JUDICIAL CORRUPTION EXPOSED:
OPERATION FAROESTE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DUTY TO INVESTIGATE
WHY MUST VICTIMS PROVE WHAT ONLY THE STATE HAS THE POWER TO UNCOVER?
Brazil — October 29, 2026
ABSTRACT
On October 21, 2026, the Special Court of Brazil's Superior Court
of Justice (STJ) convicted five defendants in a criminal case arising
from Operation Faroeste, an investigation into the commercialization
of judicial decisions involving land disputes in the State of Bahia.
Among those convicted were former Bahia Court of Justice President
Maria do Socorro Barreto Santiago, sentenced to 14 years and
11 months of imprisonment, and retired Judge Sérgio Humberto
de Quadros Sampaio, sentenced to 15 years and eight months.
Six days later, on October 27, 2026, the National Council of Justice
(CNJ) imposed disciplinary sanctions on five judicial officers
and proposed their definitive removal from office.
The case raises a fundamental constitutional question:
How can ordinary citizens and private attorneys be expected
to investigate and prove judicial corruption when the evidence
necessary to establish criminal responsibility can only be
obtained through investigative powers entrusted to the State?
Operation Faroeste provides a concrete example of why judicial
independence cannot be confused with immunity from criminal
investigation and why victims cannot be required to perform
the constitutional responsibilities of law enforcement authorities
and public prosecutors.
1. OPERATION FAROESTE: JUDICIAL DECISIONS SOLD FOR BRIBES
On October 21, 2026, the Special Court of the Superior Court
of Justice unanimously convicted five defendants in Criminal
Action No. 985 (APn 985), arising from Operation Faroeste.
The investigation revealed a scheme involving land grabbing,
the commercialization of judicial decisions, corruption,
and money laundering in western Bahia.
According to the STJ, judicial decisions concerning the blocking
and cancellation of land registrations were used to place
agricultural producers in a position of legal vulnerability.
Facing the possibility of losing their properties, producers
were pressured into entering into multimillion-real agreements
that financially benefited individuals involved in the scheme.
Part of the resulting proceeds was used to pay unlawful
advantages to judicial officials.
The STJ's official report explains that the investigation,
initially focused on specific irregularities, gradually
uncovered an organized structure that exploited judicial
authority for unlawful economic gain.
Source:
Operation Faroeste: STJ Special Court Convicts Judges for Selling Judicial Decisions in Bahia
In a unanimous ruling, the Special Court of Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice (STJ) convicted judges and businesspeople involved in a scheme to sell judicial decisions at the Court of Justice of Bahia (TJBA). The decision was issued on Wednesday, October 21, in the first merits judgment of the criminal case stemming from Operation Faroeste, an investigation launched in 2019.
Judge Maria do Socorro Barreto Santiago was sentenced to 14 years and 11 months in prison, initially under a closed regime, for passive corruption and money laundering. Retired judge Sérgio Humberto de Quadros Sampaio was sentenced to 15 years and 8 months in prison, also initially under a closed regime, for the same offenses.
The panel also ordered the loss of public office for both magistrates. In Sérgio Sampaio’s case, the sanction was converted into the revocation of his compulsory retirement.
In the same session, the Special Court convicted businessman Adailton Maturino dos Santos (21 years and 7 months in prison), his wife, Geciane Souza Maturino dos Santos (16 years and 4 months), and lawyer Ricardo Augusto Três (10 years and 9 months) for active corruption and money laundering. All sentences are to be served initially under a closed regime.
The panel acquitted Amanda Santiago Andrade Sousa, Valdete Aparecida Stresser, and Márcio Duarte Miranda due to insufficient evidence of their participation in the crimes.
The court also rejected a request by the Federal Public Prosecutor’s Office (MPF) for the defendants to be ordered to pay joint and several compensation for collective moral damages to the legal order and to public trust in institutions.
The scheme
According to Reporting Justice Og Fernandes, the investigations in Operation Faroeste revealed a sophisticated scheme involving land grabbing and the sale of judicial decisions linked to land conflicts in western Bahia.
“What initially appeared to be a one-off investigation gradually revealed an organized structure designed to use the judicial system as a tool for obtaining undue economic advantages,” he said.
The justice noted that court decisions issued in exchange for bribes—such as orders to freeze and annul property registrations—significantly altered the legal status of rural producers in the region, who became irregular occupants of areas claimed by members of the criminal scheme.
Og Fernandes pointed out that, fearing the permanent loss of their land, producers were forced into multi-million-dollar agreements to allocate their production to the interested group, which then diverted part of the money to pay undue advantages to those responsible for the court decisions.
The scheme involved a vulnerable person used as a “front” and even a fake consul from Guinea-Bissau. According to the reporting justice, Adailton Maturino dos Santos falsely presented himself as a consul of Guinea-Bissau to gain prestige, expand his access to institutions, and move within social and political circles connected to the TJBA leadership. This false official status, the justice said, was used to enable corrupt practices.
The scheme allegedly began with a promise to provide legitimacy to a tire repairman’s claim to become the owner of extensive rural areas in Bahia. The same action was later replicated in the region known as Fazenda do Estrondo, in the municipality of Formosa do Rio Preto (BA).
Conduct of the magistrates
Turning to Judge Maria do Socorro Barreto Santiago, Og Fernandes described the conduct attributed to her as “extremely damaging.”
“The sale of judicial acts in the context of highly significant economic litigation has led to severe social distrust and a serious blow to the respectability and credibility of the judicial services provided by the TJBA before the community and the producing market of western Bahia,” he stated.
Regarding retired judge Sérgio Sampaio, the reporting justice highlighted his leadership in a scheme to conceal illicit funds obtained through the sale of court decisions. The scheme involved third parties, including his brother-in-law and a socially vulnerable individual in whose name a bank account was opened to serve as a conduit for the bribes.
According to the justice, the clandestine nature of the scheme was reinforced by the discovery of deleted messages on seized cell phones containing conversations about depositing sums of money in exchange for favorable rulings. Another point highlighted by the reporting justice was the seizure, in the judge’s possession, of the bank card of the vulnerable person used as a front.
Related case: APn 985
Source: Superior Tribunal de Justiça (STJ), updated October 22, 2026.
Read the original release: STJ official news article
Official STJ report:
https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/2026/21102026-Operacao-Faroeste-Corte-Especial-condena-magistrados-por-venda-de-decisoes-judiciais-na-Bahia.aspx
2. THE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS OF OCTOBER 21, 2026
The STJ imposed the following prison sentences:
| Defendant |
Sentence |
|
Adailton Maturino dos Santos
|
21 years and 7 months
|
|
Geciane Souza Maturino dos Santos
|
16 years and 4 months
|
|
Sérgio Humberto de Quadros Sampaio
|
15 years and 8 months
|
|
Maria do Socorro Barreto Santiago
|
14 years and 11 months
|
|
Ricardo Augusto Três
|
10 years and 9 months
|
The two judicial officers were convicted of passive corruption
and money laundering. The other three defendants were convicted
of active corruption and money laundering.
All five received sentences under an initially closed
prison regime.
The Court also ordered the loss of public office by the two
judicial officers. In Sérgio Humberto's case, the sanction
was converted into the revocation of his compulsory retirement.
Three additional defendants were acquitted because the Court
found insufficient evidence of their participation in the
criminal conduct.
The STJ also rejected the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office's
request for collective moral damages.
The criminal judgment must be distinguished from a final,
unappealable conviction. The applicable consequences of the
judgment remain subject to the procedural rules governing
appeals and finality.
3. HOW THE JUDICIAL CORRUPTION SCHEME OPERATED
According to the October 21, 2026 report published by Migalhas,
the criminal case involved a land dispute between the Castro
family and the Horita Group concerning approximately
405,000 hectares associated with land registration No. 736,
in the Fazenda Estrondo region of Formosa do Rio Preto, Bahia.
In December 2017, Judge Sérgio Humberto ordered the blocking
of land registration No. 736.
The measure was suspended by a duty judge in February 2018.
In March 2018, appellate judge Maria do Socorro Barreto
Santiago reinstated the restriction.
According to the prosecution's case, these judicial acts
were part of a strategy designed to pressure agricultural
producers into entering into financially advantageous
agreements with the interested group.
The reporting justice, Og Fernandes, emphasized an essential
legal distinction:
The criminal proceedings were not intended merely to determine
whether the underlying land decisions were legally correct.
The question was whether judicial authority had been exercised
in exchange for unlawful financial advantages.
A judicial decision does not have to be manifestly unlawful
for its commercialization to constitute corruption.
This distinction is crucial to understanding judicial corruption.
A decision may contain apparently plausible legal reasoning
and nevertheless have been influenced by the receipt of a bribe.
Conversely, an incorrect or poorly reasoned judicial decision
does not, by itself, establish that its author committed
a criminal offense.
The criminal investigation must establish the elements of
the offense through legally admissible evidence.
Migalhas — October 21, 2026:
https://www.migalhas.com.br/quentes/466931/operacao-faroeste-stj-condena-magistrados-da-ba-por-venda-de-decisoes
4. THE FINANCIAL EVIDENCE: WHY THE INVESTIGATION WAS ESSENTIAL
The STJ examined evidence concerning financial transactions,
communications, intermediaries, and the concealment of illicit
payments.
According to the Court's official account, the scheme included
the use of third parties to conceal the receipt and destination
of money obtained through the commercialization of judicial
decisions.
In the case of Judge Sérgio Humberto, the reporting justice
described the use of a bank account opened in the name of
a socially vulnerable individual.
A bank card associated with that account was found
in the judge's possession.
Investigators also recovered electronic messages related
to financial transactions and judicial decisions.
Regarding Maria do Socorro, the October 21 Migalhas report
describes financial operations allegedly used to conceal
an unlawful payment associated with the settlement of
a real estate debt.
The reporting justice considered a purported loan of
R$400,000 from her brother to have been simulated.
These findings illustrate a fundamental investigative reality:
Evidence of judicial corruption may exist outside the judicial
record, concealed in financial transactions, private
communications, third-party accounts, and electronic devices.
Ordinary citizens cannot lawfully compel banks to disclose
protected financial records.
Private attorneys cannot independently authorize searches,
seizures, or compulsory access to protected communications.
Such measures require the intervention of competent public
authorities and, where applicable, prior judicial authorization.
5. HOW THE INVESTIGATIONS BEGAN
The origins of Operation Faroeste predate the police operation
launched in November 2019.
According to the National Council of Justice, the investigations
that gave rise to the operation date back to 2015, within
the Public Prosecutor's Office of the State of Bahia.
The original inquiries concerned suspected irregularities
in land ownership and registration in western Bahia.
As the investigations progressed, evidence emerged concerning
possible involvement by members of the judiciary and other
individuals.
The matter subsequently involved the Federal Police,
the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office, and the Superior
Court of Justice.
On November 19, 2019, the Federal Police launched
Operation Faroeste.
On May 6, 2020, the Special Court of the STJ accepted
criminal charges against judicial officers and other
individuals investigated in connection with the scheme.
The proceedings involved former presidents of the Bahia
Court of Justice, appellate judges, trial judges,
businesspeople, attorneys, and public employees.
Additional criminal proceedings followed as investigators
examined different alleged offenses and participants.
The investigation ultimately led to the criminal convictions
announced on October 21, 2026.
The available official sources establish that the investigative
history began in 2015. They do not conclusively identify
the individual who first reported the suspected offenses.
Official STJ report — May 6, 2020:
https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/Operacao-Faroeste-recebida-denuncia-contra-desembargadores-do-TJBA-e-mais-11-pessoas.aspx
6. OCTOBER 27, 2026: THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE IMPOSES DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS
On October 27, 2026, the National Council of Justice
unanimously upheld disciplinary charges against five
judicial officers of the Bahia Court of Justice.
The decision was delivered during the CNJ's
17th Ordinary Session of 2026.
The disciplinary proceeding was registered under
No. 0007029-33.2020.2.00.0000.
The reporting councilor was Rodrigo Badaró.
The five sanctioned judicial officers were:
- José Olegário Monção Caldas;
- Maria da Graça Osório Pimentel Leal;
- Maria do Socorro Barreto Santiago;
- Marivalda Almeida Moutinho;
- Sérgio Humberto de Quadros Sampaio.
The CNJ imposed the disciplinary sanction of placement
on availability, accompanied by a proposal for definitive
removal from judicial office.
Under the procedure described by the CNJ, the Office of
the Attorney General of the Union must bring the appropriate
judicial action before the Supreme Federal Court.
The CNJ announced a 30-day period for that action.
The disciplinary proceedings examined violations of judicial
duties, including impartiality, integrity, independence,
prudence, dignity, honor, and professional decorum.
The reporting councilor's opinion comprised 101 pages.
The CNJ dismissed the disciplinary accusations against
Judge Márcio Reinaldo Miranda Braga.
It also declared the disciplinary proceedings against
former appellate judge Gesivaldo Nascimento Britto
extinguished because of his death.
The disciplinary decision must not be confused with
the criminal judgment delivered by the STJ six days earlier.
The two proceedings have different legal purposes,
standards, and consequences.
Official CNJ report:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/cinco-magistrados-do-tjba-sao-penalizados-pelo-cnj-por-envolvimento-na-operacao-faroeste/
Migalhas — October 27, 2026:
https://www.migalhas.com.br/quentes/467336/cnj-pune-5-magistrados-por-venda-de-decisoes-e-propoe-perda-dos-cargos
7. THE CNJ'S DISCIPLINARY FINDINGS
7.1. José Olegário Monção Caldas
According to the October 27 Migalhas report, the reporting
councilor examined José Olegário's support for maintaining
Ordinance CCI-105/15, contrary to a technical opinion.
The disciplinary analysis also addressed contacts with
individuals connected to the investigated scheme and
financial movements amounting to approximately
R$22.3 million.
7.2. Maria da Graça Osório Pimentel Leal
The CNJ examined the participation of the judge's niece,
who had no official employment relationship, in activities
associated with the judicial chambers.
The proceedings also addressed a decision involving land
registration No. 1,037, contacts with investigated individuals,
and financial transactions lacking adequate documentary
justification.
7.3. Maria do Socorro Barreto Santiago
The disciplinary proceedings examined the appointment
of Sérgio Humberto without submission to the Full Court,
as well as conduct concerning land registrations,
contacts with investigated individuals, and suspicious
financial transactions.
The reporting councilor also referred to a Rolex watch
valued at approximately R$500,000 which, according to
the accusation, had been provided by Adailton Maturino.
The analysis further addressed alleged interference
with investigative measures and communications involving
court employees.
7.4. Marivalda Almeida Moutinho
The CNJ examined irregularities concerning her judicial
appointment, decisions favoring interested parties,
and her handling of a challenge to her own impartiality.
The reporting councilor also addressed allegations
of external participation in drafting judicial decisions.
7.5. Sérgio Humberto de Quadros Sampaio
The disciplinary analysis addressed judicial decisions
issued after the CNJ had suspended an administrative
measure concerning land possession.
According to the reporting councilor, a similar result
was subsequently obtained through judicial proceedings
in a case that had remained inactive for approximately
32 years.
The decision reportedly imposed a daily fine
of R$100,000.
The proceedings also examined financial movements
exceeding R$14 million and the use of accounts
and assets registered in the names of third parties.
8. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
HOW CAN THE STATE EXPECT A CITIZEN OR A PRIVATE ATTORNEY
TO UNCOVER A COMPLEX JUDICIAL CORRUPTION SCHEME WITHOUT
THE INVESTIGATIVE POWERS OF THE POLICE AND THE PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE?
The answer is straightforward:
The Brazilian Constitution does not impose that burden
on ordinary citizens or private attorneys.
The Constitution assigns criminal investigation and public
prosecution responsibilities to competent State institutions.
Citizens may report suspected crimes, submit documents,
identify witnesses, and request investigations.
They cannot be required to exercise investigative powers
that the law reserves to public authorities.
9. ARTICLE 144: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE POLICE
Article 144 of the Brazilian Federal Constitution establishes
the constitutional framework governing public security.
Under Article 144, paragraph 1, the Federal Police exercises
investigative functions within its constitutionally defined
jurisdiction.
The Federal Police also exercises the exclusive functions
of judicial police of the Union.
Not every suspected offense committed by a state judicial
officer automatically falls within federal police jurisdiction.
The competent authority must be identified according
to the nature of the offense and the applicable
jurisdictional rules.
Nevertheless, where the investigation falls within
federal jurisdiction, the State cannot require
the complainant to perform the investigative functions
of the Federal Police.
10. ARTICLE 129(I): THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE IS THE HOLDER OF PUBLIC CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
Article 129(I) of the Federal Constitution assigns
the Public Prosecutor's Office the institutional function
of initiating public criminal prosecutions, as provided by law.
This constitutional arrangement is fundamental
to the rule of law.
The prosecution of serious criminal offenses cannot
depend exclusively on a victim's financial resources,
technical knowledge, or ability to hire private investigators.
The Public Prosecutor's Office must assess criminal
complaints and determine the legally appropriate
measures within its jurisdiction.
It is not constitutionally acceptable to transform
the citizen's right to report suspected criminal conduct
into an obligation to conduct a complete criminal
investigation before requesting State intervention.
11. ARTICLE 129(VIII): THE POWER TO REQUEST INVESTIGATIVE MEASURES
Article 129(VIII) authorizes the Public Prosecutor's Office
to request investigative measures and the initiation
of police investigations, stating the legal grounds
for such requests.
This power is particularly important when suspected
criminal conduct involves public officials or members
of the judiciary.
Evidence may be concealed in financial transactions,
electronic communications, business arrangements,
or accounts maintained in the names of intermediaries.
The authorities must assess whether the available
information provides sufficient grounds for
investigative measures.
Not every accusation automatically requires
the opening of a criminal investigation.
However, the absence of evidence that only public
investigators could lawfully obtain cannot, by itself,
justify imposing an impossible evidentiary burden
on the complainant.
12. ARTICLE 5(XXXIV): THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF PETITION
Article 5(XXXIV) guarantees the right to petition
public authorities in defense of rights or against
illegality or abuse of power.
This constitutional guarantee belongs to citizens.
It is not conditioned upon their ability to prove
every element of a criminal offense.
A citizen may report facts suggesting judicial
corruption and request action by the competent authorities.
The authorities must then examine the complaint
according to the applicable legal requirements.
13. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL OF THE REPUBLIC
The Prosecutor General of the Republic heads
the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Union.
However, the Prosecutor General does not personally
conduct every criminal investigation involving
a member of the judiciary.
The competent prosecutorial authority depends
on the applicable jurisdictional and institutional rules.
In Operation Faroeste, the involvement of appellate
judges brought the proceedings within the original
criminal jurisdiction of the Superior Court of Justice,
subject to the applicable constitutional rules.
Article 105(I)(a) of the Constitution establishes
the STJ's original criminal jurisdiction over
specified authorities, including state appellate judges,
within the limits of the applicable legal framework.
The criminal charges examined by the STJ were
presented by the Federal Public Prosecutor's Office
through the competent prosecutorial structure.
This institutional arrangement is particularly
important when the alleged criminal conduct involves
members of the court system itself.
14. THE IMPOSSIBLE BURDEN OF PROOF IMPOSED ON VICTIMS
Consider a citizen who discovers that judicial decisions
contradict official property records, disregard relevant
evidence, violate procedural guarantees, or repeatedly
benefit the same economic interests.
Such circumstances may justify further examination,
depending on the evidence and context.
However, they do not necessarily establish bribery.
Proof of corruption may require financial records,
electronic evidence, witness testimony, forensic analysis,
and investigative measures unavailable to private citizens.
A citizen cannot independently compel a bank to disclose
another person's protected financial information.
A private attorney cannot lawfully seize a judge's
electronic devices or compel disclosure of private
communications without the appropriate legal process.
The investigation may therefore be necessary
to discover evidence that the complainant
could not otherwise obtain.
To refuse an investigation solely because the victim
cannot produce evidence accessible only through
State investigative powers creates a circular obstacle
to criminal accountability.
Operation Faroeste demonstrates why independent
criminal investigation is essential to uncovering
complex corruption schemes.
15. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IS NOT IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
Judicial independence protects the legitimate
exercise of judicial functions.
It does not authorize judges to receive unlawful
financial advantages in exchange for decisions.
Nor does it exempt judicial officers from criminal
responsibility for corruption, money laundering,
or other offenses.
The distinction between judicial error and judicial
corruption must remain clear.
An incorrect judicial decision does not automatically
establish corruption.
Equally, a legally plausible judicial decision
does not exclude corruption if it was issued
in exchange for an unlawful advantage.
The decisive issue is whether legally admissible
evidence establishes the elements of the criminal offense.
16. WHAT HAPPENS TO JUDICIAL DECISIONS AFFECTED BY CORRUPTION?
The conviction of a judge for corruption raises
an additional question concerning the validity
of judicial acts affected by criminal conduct.
Brazilian constitutional law guarantees due process,
the right to be heard, full defense, access to justice,
and the duty to provide reasoned judicial decisions.
These guarantees are protected by Articles 5
and 93(IX) of the Federal Constitution.
Where a specific judicial decision has been
contaminated by corruption, the affected party
may have grounds to seek its invalidation through
the legally applicable procedural mechanisms.
However, a judge's criminal conviction does not
automatically render every decision issued
during that judge's career legally nonexistent.
The appropriate remedy depends on the nature
of the proceedings, the evidence establishing
the connection between corruption and the
particular judicial act, and the applicable
procedural requirements.
The criminal accountability of a judge,
the invalidation of a judicial decision,
and compensation for harm suffered by victims
are legally distinct questions.
17. THE INSTITUTIONAL FAILURE THAT MUST BE PREVENTED
The fundamental danger exposed by Operation Faroeste
is not limited to individual judicial officers
accepting unlawful payments.
It concerns the possibility that organized
criminal conduct may operate through formally
issued judicial decisions, official registries,
professional intermediaries, and financial transactions.
When this occurs, the appearance of institutional
regularity may conceal criminal conduct.
A legal system cannot effectively address
such risks if every complaint is treated
as merely an expression of dissatisfaction
with an unfavorable judicial decision.
At the same time, the State must distinguish
documented indications of criminal wrongdoing
from unsupported accusations.
Independent investigation, due process,
and individualized accountability are therefore
essential components of judicial integrity.
18. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LESSON OF OPERATION FAROESTE
Operation Faroeste provides an important
paradigm for understanding the responsibilities
of the Brazilian State.
The investigation involved judicial officers,
attorneys, businesspeople, financial transactions,
land registrations, electronic communications,
and judicial decisions.
Its development required the participation
of public institutions possessing investigative
and prosecutorial authority.
The case demonstrates why the investigation
of complex judicial corruption cannot depend
exclusively on the efforts of victims
and their private attorneys.
Citizens possess the constitutional right
to report suspected criminal conduct.
The competent authorities possess the legal
responsibility to assess those reports and,
when the statutory requirements are met,
undertake appropriate investigative measures.
The Public Prosecutor's Office is responsible
for public criminal prosecution within
its jurisdiction.
The judiciary is responsible for adjudicating
criminal accusations independently,
impartially, and in accordance with due process.
19. CONCLUSION: THE STATE CANNOT DEMAND THAT VICTIMS DO ITS INVESTIGATIVE WORK
The convictions delivered by the Superior Court
of Justice on October 21, 2026, and the disciplinary
decision issued by the National Council of Justice
on October 27, 2026, demonstrate the importance
of effective mechanisms for investigating
and addressing judicial corruption.
The central constitutional question remains:
If uncovering a complex judicial corruption scheme
requires years of investigation, financial analysis,
electronic evidence, and the intervention of public
authorities, how can an ordinary citizen or
a private attorney reasonably be required
to discover and prove the same crimes alone?
The Constitution does not require citizens
to substitute themselves for criminal investigators
or public prosecutors.
Their role is to exercise their rights,
report suspected wrongdoing, and provide
the information available to them.
The State must fulfill its own constitutional
responsibilities through competent,
independent, and legally accountable institutions.
Judicial independence must protect impartial
adjudication, not institutional impunity.
The right to report judicial corruption must
be meaningful even when the complainant
does not possess the coercive powers
necessary to uncover concealed criminal evidence.
20. PRIMARY DOCUMENTS AND VIDEO RECORDINGS
20.1. STJ Criminal Action No. 985
Judgment delivered on October 21, 2026.
Reporting Justice: Og Fernandes.
Official report:
https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/2026/21102026-Operacao-Faroeste-Corte-Especial-condena-magistrados-por-venda-de-decisoes-judiciais-na-Bahia.aspx
The complete authenticated judgment was not available
for verification when this article was prepared.
Accordingly, the official news report is cited
as a summary of the judgment, not as a substitute
for its complete text.
20.2. CNJ Disciplinary Proceeding
Proceeding No. 0007029-33.2020.2.00.0000.
Reporting Councilor: Rodrigo Badaró.
Judgment: October 27, 2026.
Official session records:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/lista-de-processos-da-sessao/?sessao=944
20.3. Video of the CNJ Session
The disciplinary decision was delivered during
the 17th Ordinary Session of the CNJ,
held on October 27, 2026.
The official CNJ page providing access
to session recordings is:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/sobre-o-cnj/audiencias-e-sessoes/
The direct video URL for the specific judgment
had not been independently verified
at the time of publication.
REFERENCES
Bibliographic references formatted according to
the structure of ABNT NBR 6023:2018,
with English translations of the original
Portuguese titles.
1. BRAZIL. Superior Court of Justice (STJ).
Operation Faroeste: Special Court Convicts Judges
for Selling Judicial Decisions in Bahia.
Brasília, DF: STJ, October 21, 2026.
Available at:
https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/2026/21102026-Operacao-Faroeste-Corte-Especial-condena-magistrados-por-venda-de-decisoes-judiciais-na-Bahia.aspx
.
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Operation Faroeste: Criminal Charges Accepted
Against Appellate Judges of the Bahia Court
of Justice and 11 Other Individuals.
Brasília, DF: STJ, May 6, 2020.
Available at:
https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/Operacao-Faroeste-recebida-denuncia-contra-desembargadores-do-TJBA-e-mais-11-pessoas.aspx
.
Accessed on: October 29, 2026.
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Five Judicial Officers from the Bahia Court
of Justice Are Disciplined for Involvement
in Operation Faroeste.
Brasília, DF: CNJ, October 27, 2026.
Available at:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/cinco-magistrados-do-tjba-sao-penalizados-pelo-cnj-por-envolvimento-na-operacao-faroeste/
.
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October 27, 2026.
Brasília, DF: CNJ, 2026.
Available at:
https://www.cnj.jus.br/lista-de-processos-da-sessao/?sessao=944
.
Accessed on: October 29, 2026.
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Operation Faroeste: Superior Court of Justice
Convicts Bahia Judges for Selling Judicial Decisions.
Migalhas, October 21, 2026.
Available at:
https://www.migalhas.com.br/quentes/466931/operacao-faroeste-stj-condena-magistrados-da-ba-por-venda-de-decisoes
.
Accessed on: October 29, 2026.
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National Council of Justice Punishes Five Bahia
Judges for Selling Judicial Decisions and Proposes
Their Removal from Office.
Migalhas, October 27, 2026.
Available at:
https://www.migalhas.com.br/quentes/467336/cnj-pune-5-magistrados-por-venda-de-decisoes-e-propoe-perda-dos-cargos
.
Accessed on: October 29, 2026.
7. BRAZIL.
Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil
of 1988.
Brasília, DF: Presidency of the Republic, 1988.
Articles 5, 93, 105, 129, and 144.
Available at:
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicao.htm
.
Accessed on: October 29, 2026.
8. BRAZIL.
Complementary Law No. 35 of March 14, 1979:
Organic Law of the National Judiciary (LOMAN).
Brasília, DF: Presidency of the Republic, 1979.
Available at:
https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/lcp/lcp35.htm
.
Accessed on: October 29, 2026.
9. BRAZIL. National Council of Justice (CNJ).
Code of Ethics of the National Judiciary:
Resolution No. 60 of September 19, 2008.
Brasília, DF: CNJ, 2008.
Available at:
https://atos.cnj.jus.br/atos/detalhar/127
.
Accessed on: October 29, 2026.
10. BRAZIL. Superior Court of Justice (STJ).
STJ News Highlights the First Convictions
in Operation Faroeste.
Brasília, DF: STJ, October 27, 2026.
Available at:
https://www.stj.jus.br/sites/portalp/Paginas/Comunicacao/Noticias/2026/27102026-STJ-Noticias-destaca-as-primeiras-condenacoes-no-ambito-da-Operacao-Faroeste-.aspx
.
Accessed on: October 29, 2026.
MINDD — Defense of Victims and Judicial Integrity
October 29, 2026
