JUDGES TO THE CUSTOMER'S TASTE
A COUNTER OF POLITICAL INTERESTS: THE STF AND THE JUDGE MADE TO ORDER
THE POLITICIZATION OF BRAZIL'S SUPREME FEDERAL COURT, JUDGE SHOPPING, THE NATURAL JUDGE PRINCIPLE, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
By AI CHATGPT and DEEPSEEK AI
October 11, 2026
INTRODUCTION
This publication presents the complete English translation of an editorial published by O Estado de S. Paulo on September 30, 2026, followed by two analyses produced by DeepSeek AI, the author's intervention, an independent legal analysis by ChatGPT, and the complete English translation of Resolution No. 921, issued by the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court on October 2, 2026.
The original editorial and the AI-generated analyses are reproduced in separate sections, preserving their respective arguments, attributions, and conclusions.
The purpose is to examine a fundamental constitutional question:
What happens to the Rule of Law when litigants can effectively select the judge who will decide their cases, not through neutral rules established in advance, but through procedural maneuvers designed to reach a particular judicial officer?
The question acquired particular significance when, just two days after the publication of the Estadão editorial, the President of Brazil's Supreme Federal Court, Justice Edson Fachin, issued Resolution No. 921/2026, establishing additional procedures to safeguard the natural judge principle and prevent distortions in judicial case assignments.
The Resolution's adoption provides an important institutional development against which to examine the allegations and constitutional concerns raised in the editorial.
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PART I — LITERAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE ESTADÃO EDITORIAL
O ESTADO DE S. PAULO — OPINION
JUDGES TO THE CUSTOMER'S TASTE
STF justices distort the institution of prevention to meet demands aligned with their political preferences. In practice, the parties choose the judge who best suits them.
By Notas & Informações
September 30, 2026 | 3:02 a.m.
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When sobriety still dictated the conduct of the justices of the Supreme Federal Court (STF), Their Excellencies did not involve themselves in political disputes, or at least made an effort to appear equidistant from the contenders. Today, some justices not only do not disguise their political affinities and antipathies, but make a point of flaunting them in interviews, posts on social media, corporate events, dinners, single-justice decisions, and even in debates broadcast live in the Court's plenary session.
It is not surprising, therefore, that interested parties have learned to dance to the tune of this shameless ball in order to extract advantages. If the political positions of STF justices have become predictable, all that is needed is to find a way to make a given request reach the right chambers. And that way has been found.
As this newspaper reported a few days ago, the fashion now in Brasília is to submit new requests in the records of old cases, some even archived. Since the political identities of the reporting justices have become known, the meaning of prevention is subverted — which, in the STF, is the linkage of the justice who first received a case to all other proceedings directly related to that case — as a way to circumvent the drawing of lots.
The most recent application of this trick involves the case of the false information that Flávio Bolsonaro, if elected president of the Republic, would strip Our Lady of Aparecida of the title of patron saint of Brazil.
After Justice André Mendonça, vice president of the Superior Electoral Court (TSE), ordered digital platforms to remove publications on the subject, the defense of comedian Antonio Tabet, one of those who spread the false information, did not knock on the STF's door through the ordinary route: it requested an “extension” in a case reported by Justice Flávio Dino concerning posts related to the ineligibility of former federal deputy Deltan Dallagnol.
And Mr. Dino, through convoluted hermeneutics, found a link of convenience between the cases: the defense of freedom of expression. Dino granted Tabet's request and restored the circulation of the posts.
Immediately thereafter, what did Flávio Bolsonaro's defense do? Exactly the same thing. Instead of filing his appeal and awaiting the drawing of lots, which would have been regular, the presidential candidate took the petition directly to Justice Luiz Fux, on the pretext that he is the reporting justice in one of the cases before the STF addressing the constitutionality of Article 19 of the Brazilian Civil Framework for the Internet.
Fux, whose positions have been aligning with Mendonça's on politically sensitive issues, suspended Dino's decision.
In short: each side chose a justice, and nobody pretended to be surprised by the result.
The scheme is intended to distort a legitimate institution. Prevention exists so that related cases remain with the same reporting justice, avoiding contradictory decisions in the name of the sound administration of justice. It is an exception to the rule of drawing lots, not its revocation, as the opportunists who, in practice, wish to abolish the principle of the natural judge when they understand that this judge does not lean quite so naturally toward their interests may think.
That said, if today there are those who deliberately choose which justice they wish to see judge their claim, that is the responsibility of the Supreme Court justices themselves, who ignored the written and unwritten rules of the judiciary to act as political activists.
If only the disorder installed in the STF produced merely, so to speak, legal uncertainty. At this pace, the country is moving toward the very borders of anomie, a scenario unimaginable in less indecent times, when the Court was not yet such an openly acknowledged political arena.
Each justice's chambers have become a fortified emplacement, and each justice an officer in the political battle. And so the STF has been reduced by its own members to a mere registry office that issues tailor-made decisions for whoever has the shrewdness to knock on the right door.
If it still wishes to regain respect, it is the duty of the STF's current composition to cease lending itself to this role, unworthy of the institution's history.
The justices must not meddle in politics and must return to the Court's presidency, for the drawing of lots, requests with no real connection to the cases they report.
Until that happens, every case will have the judge the customer orders — and the result will be anything but justice.
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SOURCE:
O ESTADO DE S. PAULO. Juízes ao gosto do freguês. Editorial. Opinião, Notas & Informações. September 30, 2026, 3:02 a.m.
English translation of the original Portuguese editorial.
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PART II — DEEPSEEK AI ANALYSIS
JUDGES TO THE CUSTOMER'S TASTE: HOW STF JUSTICES TURNED THE COURT INTO A COUNTER OF CHOICES
Analysis of the Estadão Opinion on the subversion of the institution of prevention in the Supreme Federal Court
What Is Happening at the STF?
In an editorial published on September 30, 2026, the newspaper Estadão brings a forceful criticism of the behavior of some justices of the Supreme Federal Court (STF).
The text, signed by the Notes & Information editorial department, denounces what it calls the “subversion of the institution of prevention” — a mechanism that should ensure that connected cases remain with the same reporting justice, but that has been used as a tool to choose the judge according to political convenience.
The Case That Illustrates the Crisis
The article details an emblematic episode involving the fake news about Our Lady of Aparecida:
1. The origin: False information circulated that Flávio Bolsonaro, if elected president, would strip Our Lady of Aparecida of the title of patron saint of Brazil.
2. André Mendonça's reaction: The justice, then vice president of the TSE, ordered the removal of the posts.
3. The defense's maneuver: Instead of appealing through the ordinary route, comedian Antonio Tabet's defense filed a request for an “extension” in a case before Justice Flávio Dino on a completely different subject (posts related to Deltan Dallagnol's ineligibility).
4. Dino's decision: Through “convoluted hermeneutics,” Dino found a link of convenience — the defense of freedom of expression — and restored the posts.
5. Flávio Bolsonaro's response: The candidate's defense did exactly the same thing: it took the petition directly to Justice Luiz Fux, under the pretext that he reports a case about the Brazilian Civil Framework for the Internet. Fux suspended Dino's decision.
Result: Each side chose the justice who was most favorable to it, and nobody was surprised by the result.
Why Is This Serious?
The institution of prevention exists for a legitimate reason: to avoid contradictory decisions on connected cases, ensuring the sound administration of justice.
It is an exception to the rule of random drawing, not its revocation.
When justices ignore the written and unwritten rules of the judiciary to act as political activists, they open the way for the parties to “choose” the judge who best suits them.
In practice, this abolishes the principle of the natural judge — a fundamental guarantee of the Democratic Rule of Law.
The Consequences for the Country
The editorial is direct in pointing out the consequences of this practice:
> “Each justice's chambers have become a fortified emplacement, and each justice an officer in the political battle. And so the STF has been reduced by its own members to a mere registry office that issues tailor-made decisions for whoever has the shrewdness to knock on the right door.”
The text warns that the country is moving “toward the very borders of anomie” — a scenario unimaginable in less indecent times, when the Court was not yet such an openly acknowledged political arena.
What Should Be Done?
Estadão points to the path toward recovering the STF's credibility:
Justices must not meddle in politics.
Requests with no real connection to the cases reported should be returned to the Court's presidency for drawing lots.
Respect for the written and unwritten rules of the judiciary.
Until that happens, “every case will have the judge the customer orders — and the result will be anything but justice.”
Final Reflection
The article raises an uncomfortable question: to what extent does the politicization of the STF compromise Brazilian democracy itself?
When justices set sobriety and equidistance aside to flaunt political preferences, the Judiciary loses its countermajoritarian function and becomes yet another player in the partisan dispute.
The question that remains is: who watches the watchdogs?
Source: Estadão Opinion — “Judges to the Customer's Taste” (September 30, 2026).
Tags: #STF #Judiciary #Politics #Democracy #Brazil
This post is an analysis based on an editorial published by the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo. The opinions expressed are those of the original outlet.
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PART III — I SAID
COUNTER OF POLITICAL INTERESTS
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PART IV — DEEPSEEK AI SAID
COUNTER OF POLITICAL INTERESTS: THE STF AND THE JUDGE MADE TO ORDER
Meta description: Estadão editorial denounces the distorted use of prevention at the STF: justices act as political activists, and the parties choose the reporting justice according to convenience.
Suggested slug: balcao-de-interesses-politicos-stf
What Is at Stake
The Supreme Federal Court (STF) has ceased to be a space of sobriety and equidistance.
Instead, some justices have begun to flaunt political preferences in interviews, social media, single-justice decisions, and even in the plenary.
The result is predictable: interested parties have learned to choose the chambers that best serve their interests.
The Estadão editorial, signed by Notes & Information on September 30, 2026, denounces exactly this: the institution of prevention — which should ensure that connected cases remain with the same reporting justice — is being used as a tool to circumvent the drawing of lots and deliver each case to the most convenient justice.
The Case That Exposed the Counter
The trick became evident in the episode of the false information about Flávio Bolsonaro and Our Lady of Aparecida:
1. André Mendonça, vice president of the TSE, ordered the posts to be removed.
2. Comedian Antonio Tabet's defense did not appeal through the ordinary route: it requested an “extension” in a case before Justice Flávio Dino on a different subject.
3. Dino found a “link of convenience” — the defense of freedom of expression — and restored the posts.
4. Flávio Bolsonaro's defense did the same: it took the petition directly to Justice Luiz Fux, who suspended Dino's decision.
Each side chose its justice.
Nobody pretended to be surprised by the result.
The Logic of the “Customer”
Prevention exists to avoid contradictory decisions and ensure the sound administration of justice.
It is an exception to the rule of drawing lots, not its revocation.
When justices ignore the rules of the judiciary to act as political activists, they open the way for parties to choose the natural judge according to their interests.
In practice, the principle of the natural judge is replaced by the pet judge.
> “Each justice's chambers have become a fortified emplacement, and each justice an officer in the political battle. And so the STF has been reduced by its own members to a mere registry office that issues tailor-made decisions for whoever has the shrewdness to knock on the right door.”
Consequences for the Country
Legal uncertainty.
Explicit politicization of the Court.
Loss of institutional credibility.
An open path toward anomie — a scenario unimaginable in less indecent times.
The STF is no longer a disguised political arena.
It is an openly acknowledged political arena.
And that compromises democracy itself.
What Should Be Done?
To regain respect, Estadão points out:
Justices must not meddle in politics.
Requests with no real connection to the cases reported must be returned to the Court's presidency for drawing lots.
Respect for the written and unwritten rules of the judiciary.
Until that happens, every case will have the judge the customer orders — and the result will be anything but justice.
Final Reflection
When sobriety ceases to dictate the conduct of justices, the Judiciary loses its countermajoritarian function and becomes yet another player in the partisan dispute.
The question that remains is uncomfortable: who watches the watchdogs?
Source: Estadão Opinion — “Judges to the Customer's Taste” (September 30, 2026).
Tags: #STF #Judiciary #Politics #Democracy #Brazil #CounterOfInterests
This post is an analysis based on an editorial published by the newspaper O Estado de S. Paulo. The opinions expressed are those of the original outlet.
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PART V — CHATGPT: INDEPENDENT LEGAL ANALYSIS
JUDGE SHOPPING, CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION, AND THE NATURAL JUDGE PRINCIPLE
The constitutional limits of judicial case assignment and the dangers of politically selective adjudication
Legal analysis — October 11, 2026
1. The Constitutional Problem Is Not Merely Which Justice Decides a Case, but How That Justice Acquires Jurisdiction Over It
The editorial published by O Estado de S. Paulo identifies a potentially serious institutional problem: the manipulation of procedural mechanisms to direct disputes toward judicial officers whose positions are already known or considered predictable.
The fundamental legal issue is not whether a particular justice adopts a conservative, progressive, liberal, or restrictive understanding of constitutional rights.
Judicial disagreement is inherent in constitutional adjudication.
The constitutional problem arises when the assignment of a case ceases to be governed by objective, previously established rules and becomes susceptible to strategic manipulation by interested parties.
Brazilian procedural law recognizes prevenção, a mechanism of prior judicial assignment intended to ensure that legally connected proceedings are heard by the appropriate judge or reporting justice.
Its legitimate function is to preserve consistency, prevent conflicting decisions, and ensure the orderly administration of justice.
However, the existence of prevention does not eliminate the constitutional requirement that judicial jurisdiction be established according to law.
The question is whether the procedural connection is legally real or merely asserted to secure a preferred decision-maker.
A general similarity between legal arguments does not necessarily establish the connection required to assign a new claim to the reporting justice of an earlier proceeding.
Indeed, this distinction was expressly incorporated into Resolution No. 921/2026, issued by the STF on October 2, 2026.
2. The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 and the Natural Judge Principle
The Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988 establishes important guarantees concerning judicial independence, jurisdiction, due process, and access to justice.
Article 5, item XXXVII, prohibits exceptional courts or tribunals.
Article 5, item LIII, establishes that no one shall be prosecuted or sentenced except by the competent authority.
These guarantees are closely associated with the constitutional principle of the natural judge.
The principle requires that jurisdiction be established by law and applicable rules, rather than improvised to serve the interests of an individual litigant or public authority.
Article 93, item XV, further requires the immediate distribution of cases at every level of jurisdiction.
The relevant constitutional provisions must be examined together with the rules governing judicial competence, case assignment, connection, and prevention.
Judicial independence cannot be reduced to freedom from direct political orders. It also requires institutional safeguards against the manipulation of the process by which a particular judge acquires authority over a dispute.
3. Prevention Is an Exception to Random Case Assignment, Not an Instrument for Choosing a Judge
The Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure regulates the relationship between connected claims and the allocation of judicial proceedings.
Article 55 addresses connection between proceedings when they share a claim or cause of action, while Article 286 establishes circumstances in which cases are distributed by dependency.
The STF's Internal Rules also address the assignment of related cases.
Article 69 provides that the assignment of an action or appeal establishes prevention for proceedings linked to it through connection or continence.
These rules have a legitimate institutional purpose.
They seek to avoid incompatible decisions and ensure that genuinely related disputes are handled coherently.
However, the legal justification for prevention depends upon the relationship between the proceedings.
Prevention cannot legitimately be converted into a procedural fiction through which an unrelated controversy is directed to a particular justice merely because that justice has already expressed favorable opinions on a broad constitutional subject.
The distinction between real procedural connection and tactical similarity of arguments is therefore central to preserving judicial impartiality.
The Code of Civil Procedure and the Internal Rules provide the legal framework for evaluating that distinction.
4. The Dispute Involving André Mendonça, Flávio Dino, and Luiz Fux
The episode examined by Estadão involved decisions concerning social media publications about Our Lady of Aparecida and the presidential candidacy of Flávio Bolsonaro.
The sequence included:
First: Justice André Mendonça, acting in the Superior Electoral Court, ordered the removal of certain publications associated with allegedly false information concerning the candidate.
Second: Comedian Antonio Tabet challenged the removal of his publication, and Justice Flávio Dino issued a decision allowing the post to circulate.
Third: Flávio Bolsonaro's defense brought the matter before Justice Luiz Fux, who suspended Dino's decision.
The existence of the successive judicial interventions is documented in contemporaneous reporting.
The editorial's criticism focuses particularly on the procedural mechanisms used to bring the disputes before Dino and Fux.
Its argument is that the litigants effectively selected their preferred reporting justices rather than submitting independent claims through the ordinary distribution procedure.
That allegation raises a genuine question concerning judicial assignment.
However, establishing the legal validity or invalidity of a particular assignment requires examination of the original petitions, procedural history, applicable jurisdictional rules, and judicial decisions.
The fact that two justices reach different conclusions does not, by itself, establish unlawful judge shopping or political misconduct.
The procedural question must therefore be distinguished from allegations concerning subjective political motivations.
5. Subsequent Developments: September 30 and October 1, 2026
The controversy continued after the publication of the editorial.
On September 30, 2026, the plenary of the Superior Electoral Court considered the dispute concerning publications associated with Our Lady of Aparecida.
The Court maintained restrictions on certain false information concerning Flávio Bolsonaro but allowed Antonio Tabet's specific publication to remain available.
The distinction was relevant because Tabet's post did not expressly identify Flávio Bolsonaro by name.
On October 1, Justice Flávio Dino declared that the request before him had become moot following the TSE's decision.
These subsequent developments demonstrate that the substantive controversy concerning freedom of expression and electoral misinformation was not identical to the procedural controversy concerning judicial case assignment.
They also demonstrate why the constitutional questions must be separated.
One question concerns whether a particular publication may lawfully be removed.
Another concerns which judicial authority has jurisdiction to decide that question.
A third concerns whether the assignment of the controversy to that authority followed previously established procedural rules.
These are distinct legal questions.
6. October 2, 2026: The STF Establishes New Case-Assignment Controls
On October 2, 2026, the President of the Supreme Federal Court, Justice Edson Fachin, issued Resolution No. 921/2026.
The Resolution establishes a procedure for reviewing certain petitions submitted in proceedings already pending before the Court.
Its stated objectives include ensuring compliance with case-assignment rules and safeguarding the natural judge principle.
The Resolution addresses petitions filed by third parties and certain requests that seek to extend decisions beyond their original subject matter.
It also creates procedures through which the Court's Presidency and Judicial Secretariat assess whether those petitions should be attached to existing proceedings or registered and assigned as separate cases.
Significantly, the Resolution states that sharing a common legal thesis does not, by itself, establish the identity or connection of claims necessary to justify their procedural association.
This provision directly addresses the distinction between substantive similarity and genuine procedural connection.
The STF's official announcement explains that the measure seeks to prevent new petitions from becoming automatically linked to specific reporting justices.
7. What Resolution No. 921/2026 Does — and Does Not — Establish
The enactment of Resolution No. 921/2026 is institutionally significant.
It demonstrates that the Court adopted additional procedural safeguards concerning the assignment of petitions in existing proceedings.
However, the Resolution must be interpreted according to its actual provisions.
It does not abolish legitimate prevention.
It does not establish that every petition connected to an existing case must necessarily be distributed by a new random draw.
It also does not automatically invalidate decisions made before its entry into force.
Indeed, Article 7 expressly limits its application to petitions filed after the Resolution becomes effective.
Nevertheless, its adoption confirms the importance of distinguishing legally justified case assignments from attempts to direct unrelated claims toward specific judicial officers.
The Resolution represents an institutional effort to control that risk.
8. Judicial Impartiality and the Appearance of Justice
Judicial impartiality is not exhausted by the personal conviction of a judge that he or she is acting fairly.
The structure of judicial proceedings must also protect public confidence that disputes are assigned and decided under neutral rules.
If litigants believe that success depends upon identifying a particular judge and finding a procedural route to that judge's chambers, the credibility of the justice system may be seriously damaged.
This institutional concern applies regardless of which political party, ideological movement, corporation, or individual benefits from the procedure.
A procedural mechanism cannot be constitutionally acceptable when it benefits one political faction and constitutionally objectionable when it benefits another.
The same jurisdictional standards must govern everyone.
Otherwise, the judicial process risks becoming an instrument of selective advantage rather than impartial adjudication.
9. The Essential Constitutional Question
The editorial and the subsequent Resolution should be considered together.
The editorial alleges that procedural mechanisms have been used to direct controversies toward preferred justices.
The Resolution establishes additional safeguards intended to prevent improper case assignments.
The central question remains:
Was the dispute assigned to the judicial officer through neutral rules established before the controversy arose, or was an unrelated claim strategically attached to an existing proceeding to obtain a preferred decision-maker?
The answer cannot be determined solely by examining the substantive outcome.
It requires scrutiny of the procedural record, the jurisdictional basis asserted, the applicable rules, and the reasons given for accepting or rejecting the requested assignment.
The principle of the natural judge exists precisely to ensure that adjudication is governed by law rather than by the convenience of litigants or the political preferences of judicial officers.
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PART VI — THE BRAZILIAN SUPREME FEDERAL COURT'S RESOLUTION NO. 921/2026
FULL AND LITERAL ENGLISH TRANSLATION
A NEW PROCEDURE TO SAFEGUARD THE NATURAL JUDGE PRINCIPLE AND PREVENT THE IMPROPER DIRECTION OF PETITIONS TO PARTICULAR JUSTICES
Issued by Justice Edson Fachin, President of the Supreme Federal Court
October 2, 2026
On October 2, 2026, two days after the publication of the Estadão editorial, the Presidency of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court issued Resolution No. 921/2026.
The Resolution establishes procedures intended to ensure that specified petitions submitted in existing judicial proceedings are not automatically assigned to the reporting justice without preliminary verification of the applicable case-assignment requirements.
The Resolution expressly addresses the protection of the natural judge principle and compliance with the rules governing judicial distribution.
The following is the complete English translation of the Resolution, including its preamble, recitals, seven articles, paragraphs, electronic signature, and authentication information.
The original Portuguese text remains legally authoritative.
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SUPREME FEDERAL COURT
RESOLUTION NO. 921, OF OCTOBER 2, 2026
Provides for the validation of submissions presented by third parties outside the procedural relationship and for procedures intended to ensure compliance with the case-assignment rules established in Resolution No. 706, of October 15, 2020.
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME FEDERAL COURT, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by item XIX of Article 13 and item I of Article 363 of the Internal Rules,
CONSIDERING the provisions of items XXXVII and LIII of Article 5 of the Federal Constitution;
CONSIDERING the need to ensure compliance with the case-assignment rules and the principle of the natural judge;
CONSIDERING that the linking of petitions to proceedings does not eliminate the need to comply with the case-assignment rules established in procedural legislation and in the Court's normative acts;
CONSIDERING the provisions of Resolution No. 706, of October 15, 2020;
CONSIDERING the need to establish a procedure for validating the linking of petitions presented by third parties outside the procedural relationship;
CONSIDERING the advisability of standardizing the treatment of such petitions and improving the mechanisms for preventing possible distortions in the assignment of cases;
RESOLVES:
Article 1
This Resolution establishes the procedure for validating the assignment of petitions presented by third parties in proceedings pending before the Court, in order to ensure compliance with the case-assignment rules established in the Internal Rules and in Resolution No. 706, of October 15, 2020.
Article 2
The following shall be subject to the validation provided for in this Resolution, before being added to the case records:
I – a petition submitted by a third party, understood as one submitted by someone who does not act in the proceedings as a party, counsel for a party, or guardian of the legal order;
II – regardless of who submits it, a petition that:
a) challenges an act of a judicial body or of an authority that does not appear in the proceedings;
b) requests the extension of the effects of a decision to persons, acts, or facts not included within the subject matter of the proceedings;
c) makes a request against someone who is not a party to the proceedings;
III – a petition submitted by an amicus curiae that makes a request.
§ 1. The sharing of a legal thesis does not, in itself, characterize identity or connection of claims or causes of action with the subject matter of the proceedings (Article 55 of the Code of Civil Procedure).
§ 2. In electronic filing, the petitioner shall declare whether the petition falls within any of the situations described in item II, and any untruthful declaration shall be subject to the provisions of Article 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
§ 3. Petitions submitted in compliance with a summons or judicial order, as well as those submitted by the Office of the Prosecutor General of the Republic, shall not be subject to screening.
Article 3
A petition submitted by a third party shall not be added to the case records before the screening provided for in this Article, which shall be the responsibility of the Presidency, through analysis by the Judicial Secretariat.
§ 1. The Presidency shall:
I – order its inclusion in the case records when the petition is limited to requesting intervention in the proceedings or making a request within the scope of the subject matter raised therein, with the Reporting Justice being responsible for deciding on its admission;
II – deny its inclusion in the case records and order the petition to be registered under the appropriate procedural category and assigned, when it presents an autonomous claim.
§ 2. The screening shall not constitute a judgment regarding the admissibility of the intervention or the merits of the request.
§ 3. The validation provided for in the main provision of this Article may take place through a specific electronic workflow made available by the case management system.
Article 4
Petitions subject to the procedure established in this Resolution shall not be definitively linked to the case records or submitted for consideration by the Reporting Justice before completion of the validation provided for in Article 3.
Article 5
Any doubts, omissions, or disagreements concerning the assignment of cases shall be communicated to the Presidency for deliberation through a reasoned decision.
Article 6
Proceedings subject to confidentiality levels 3 and 4 are excluded from the procedure established in this Resolution and shall remain subject to the treatment established in their own regulations.
Article 7
This Resolution shall enter into force on the date of its publication and shall apply only to petitions filed after its entry into force.
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ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE AND AUTHENTICATION
Document electronically signed by Justice Edson Fachin, PRESIDENT OF THE SUPREME FEDERAL COURT, on October 2, 2026, at 10:29 a.m., pursuant to Article 1, item III, letter “b”, of Law No. 11,419/2006.
The authenticity of the document may be verified through the Supreme Federal Court's Electronic Information System (SEI), by entering the following information:
Verification Code: 3464125
CRC Code: D8AEEC4B
Administrative Proceeding: SEI 013200/2026
Document Identification: 3464125v9
Original document: Resolution No. 921/2026, two pages.
Original Portuguese PDF:
[https://arq.migalhas.com.br/arquivos/2026/10/F2A946952B64FA_SEI_3464125_Resolucao_921.pdf](https://arq.migalhas.com.br/arquivos/2026/10/F2A946952B64FA_SEI_3464125_Resolucao_921.pdf)
Official STF announcement:
[https://noticias.stf.jus.br/postsnoticias/stf-estabelece-regras-para-peticoes-protocoladas-em-processos-ja-existentes/](https://noticias.stf.jus.br/postsnoticias/stf-estabelece-regras-para-peticoes-protocoladas-em-processos-ja-existentes/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
Unofficial English translation. The original Portuguese version is legally authoritative.
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PART VII — CHATGPT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RESOLUTION NO. 921/2026
1. The Resolution Addresses a Fundamental Institutional Problem
Resolution No. 921/2026 is particularly significant when examined alongside the editorial published by O Estado de S. Paulo on September 30, 2026.
The editorial denounced the alleged manipulation of judicial case assignments by litigants seeking favorable decisions from particular justices.
Two days later, the Presidency of the Supreme Federal Court adopted a Resolution establishing additional safeguards concerning the assignment of petitions submitted in existing proceedings.
Although the temporal proximity is notable, the Resolution itself does not establish that it was issued specifically in response to the editorial.
Its text establishes a broader institutional concern with preserving the integrity of judicial case assignments.
2. Article 2, Paragraph 1: A Common Legal Argument Is Not Enough
One of the most important provisions is Article 2, paragraph 1.
It establishes that sharing a common legal thesis does not, by itself, demonstrate the required identity or connection between claims or causes of action.
This distinction is central to the controversy.
Two proceedings may both concern freedom of expression without necessarily involving the same parties, facts, claims, or legally relevant procedural connection.
Similarly, the fact that two cases raise constitutional questions does not automatically justify placing them before the same reporting justice.
A broad constitutional theme cannot automatically substitute for the specific legal requirements governing judicial case assignment.
This principle reinforces the requirement that procedural connection be determined objectively.
3. Article 3: Preliminary Screening of Petitions
Article 3 establishes that certain third-party petitions must undergo preliminary screening before being added to the existing case records.
The Presidency, through the Judicial Secretariat, is responsible for the procedure.
When a petition is limited to requesting intervention or making a request within the existing proceeding's subject matter, the Presidency may authorize its inclusion.
The reporting justice subsequently decides whether intervention should be admitted.
However, when the petition contains an autonomous claim, it must be registered under the appropriate procedural category and assigned according to the applicable rules.
This procedure distinguishes between participation in an existing controversy and the commencement of an independent judicial claim.
4. Article 4: A Petition Cannot Automatically Reach the Reporting Justice
Article 4 prohibits definitive attachment of petitions covered by the Resolution, or their submission to the reporting justice, before completion of the required validation.
This provision addresses the risk that an unrelated petition might reach a predetermined judicial officer merely because it was submitted in the records of an existing case.
Its purpose is procedural.
It does not determine how a justice should decide the merits.
Instead, it regulates the preliminary question of how the petition reaches the judicial authority responsible for deciding it.
That distinction is essential.
The legality of judicial adjudication depends not only upon the content of the decision but also upon compliance with the rules establishing the decision-maker's jurisdiction.
5. Article 5: Reasoned Decisions Concerning Case Assignment
Article 5 establishes that doubts, omissions, or disagreements concerning case assignments must be referred to the Presidency for a reasoned decision.
This requirement is important because judicial case assignment should not function as an unexplained administrative process immune from scrutiny.
When a dispute arises concerning whether a petition should be attached to an existing case or independently distributed, the applicable criteria must be identified and the conclusion justified.
Reasoned decision-making helps ensure that the allocation of judicial authority remains subject to legal standards rather than individual preference.
6. Article 6: An Important Exception
The Resolution excludes proceedings subject to confidentiality levels 3 and 4 from its screening procedure.
Those proceedings remain governed by their own regulations.
This exception is significant because it means that Resolution No. 921/2026 does not establish a universal screening mechanism covering every judicial proceeding before the STF.
Its practical effectiveness therefore depends on the circumstances and the applicable procedural regime.
The exclusion does not itself establish wrongdoing or improper case assignments in confidential proceedings.
Nevertheless, the distinction is relevant when evaluating the scope of the new safeguards.
7. Article 7: The Resolution Is Prospective
Article 7 expressly provides that the Resolution applies only to petitions filed after its entry into force.
Accordingly, it does not retroactively govern the procedural steps taken in the controversy involving André Mendonça, Flávio Dino, Luiz Fux, Antonio Tabet, and Flávio Bolsonaro.
Nor does the adoption of the Resolution automatically invalidate earlier decisions.
Any challenge to those decisions must be examined under the laws, jurisdictional rules, and procedural requirements applicable when they were rendered.
Nevertheless, the Resolution provides an important contemporary institutional statement concerning the need to prevent improper judicial case assignments.
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PART VIII — CONCLUSION
JUSTICE CANNOT BE DISPENSED ACCORDING TO POLITICAL OR PERSONAL CONVENIENCE
The controversy examined by O Estado de S. Paulo, the analyses produced by DeepSeek AI, and the subsequent adoption of Resolution No. 921/2026 raise a question that extends beyond the specific Brazilian political dispute.
Who determines which judge will hear a case: the law, or those who possess the procedural knowledge and influence necessary to reach a preferred judicial officer?
A constitutional judiciary must be organized around previously established rules of jurisdiction and case assignment.
Judicial authority cannot legitimately derive from the tactical preferences of litigants.
Nor can procedural rules be applied selectively depending upon the political identity or legal interests of those seeking judicial intervention.
The natural judge principle exists to prevent adjudication from becoming an exercise in personalized jurisdiction.
It protects the litigant's right to be heard by a competent and impartial judicial authority whose jurisdiction is determined according to law.
This guarantee is inseparable from due process, equality before the law, and public confidence in the administration of justice.
The adoption of Resolution No. 921/2026 reflects the importance of maintaining effective safeguards against distortions in judicial case assignments.
But the Resolution also raises a broader institutional question.
Can public confidence in judicial impartiality be restored solely through administrative rules if litigants continue to believe that favorable outcomes depend upon reaching particular judicial chambers?
Procedural reform is necessary when existing mechanisms prove susceptible to manipulation.
Yet the credibility of constitutional adjudication ultimately depends upon the consistent, transparent, and impartial application of those mechanisms.
The same standards must govern political allies and opponents.
The same rules must apply to powerful institutions and ordinary citizens.
The same constitutional guarantees must protect those whose arguments are popular and those whose arguments are unpopular.
The Rule of Law cannot coexist with a judicial system in which the practical outcome of litigation depends upon choosing the right judge rather than establishing the right under the law.
The decisive constitutional principle is not complicated:
THE JUDGE MUST BE DETERMINED BY LAW — NOT SELECTED ACCORDING TO THE POLITICAL CONVENIENCE OF THE LITIGANT.
And the ultimate institutional obligation is equally clear:
THE JUDICIARY EXISTS TO ADMINISTER JUSTICE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, NOT TO OPERATE AS A COUNTER OF POLITICAL OR PERSONAL INTERESTS.
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PART IX — SOURCES AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES
ABNT FORMAT — ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS AND VERIFIED REFERENCES
1. O ESTADO DE S. PAULO. Juízes ao gosto do freguês. Estadão, Opinião, Notas & Informações, 30 set. 2026, 3h02.
Original Portuguese editorial supplied for translation.
The exact original article URL was not independently verified.
2. BRASIL. Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, 1988.
Available at:
[https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicaocompilado.htm](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/constituicao/constituicaocompilado.htm)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
3. BRASIL. Lei nº 13.105, de 16 de março de 2015. Código de Processo Civil. Brasília, DF: Presidência da República, 2015.
Available at:
[https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2015/lei/l13105compilada.htm](https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2015-2018/2015/lei/l13105compilada.htm)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
4. BRASIL. SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL. Regimento Interno do Supremo Tribunal Federal. Brasília, DF: STF.
Article 69 — Judicial prevention and the assignment of connected proceedings.
Document available through the Organization of American States:
[https://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_bra_STF_regimento.pdf](https://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_bra_STF_regimento.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
5. BRASIL. SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL. Resolução nº 921, de 2 de outubro de 2026. Dispõe sobre a validação de manifestações apresentadas por terceiros estranhos à relação processual e sobre procedimentos destinados a assegurar a observância das regras de distribuição previstas na Resolução nº 706, de 15 de outubro de 2020. Brasília, DF: STF, 2026.
Administrative Proceeding: SEI 013200/2026.
Document: 3464125v9.
Electronically signed by Justice Edson Fachin, President of the Supreme Federal Court, on October 2, 2026.
Available at:
[https://arq.migalhas.com.br/arquivos/2026/10/F2A946952B64FA_SEI_3464125_Resolucao_921.pdf](https://arq.migalhas.com.br/arquivos/2026/10/F2A946952B64FA_SEI_3464125_Resolucao_921.pdf)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
6. BRASIL. SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL. STF estabelece regras para petições protocoladas em processos já existentes. STF Notícias, Brasília, 2 out. 2026.
Available at:
[https://noticias.stf.jus.br/postsnoticias/stf-estabelece-regras-para-peticoes-protocoladas-em-processos-ja-existentes/](https://noticias.stf.jus.br/postsnoticias/stf-estabelece-regras-para-peticoes-protocoladas-em-processos-ja-existentes/?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
7. AGÊNCIA BRASIL. Dino derruba decisão de Mendonça e libera post sobre Nossa Senhora. Brasília, 27 set. 2026.
Available at:
[https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-09/dino-derruba-decisao-de-mendonca-e-libera-post-sobre-nossa-senhora](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-09/dino-derruba-decisao-de-mendonca-e-libera-post-sobre-nossa-senhora?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
8. AGÊNCIA BRASIL. Fux suspende decisão de Dino que restabelecia posts de Nossa Senhora. Brasília, 29 set. 2026.
Available at:
[https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-09/fux-suspende-decisao-de-dino-que-restabelecia-posts-sobre-nossa-senhora](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-09/fux-suspende-decisao-de-dino-que-restabelecia-posts-sobre-nossa-senhora?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
9. AGÊNCIA BRASIL. Dino declara perda de objeto em pedido de Tabet sobre Nossa Senhora. Brasília, 1 out. 2026.
Available at:
[https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-10/dino-declara-perda-de-objeto-em-pedido-de-tabet-sobre-nossa-senhora](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-10/dino-declara-perda-de-objeto-em-pedido-de-tabet-sobre-nossa-senhora?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
10. AGÊNCIA BRASIL. Fachin cria regra para evitar direcionamento de processos no STF. Brasília, 2 out. 2026.
Available at:
[https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-10/fachin-cria-regra-para-evitar-direcionamento-de-processos-no-stf](https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/justica/noticia/2026-10/fachin-cria-regra-para-evitar-direcionamento-de-processos-no-stf?utm_source=chatgpt.com)
Accessed: October 11, 2026.
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EDITORIAL INTEGRITY AND TRANSLATION NOTICE
Part I: English translation of the original September 30, 2026, editorial published by O Estado de S. Paulo. The editorial's arguments and opinions remain attributable to the newspaper.
Parts II and IV: English translations of the two analyses produced by DeepSeek AI.
Part III: Literal translation of the author's intervention.
Part V: Independent legal analysis by ChatGPT, distinguishing documented procedural developments from editorial allegations and conclusions.
Part VI: Complete, unofficial English translation of Resolution No. 921/2026 of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court. The original Portuguese text is legally authoritative.
Parts VII and VIII: Additional legal analysis and conclusions by ChatGPT.
The inclusion of the original editorial and the AI-generated analyses does not convert allegations concerning judicial misconduct or political motivation into established judicial findings.
The purpose of this publication is to permit readers to examine the original criticism, the different analyses, the applicable constitutional principles, and the subsequent institutional response.
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MINDD — DEFENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
OCTOBER 11, 2026
A COUNTER OF POLITICAL INTERESTS: THE STF AND THE JUDGE MADE TO ORDER
THE RULE OF LAW REQUIRES AN INDEPENDENT AND IMPARTIAL JUDICIARY — NOT A JUDGE SELECTED TO SATISFY THE INTERESTS OF THE LITIGANT.
