCY ORDINANCE NO. 142 OF MARCH 31, 2026

Establishes, within the National Council of Justice, the National Network of Judges with Jurisdiction over Organized Crime and provides for its composition, coordination, and operation.

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE (CNJ), in the exercise of his legal and regulatory powers, pursuant to Article 103-B of the Federal Constitution and the Internal Rules of the National Council of Justice, and having as its purpose the establishment, within the National Council of Justice, of the National Network of Judges with Jurisdiction over Organized Crime, as well as the regulation of its composition, coordination, and operation,

RESOLVES:

Article 1

The National Network of Judges with Jurisdiction over Organized Crime is hereby established within the National Council of Justice, and its composition, coordination, and operation are hereby regulated.

Sole paragraph. The Network has a collaborative, consultative, and technical-operational support character.

Article 2

The objectives of the Network are:

I — to promote integration and the exchange of experiences, protocols, and best practices;

II — to encourage the minimum standardization of routines, workflows, and indicators;

III — to support the implementation of national guidelines for the management of complex cases;

IV — to strengthen institutional security and the protection of sensitive data and information;

V — to encourage continuing education, innovation, and the responsible use of technologies;

VI — to coordinate with counterpart national and international networks and institutions, subject to legal areas of competence; and

VII — to encourage the performance of coordinated judicial acts, pursuant to CNJ Resolution No. 350/2020.

Article 3

The Network shall be composed of:

I — one judge, who shall act as the focal point of each State Court of Justice and Federal Regional Court and shall be appointed by the respective Presidency;

II — three auxiliary judges of the Presidency of the CNJ; and

III — one judge representing the National Office of the Inspector General of Justice.

Paragraph 1. Participation shall preferably be composed of judges serving in specialized judicial units or units with related jurisdiction, as well as judges with jurisdiction over criminal enforcement.

Paragraph 2. At least one of the judges appointed by the Presidency of the CNJ shall be a member of the Management Committee of the National System for the Security of the Judiciary.

Paragraph 3. The focal-point judge shall be responsible for communicating to the other judges in his or her area of activity the information and deliberations arising from the Network.

Paragraph 4. Each State Court of Justice and Federal Regional Court shall also appoint an alternate judge, who shall serve in the absence of the principal member.

Article 4

The Presidency of the CNJ shall appoint the coordinator of the Network from among its auxiliary judges, as well as an eventual substitute.

Article 5

The Coordination shall be responsible for:

I — preparing an annual work plan, goals, and schedule;

II — proposing guidelines, statements, and recommendations to the CNJ;

III — coordinating the creation of thematic working groups;

IV — supervising the collaborative platform and the repository of best practices in a secure digital environment;

V — promoting periodic meetings and educational events; and

VI — conducting technical visits.

Article 6

The responsibilities of the Network are:

I — to map judicial units with jurisdiction over organized crime and identify their needs;

II — to consolidate and disseminate operating protocols concerning precautionary measures, security and data confidentiality, chain of custody, interinstitutional cooperation, asset-securing measures, and asset recovery, in addition to other related subjects;

III — to propose indicators and monitoring panels;

IV — to support initiatives for the protection of judges and court employees;

V — to promote studies on judicial organization and the allocation of resources in complex cases; and

VI — to prepare, if necessary, a draft normative act to be submitted to the Presidency of the CNJ.

Article 7

The Network shall hold ordinary quarterly meetings and extraordinary meetings whenever convened by the Coordination.

Sole paragraph. Deliberations shall preferably be adopted by consensus.

Article 8

The Network may coordinate with the National School of the Judiciary, judicial schools, and other collaborating institutions, including public and private universities, for the development of continuing-education programs, as well as courses on the management of complex cases, national and international cooperation, money laundering, security and protective intelligence, technology, and digital security.

Article 9

Two CNJ employees shall be appointed to assist the Coordination.

Article 10

Meetings shall preferably be held remotely, although an in-person format may be adopted when necessary.

Article 11

Participation in the Working Group shall be voluntary and shall not entail additional budgetary expenses for the CNJ regarding the remuneration of members or collaborators.

Article 12

The Coordination shall submit an annual report to the Presidency of the CNJ.

Article 13

Omitted cases shall be decided by the Presidency of the CNJ.

Article 14

This Ordinance enters into force on the date of its publication.

Justice Edson Fachin

Document electronically signed by LUIZ EDSON FACHIN, PRESIDENT, on April 7, 2026, at 12:10 p.m., pursuant to Article 1, Paragraph 2, Item III, letter “b,” of Law No. 11,419/2006.

The authenticity of the document may be verified on the CNJ portal by entering verification code 2553427 and CRC code 33802774.

Case No. 06079/2026 — Document No. 2553427v11.

Official CNJ sources confirming the creation and launch of the Network:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/rede-nacional-do-judiciario-vai-fortalecer-combate-ao-crime-organizado/
https://www.cnj.jus.br/cnj-realiza-primeira-reuniao-da-rede-de-magistrados-com-competencia-em-criminalidade-organizada/
https://www.cnj.jus.br/cnj-cria-rede-nacional-de-magistrados-para-enfrentar-avanco-do-crime-organizado-no-pais/

PART II — AI CHATGPT TECHNICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS

1. The Central Institutional Contradiction

The creation of a national network of judges specializing in organized crime is, in principle, an important institutional development.

Money laundering, cryptoassets, electronic betting, shell companies, straw-man accounts, transnational structures, and the rapid movement of illicit assets cannot be effectively confronted through isolated and fragmented judicial action.

However, the institutional design contains a critical vulnerability:

The system is primarily structured to protect judges from organized crime and to strengthen judges’ power to investigate external criminal organizations, but the Ordinance does not expressly establish an independent mechanism for investigating the possibility that judges, court officials, prosecutors, lawyers, financial operators, registrars, businesspeople, or political agents may themselves become part of an organized criminal structure.

This is not a hypothetical risk.

Brazilian criminal investigations have already described alleged structures involving:

the payment of bribes to judges;
the negotiation or sale of judicial decisions;
the manipulation of judicial jurisdiction;
the use of intermediaries and lawyers;
land grabbing backed by judicial orders;
the concealment of illicit funds;
the acquisition of jewelry, artwork, luxury vehicles, and real estate;
false income-tax declarations;
straw-man accounts;
companies and apparently lawful transactions used to launder corruption proceeds.

The most important Brazilian example is Operation Faroeste.

2. Operation Faroeste: Sale of Judicial Decisions and Money Laundering

Operation Faroeste was launched to investigate an alleged scheme involving the sale of judicial decisions connected with land disputes and land grabbing in western Bahia.

According to official statements from the Superior Court of Justice and the Federal Prosecution Service, the investigated conduct included alleged:

active corruption;
passive corruption;
money laundering;
participation in a criminal organization;
payment of multimillion-real bribes;
sale of judicial decisions;
use of judges, appellate judges, lawyers, businesspeople, and intermediaries;
laundering through jewelry, artwork, luxury assets, false tax declarations, and straw-man bank accounts.

The STJ reported in 2019 that the alleged organization had a structured division of tasks and sought economic advantages through corruption and money laundering. It involved judges, appellate judges, court employees, businesspeople, and lawyers.

In 2020, the STJ described Operation Faroeste as investigating possible money laundering, corruption, criminal organization, and the sale of judicial decisions related to land grabbing and land disputes in western Bahia.

In February 2025, the Federal Prosecution Service stated that another indictment had been accepted in a case involving an alleged scheme for selling judicial decisions and that investigations pointed to the involvement of judges, appellate judges, lawyers, and rural producers.

In May 2026, the STJ accepted another indictment against two members of the Bahia Judiciary and businesspeople for alleged active and passive corruption and money laundering. The court emphasized that specific acts of corruption and laundering could be prosecuted separately from the broader allegation of participation in a criminal organization.

In July 2026, the Federal Prosecution Service reported that defendants would answer for alleged money laundering involving the concealment of the illicit origin of resources through the purchase of jewelry and artwork, false income-tax declarations, and the use of straw-man bank accounts.

Official sources:

https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/Ministro-ordena-prisao-de-desembargadora-do-TJBA-e-de-mais-dois-envolvidos-na-Operacao-Faroeste.aspx

https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/Operacao-Faroeste-Corte-Especial-analisa-no-dia-6-recebimento-de-denuncia-por-venda-de-decisoes-no-TJBA.aspx

https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/2026/13052026-Operacao-Faroeste-recebida-nova-denuncia-contra-magistradas-baianas.aspx

https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/procuradoria-geral-da-republica-pgr/noticias/operacao-faroeste-stj-recebe-nova-denuncia-contra-desembargadora

https://www.mpf.mp.br/o-mpf/unidades/procuradoria-geral-da-republica-pgr/noticias/operacao-faroeste-stj-recebe-denuncia-do-mpf-contra-juiza-e-desembargadora-da-bahia-por-corrupcao

Necessary legal qualification

The acceptance of a criminal indictment does not constitute a final conviction.

The defendants retain the presumption of innocence, the right to adversarial proceedings, and the right to a full defense.

Nevertheless, the official record is sufficient to establish the institutional proposition that the Brazilian State itself recognizes the concrete possibility of organized criminal structures operating through or within the Judiciary.

That possibility must therefore be incorporated into the regulatory design of any network created to confront organized crime.

3. How the Sale of Judicial Decisions Generates Money Laundering

The sale of a judicial decision ordinarily produces two interconnected criminal layers.

3.1 Predicate offense

The first layer is the underlying corruption offense, which may include:

passive corruption by the public official;
active corruption by the person offering or paying the advantage;
influence peddling;
extortion;
criminal organization;
obstruction of justice;
fraudulent alteration or suppression of evidence;
abuse of authority;
falsification or ideological falsehood;
fraud against the administration of justice.

3.2 Laundering of the proceeds

The second layer begins when the corrupt payment or the economic benefit produced by the decision must be concealed, disguised, converted, or reintegrated into the lawful economy.

Typical laundering methods include:

payments through lawyers, relatives, assistants, or front persons;
sham consulting contracts;
fictitious legal fees;
transfers through shell companies;
inflated or simulated purchase-and-sale transactions;
artwork, jewelry, vehicles, livestock, real estate, or agricultural commodities;
cryptocurrency wallets;
electronic-betting accounts;
offshore companies and trusts;
false loans;
cash purchases;
fragmented transfers;
straw-man accounts;
false tax declarations;
the transfer of assets to family members or associates.

Thus, the illicit sale of a decision is not exhausted when the judge signs the order.

It creates a financial chain that may extend through banks, companies, accountants, lawyers, registries, tax declarations, electronic platforms, and foreign jurisdictions.

4. The Judicial Decision Itself May Become an Instrument of Laundering

In conventional laundering, the offender attempts to give illicit money an appearance of lawful origin.

In judicial corruption, the judicial decision may perform a more sophisticated function: it can give an appearance of legality not only to the money but also to the underlying asset.

A corrupt order may be used to:

recognize fraudulent ownership;
validate a forged debt;
authorize the transfer of disputed land;
release frozen assets;
block the legitimate owner’s defense;
extinguish an investigation;
approve a fraudulent settlement;
confer procedural legitimacy on a nonexistent entity;
validate an auction or foreclosure based on false documents;
create an enforceable judicial title;
prevent access to evidence;
remove an honest judge or investigator;
manufacture res judicata in favor of the criminal enterprise.

In such cases, the laundering process becomes jurisdictional laundering or judicial laundering.

The decision itself operates as an apparent legal certificate transforming:

possession into ownership;
a forged debt into an enforceable debt;
criminal proceeds into apparently lawful assets;
an illegal transaction into a transaction protected by judicial authority.

That is why the sale of judgments is more serious than an isolated bribery offense. It weaponizes the coercive power and institutional legitimacy of the State.

5. International Treaties Binding Brazil

5.1 United Nations Convention against Corruption — UNCAC

Promulgated in Brazil by Decree No. 5,687 of January 31, 2006.

Official Brazilian text:
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2006/decreto/d5687.htm

United Nations treaty status:
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=18&mtdsg_no=xviii-14&src=treaty

The Convention is directly applicable to judicial corruption and money laundering.

Particularly relevant provisions include:

Article 11: measures to strengthen integrity and prevent opportunities for corruption among members of the Judiciary;
Article 15: bribery of national public officials;
Article 18: trading in influence;
Article 19: abuse of functions;
Article 20: illicit enrichment, subject to domestic constitutional principles;
Article 23: laundering of proceeds of crime;
Article 24: concealment;
Article 25: obstruction of justice;
Article 31: freezing, seizure, and confiscation;
Articles 46–49: mutual legal assistance, joint investigations, and special investigative techniques;
Articles 51–59: asset recovery.

UNCAC Article 11 is especially significant because it does not treat judicial independence as institutional immunity. It connects judicial independence with measures designed to strengthen integrity and prevent corruption.

Therefore:

Judicial independence protects adjudication from improper pressure; it does not protect a judge from independent criminal investigation where there are objective indications of bribery, influence peddling, illicit enrichment, concealment, or money laundering.

The Convention was promulgated internally through Decree No. 5,687/2006.

5.2 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime — Palermo Convention

Promulgated by Decree No. 5,015 of March 12, 2004.

Official Brazilian text:
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2004-2006/2004/decreto/d5015.htm

UNODC information:
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html

Ratification status:
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/ctoc/signatures.html

The Convention is directly relevant where judicial corruption operates through a structured group involving judges, lawyers, businesspeople, intermediaries, registrars, public employees, financial operators, or political agents.

Relevant provisions concern:

participation in an organized criminal group;
laundering of proceeds of crime;
corruption;
obstruction of justice;
confiscation and seizure;
international cooperation;
extradition;
mutual legal assistance;
joint investigations;
special investigative techniques;
protection of witnesses and victims.

Brazil incorporated the Convention through Decree No. 5,015/2004.

5.3 Inter-American Convention against Corruption

Promulgated in Brazil by Decree No. 4,410 of October 7, 2002.

Official Brazilian text:
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/2002/d4410.htm

OAS treaty text and status:
https://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_american_treaties_B-58_against_Corruption_signatories.asp

Brazil’s anticorruption page:
https://www.oas.org/juridico/english/bra.htm

The Convention recognizes that corruption:

undermines the legitimacy of public institutions;
harms society, public order, and justice;
obstructs comprehensive development;
requires coordinated international action.

It requires States to prevent, detect, punish, and eradicate corruption and to cooperate in investigations, prosecutions, and the tracing of assets.

Brazil signed the Convention on March 29, 1996, ratified it on July 10, 2002, and deposited the ratification instrument on July 24, 2002.

5.4 OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions

Brazil is a party to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention.

OECD Brazil monitoring page:
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/sub-issues/fighting-foreign-bribery/brazil-country-monitoring.html

Convention information:
https://www.oecd.org/en/topics/fighting-foreign-bribery.html

Phase 4 report concerning Brazil:
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/implementing-the-oecd-anti-bribery-convention-phase-4-report-brazil_fd55d063-en.html

Phase 4 follow-up:
https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-anti-bribery-convention-phase-4-follow-up-report-on-brazil_c392b81d-en.html

The Convention focuses primarily on the “supply side” of bribery in international business transactions. It is nevertheless indirectly relevant to:

bribery involving foreign officials;
transnational corporate structures;
offshore payments;
intermediaries;
fraudulent consulting contracts;
corporate accounting concealment;
the laundering of corruption proceeds.

The OECD has also issued warnings and recommendations concerning Brazil’s capacity and institutional independence in foreign-bribery enforcement.

5.5 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances — Vienna Convention of 1988

Promulgated by Decree No. 154 of June 26, 1991.

Official Brazilian text:
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/decreto/1990-1994/D0154.htm

Although initially centered on drug trafficking, the Convention was fundamental to the international development of money-laundering criminalization, confiscation, international cooperation, banking records, and asset tracing.

It is directly relevant when criminal organizations use judicial corruption to protect drug-trafficking assets or to obstruct confiscation and indirectly relevant to the broader evolution of anti-money-laundering law.

Brazil promulgated it through Decree No. 154/1991.

5.6 American Convention on Human Rights

Official OAS text:
https://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_b-32_american_convention_on_human_rights.htm

The Convention is indirectly but fundamentally related to the issue because judicial corruption destroys the guarantees of:

Article 8: the right to a hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal;
Article 25: the right to effective judicial protection;
equality before the law;
property rights;
personal liberty;
due process.

A judgment purchased through bribery cannot be regarded as an adjudication by an independent and impartial tribunal.

Formal judicial proceedings cannot cure a process whose result was secretly negotiated in advance.

5.7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

United Nations text:
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights

Article 14 guarantees a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal established by law.

The sale of a judgment violates the Covenant even where the outward appearance of ordinary procedure is maintained.

5.8 United Nations Convention against Corruption as the Most Direct Framework

Of all the instruments, UNCAC has the most direct relationship to the CNJ initiative because it simultaneously addresses:

judicial integrity;
corruption of public officials;
influence peddling;
abuse of functions;
laundering;
concealment;
obstruction;
confiscation;
international cooperation;
asset recovery.

The CNJ Network should therefore treat UNCAC Article 11 not as an abstract ethical recommendation but as a mandatory structural principle.

PART III — CORRELATED BRAZILIAN DEVELOPMENTS

6. The Expansion of Specialized Courts Is Important but Insufficient

The creation of specialized courts for criminal organizations and money laundering may improve:

technical expertise;
speed of asset-freezing orders;
analysis of complex financial evidence;
preservation of evidence;
interagency cooperation;
asset recovery;
understanding of cryptoassets and digital-payment structures.

However, specialization may also produce institutional risks where it is not accompanied by external controls:

excessive concentration of investigative and adjudicative power;
closed professional networks;
informal uniformity that suppresses independent analysis;
restricted access to information;
opaque judicial assignments;
institutional pressure to confirm investigative narratives;
internal protection of judges or prosecutors;
selective use of anti-organized-crime powers;
leakage of confidential information;
manipulation of jurisdiction;
surveillance or intimidation of critics, lawyers, witnesses, and journalists.

The solution is not to abandon specialization.

The solution is to combine specialization with:

objective and auditable case-assignment rules;
independent auditing;
disclosure of conflicts of interest;
mandatory recusal mechanisms;
financial-integrity screening;
external criminal investigation where judicial officials are implicated;
full chain-of-custody documentation;
protection for whistleblowers;
public statistics;
traceability of decisions and judicial assignments;
review by institutions that are not professionally dependent upon the investigated judge or court.

7. Protecting Judges Cannot Mean Shielding Judges

The CNJ’s concern for the security of judges facing threats from criminal organizations is legitimate.

Nevertheless, two different phenomena must not be confused:

Legitimate protection

Protection against:

death threats;
physical attacks;
intimidation;
retaliation;
doxxing;
coercion;
criminal surveillance;
attacks against family members.

Illegitimate shielding

Shielding against:

investigation of unexplained wealth;
examination of communications authorized by an independent court;
financial tracing;
disclosure of conflicts of interest;
investigation of repeated anomalous decisions;
criminal accountability;
public scrutiny;
disciplinary proceedings;
the investigation of intermediaries and relatives;
international cooperation.

Judicial independence is a guarantee belonging to society. It is not a private privilege of officeholders.

PART IV — UNITED STATES COMPARISON

8. The U.S. Public Integrity Model

The United States Department of Justice maintains a specialized Public Integrity Section, created to investigate and prosecute crimes affecting government integrity.

It handles sensitive and complex corruption cases involving federal, state, and local public officials.

Most importantly for this comparison, the Public Integrity Section states that it has exclusive jurisdiction within the Department of Justice over allegations of criminal misconduct by federal judges.

Official sources:

https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-pin

https://www.justice.gov/criminal/criminal-pin/about

The structural rationale is crucial.

A local United States Attorney’s Office may routinely appear before the same federal judges it would be required to investigate. This creates a real or apparent conflict of interest.

For that reason, official DOJ reports explain that allegations against federal judges are centralized in the Public Integrity Section to reduce appearance problems and to permit coordination with judges and magistrates from outside the affected district when search warrants, electronic surveillance, or grand-jury supervision are required.

This is a significant contrast with a model based primarily on internal judicial networks.

9. U.S. Criminal Statutes Commonly Used

Depending on the jurisdiction and the facts, U.S. judicial-corruption cases may involve:

18 U.S.C. § 201 — bribery of federal public officials and witnesses;
18 U.S.C. § 666 — bribery concerning programs receiving federal funds;
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 — mail and wire fraud;
18 U.S.C. § 1346 — schemes to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services;
18 U.S.C. § 1951 — Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right;
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957 — money laundering and monetary transactions in criminally derived property;
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 — RICO;
obstruction-of-justice statutes;
false-statement statutes;
tax offenses;
conspiracy;
asset forfeiture.

The DOJ identifies honest-services fraud, federal-program bribery, Hobbs Act extortion, and other statutes as important tools for prosecuting state and local public corruption.

10. “Kids for Cash”: Bribery, Judicial Decisions, and Money Laundering

One of the clearest U.S. examples is the Pennsylvania “Kids for Cash” scandal involving former judges Mark Ciavarella and Michael Conahan.

The case concerned payments connected with private juvenile-detention facilities and judicial conduct that sent juveniles into detention.

The federal prosecution included allegations or convictions involving:

racketeering;
racketeering conspiracy;
honest-services fraud;
money-laundering conspiracy;
tax offenses;
extortion;
bribery;
forfeiture of illicit proceeds.

The DOJ reported that Ciavarella was convicted on 12 counts, including racketeering, money-laundering conspiracy, honest-services mail fraud, and tax offenses, and that the jury ordered forfeiture connected with payments he received from the developer of juvenile-detention facilities.

Official source:

https://www.justice.gov/usao-mdpa/pr/us-court-appeals-upholds-ciavarella-s-conviction-and-sentence

Comparative significance

The U.S. case demonstrates the same structural sequence seen in allegations concerning the sale of decisions:

a public official controls adjudicative power;
a private economic interest benefits from the official act;
payments are concealed or disguised;
the judicial process is used to generate economic returns;
criminal charges reach both the corruption transaction and the laundering of its proceeds.

11. Judge David Daugherty and the Social Security Scheme

The DOJ prosecuted a former Social Security administrative law judge for participating in a scheme under which an attorney paid him in connection with the approval of disability-benefit cases.

According to the DOJ, the scheme caused the Social Security Administration to become obligated for more than USD 550 million in lifetime benefits based on cases approved by the judge, and the defendants faced conspiracy, fraud, false-statement, money-laundering, and related charges.

Official source:

https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/former-social-security-administrative-law-judge-sentenced-four-years-prison-role-550-million

This illustrates that the sale of adjudicative acts may involve not only conventional court judgments but also administrative adjudication.

12. Other U.S. Judicial-Bribery Cases

In 2015, a Puerto Rico Superior Court judge was convicted of conspiracy and bribery charges.

Official source:

https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/puerto-rico-superior-court-judge-convicted-conspiracy-and-bribery-charges-connection

In 2019, a Texas state district judge was convicted of bribery and obstruction.

Official source:

https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/texas-judge-convicted-bribery-and-obstruction

These cases demonstrate that judicial office does not remove criminal jurisdiction and that ordinary corruption statutes may be applied directly to judges.

13. Criminal Prosecution and Impeachment Are Distinct

In the United States, criminal investigation does not substitute for constitutional removal mechanisms.

A federal judge may be:

criminally investigated;
criminally prosecuted;
disciplined under judicial-conduct procedures;
impeached by the House of Representatives;
tried and removed by the Senate.

The Senate’s official historical materials explain its constitutional role in impeachment trials.

Official source:

https://www.senate.gov/about/powers-procedures/impeachment/overview.htm

This distinction is important:

Criminal liability protects society against crime; impeachment protects the constitutional order against continued occupation of office by an unfit official.

Neither mechanism should be treated as a substitute for the other.

PART V — BRAZIL–UNITED STATES TECHNICAL COMPARISON

14. Comparative Table

Issue	Brazil — CNJ Network	United States
Primary institutional design	Collaborative network of judges with jurisdiction over organized crime	DOJ/FBI criminal-investigation structure plus specialized Public Integrity Section
Principal emphasis	Coordination, protocols, security, case management, technology, asset recovery	Criminal investigation and prosecution of public corruption
Investigation of judges	Not expressly structured in Ordinance No. 142/2026	DOJ Public Integrity Section has exclusive jurisdiction within DOJ over alleged criminal misconduct by federal judges
Conflict-of-interest response	Ordinance does not create an independent external investigative mechanism	Centralized federal unit may avoid investigation by prosecutors who routinely appear before the implicated judge
Money laundering	Expressly included in training and operational protocols	Prosecuted through federal laundering statutes, forfeiture, RICO, wire/mail fraud, and related offenses
Sale of decisions	Not expressly identified in the Ordinance	Addressed through bribery, honest-services fraud, extortion, RICO, obstruction, and laundering statutes
Judicial security	Express and prominent priority	Protective measures exist, but are institutionally separate from criminal accountability
Oversight risk	Judicial self-networking may reproduce corporatism or internal shielding	Risks remain, but criminal investigation is formally placed within the Executive Branch, subject to courts, juries, and congressional mechanisms
Removal from office	Administrative-disciplinary procedures and constitutional rules	Judicial discipline plus House impeachment and Senate trial for federal judges
Main deficiency	No express protocol for investigating organized crime operating inside the Judiciary	Fragmentation among federal, state, disciplinary, and impeachment systems; continuing debate about independent judicial oversight

15. The Principal Structural Lesson from the United States

The strongest feature of the U.S. model is not that it eliminates corruption. It does not.

Its most useful structural principle is:

A judge should not ordinarily be criminally investigated solely by officials who repeatedly appear before that judge or who are professionally dependent upon the same local judicial structure.

Brazil should adopt an equivalent conflict-of-interest principle.

Where credible evidence implicates:

a judge;
an appellate judge;
a court president;
a court inspector;
a prosecutor;
a senior police official;
a court-appointed administrator;
a lawyer acting as an intermediary;

the investigation should be transferred to an independent team outside the institutional and territorial circle of professional dependence.

PART VI — NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS TO THE CNJ NETWORK

16. Express Inclusion of Internal Institutional Corruption

The CNJ should issue a supplementary normative act expressly recognizing that organized crime may:

threaten judges;
corrupt judges;
infiltrate court administrations;
use lawyers and court employees as intermediaries;
obtain confidential information;
manipulate electronic case assignment;
influence jurisdictional decisions;
purchase judicial orders;
launder money through judicially validated transactions;
use proceedings to dispossess victims or suppress evidence.

A network that studies only threats coming from outside the courthouse is incomplete.

17. Independent Investigative Protocol

The protocol should provide that, where there are objective indications involving a member of the Judiciary:

local officials who routinely appear before that judge must not control the investigation;
jurisdiction must be assigned through an auditable and predetermined mechanism;
search warrants, interception orders, and asset-freezing measures must be reviewed by judges outside the affected institutional circle;
investigators must examine both the decision and its financial consequences;
professional secrecy must not be manipulated to shield criminal intermediation;
financial records of relatives, front persons, companies, and intermediaries must be examined where legally justified;
investigators must compare unexplained wealth with declared income and professional history;
all investigative measures must preserve due process, legality, necessity, proportionality, and chain of custody.

18. Red-Flag Indicators of Possible Sale of Decisions

No single indicator proves corruption. A combination may justify independent verification.

Relevant red flags include:

repeated emergency decisions favoring the same economic group;
judicial orders contrary to settled facts without reasoned explanation;
intervention in cases outside normal assignment rules;
unexplained changes of judge or panel;
sealed proceedings without adequate justification;
suppression or disappearance of evidence;
refusal to hear material witnesses;
acceptance of obviously false, inconsistent, or nonexistent documents;
unusual contacts between judges and interested lawyers;
significant asset growth;
luxury goods incompatible with lawful income;
payments to relatives or affiliated companies;
fictitious consulting or legal-service agreements;
transfers immediately before or after a decisive order;
judicial validation of land titles, debts, auctions, or settlements benefiting the payer;
retaliatory proceedings against complainants, lawyers, or witnesses;
repeated use of institutional immunity to prevent investigation.

These indicators must trigger inquiry, not automatic guilt.

19. Financial Investigation Must Follow the Judicial Act

A technically adequate investigation should reconstruct:

who requested the decision;
who benefited from it;
what asset or legal position changed;
what communications occurred;
what intermediaries participated;
what funds moved before and after the order;
whether assets were placed in third-party names;
whether the judicial act created an apparently lawful basis for possession or ownership;
whether the decision impeded investigation or asset recovery;
whether similar decisions form a recurring pattern.

The relevant question is not merely: “Was money deposited into the judge’s account?”

It is:

“What direct or indirect economic benefit was generated, transmitted, concealed, converted, or protected through the exercise of judicial power?”

PART VII — FINAL CONCLUSIONS

20. Organized Crime Is Not Defined by the Social Status of Its Members

A criminal organization does not cease to be a criminal organization because its members wear robes, hold public office, possess law degrees, or operate through formally valid proceedings.

The defining elements are:

structure;
coordination;
continuity;
division of tasks;
pursuit of illicit advantage;
corruption or coercion;
concealment;
obstruction;
laundering of proceeds.

Where those elements are present, the correct legal object is not merely “judicial misconduct.”

It may be:

corruption;
money laundering;
influence peddling;
criminal organization;
obstruction of justice;
fraud;
extortion;
illicit enrichment;
laundering through judicial acts.

21. The Sale of a Judgment Is an Attack on the Rule of Law

Justice Fachin correctly stated that organized crime threatens the Rule of Law because it corrodes institutions and challenges the State’s capacity to ensure effective justice.

That proposition must be applied consistently.

When a criminal organization attempts to threaten a judge, it attacks the Rule of Law.

When a judge sells a decision, launders the proceeds, or knowingly gives judicial protection to a criminal enterprise, the attack is even more profound because the criminal act is committed through the institutional authority designed to stop it.

The courthouse becomes part of the criminal infrastructure.

22. Final Technical Assessment

The CNJ Network is a potentially valuable instrument for cooperation, financial intelligence, digital-asset tracing, asset recovery, and the management of complex criminal cases.

Its present design, however, is incomplete because it does not expressly establish:

an independent protocol for investigating judicial corruption;
conflict-of-interest rules for investigations involving judges;
a procedure for detecting the sale of judicial decisions;
mechanisms for tracing the proceeds of judicial corruption;
external auditing of specialized courts;
protection for whistleblowers and victims who report corruption within the Justice system;
public indicators concerning investigations, recusals, assignments, and asset recovery;
safeguards against criminal infiltration of the Judiciary itself.

The Network should therefore be supplemented by a National Protocol for the Investigation of Corruption, Money Laundering, Influence Peddling, and Organized Crime within the Justice System.

Without that addition, there is a danger that the Judiciary may become highly sophisticated in investigating external criminal organizations while remaining institutionally reluctant or structurally unable to investigate equivalent conduct committed within its own ranks.

That asymmetry would contradict:

the United Nations Convention against Corruption;
the Palermo Convention;
the Inter-American Convention against Corruption;
the American Convention on Human Rights;
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
the constitutional principles of legality, morality, impartiality, due process, equality, and effective judicial protection.

A Justice system truly articulated as a network must be capable not only of protecting honest judges from criminal organizations, but also of protecting society from criminal organizations that infiltrate, corrupt, or operate through the Justice system itself.

Pesquisar este blog

quarta-feira, 15 de julho de 2026

ALL ARTICLES ON THE BLOG CAN BE READ IN ANY LANGUAGE

IMPERDIVEL

Leitura de preparação do ambiente:

Livros de Emmanuel: Psicografia de Francisco Cândido Xavier:

Fonte Viva - Capítulo 112

Segue-me

Capítulo 32 - Atos 22:10

Que farei?

Tema principal

“Que farei?” — Paulo. (ATOS, 22.10)

Leitura do EVANGELHO SEGUNDO O ESPIRITISMO Aberto ao acaso "A PACIÊNCIA"

Estudo doutrinário Evangelho Segundo o Espiritismo

EXPOSITORA: ANA PAULA ASSAIFE

Evangelho Segundo o Espiritismo

FORA DA CARIDADE NÃO HA SALVAÇÃO :

Parábola do Festim das Núpcias

Qual é o maior mandamento ?

Amar a Deus sobre todas as coisas e amar ao próximo como a si mesmo

Parábola do Festim das Núpcias

Passes aos assistentes

Irradiação para pessoas encarnadas

Preces pelos desencarnados

Prece de encerramento e agradecimento

Avisos da casa

Comece o dia a Luz da Oração e da Proteção Divina

Referências:

Parábola do festim de bodas.

terça-feira, 14 de julho de 2026

AI ANALYSIS: JUSTICE FORGIVES A JUDGE WHO USED NONEXISTENT PRECEDENTS PRODUCED BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, WHILE LAWYERS ARE FINED, REPORTED TO BAR ASSOCIATIONS, AND SUBJECTED TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR THE SAME CONDUCT

JUSTICE FORGIVES A JUDGE WHO USED NONEXISTENT PRECEDENTS PRODUCED BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, WHILE LAWYERS ARE FINED, REPORTED TO BAR ASSOCIATIONS, AND SUBJECTED TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS FOR THE SAME CONDUCT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. THE CASE THAT EXPOSED DISCIPLINARY INEQUALITY

2. WHAT HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE

2.1. Number of the disciplinary proceeding

2.2. Adjudication on July 1, 2026

2.3. Final adjudication on July 8, 2026

2.4. Lawyers who acted in the appeals

The official source confirms proceeding No. 0000376-49.2026.2.00.0826, the opinion issued by Chief Judicial Inspector Silvia Rocha, the July 1 adjournment, the unanimous adjudication on July 8, and the participation of lawyers Rosana Gibowski and Thais Pires de Camargo Rêgo Monteiro.

TJSP · 2

Migalhas · 1

The addresses listed above were actually located and accessed during this research on July 14, 2026. Some judicial websites may subsequently change their routes, require a digital certificate or CAPTCHA, or block automated access.

2.5. Facts acknowledged by the Office of the Judicial Inspector itself

3. WHAT STILL REMAINS CONCEALED

4. THE SÃO PAULO COURT OF JUSTICE’S JUSTIFICATION: “WE ARE LEARNING”

5. THE LEGAL ISSUE IS NOT LIMITED TO THE JUDGE’S INTENT

6. NONEXISTENT PRECEDENTS ARE NOT RHETORICAL ORNAMENTS

7. THE UNDERLYING CASE CANNOT BE DEEMED IRRELEVANT WITHOUT PUBLIC SCRUTINY

8. THE DENIAL OF ORAL ARGUMENT AND THE POSSIBLE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD

9. THE JUDGE’S PERSONAL AND NONDELEGABLE RESPONSIBILITY

10. CNJ RESOLUTION NO. 615/2025

11. THE NATIONAL CODE OF JUDICIAL ETHICS

12. LOMAN AND JUDGES’ OFFICIAL DUTIES

13. THE TREATMENT IMPOSED ON LAWYERS IN BRAZIL

14. REGIONAL LABOR COURT OF THE 23RD REGION: FINE AND REFERRAL TO THE BRAZILIAN BAR ASSOCIATION

Summary of the holding

15. PARANÁ COURT OF JUSTICE: BAD-FAITH LITIGATION AND REFERRAL TO THE BRAZILIAN BAR ASSOCIATION

Essential headnote — Paraná Court of Justice

16. REGIONAL LABOR COURT OF THE 7TH REGION: FALSE CASE LAW AND VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL ETHICS

Summary of the holding

17. SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE: REFERRAL TO THE BRAZILIAN BAR ASSOCIATION BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE AI HALLUCINATIONS

18. THE LEADING UNITED STATES PRECEDENT: MATA v. AVIANCA

Central passage of the decision

19. OTHER UNITED STATES PRECEDENTS

20. UNITED KINGDOM, CANADA, AND OTHER COUNTRIES

20.1. United Kingdom

20.2. Canada

20.3. International trend

21. THE OBJECTIVE COMPARISON

22. THE FALSE DISTINCTION BETWEEN “JUDICIAL ERROR” AND “OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT”

23. INTENT IS NOT A PREREQUISITE FOR EVERY FORM OF DISCIPLINARY LIABILITY

24. PROPORTIONALITY DOES NOT MEAN IMPUNITY

25. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE DOES NOT MEAN JUDICIAL IRRESPONSIBILITY

26. VIOLATION OF EQUALITY, IMPARTIAL PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS

27. RISKS TO OBJECTIVE IMPARTIALITY

28. THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUDICIAL INSPECTOR AND THE SPECIAL BODY

29. NECESSARY MEASURES

29.1. Publication of the opinions

29.2. Identification of the underlying judicial proceeding