BANCO ITAU DESAFIA AS LEIS E ORDENS JUDICIAIS TRANSITADAS EM JULGADO USO DE "LARANJAS" E DESOBEDIÊNCIA A ORDENS JUDICIAIS ESTADUAIS E FEDERAIS QUANDO SERÁ QUE O BANCO ITAU VAI CUMPRIR A LEI E AS ORDENS DO BANCO CENTRAL DO BRASIL E FECHAR AS CONTAS BANCÁRIAS DOS LARANJAS DO INEXISTENTE CONDOMÍNIO DA GLEBA 8D EM COMARY ???? ITAÚ BANK DEFIES THE LAWS AND FINAL COURT ORDERS USE OF “FRONTS” AND DISOBEDIENCE OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURT ORDERS WHEN WILL ITAÚ BANK COMPLY WITH THE LAW AND WITH THE ORDERS OF THE CENTRAL BANK OF BRAZIL AND CLOSE THE BANK ACCOUNTS OF THE FRONTS OF THE NONEXISTENT CONDOMINIUM OF GLEBA 8D IN COMARY????

As contas bancárias irregulares foram encerradas  em 04.01.2008

CERTIDÃO de ANULAÇÃO da inscrição indevida no CNPJ 

em 02.05.2007, retroativa à 30/06/1994

 CERTIDÃO de CANCELAMENTO JUDICIAL da inscrição indevida

no Registro de Imóveis por FRAUDE AS LEIS de LOTEAMENTOS 

 CERTIDÃO NEGATIVA DE REGISTRO NA JUNTA COMERCIAL 

Conheça a VERDADE sobre os ABUSOS BANCARIOS em benefício do INEXISTENTE CONDOMÍNIO DA GLEBA 8D EM COMARY, e outros, lendo

"Associações de "fachada" BURLAM leis FEDERAIS no Rio de Janeiro"

ATE QUANDO  O BANCO ITAÚ VAI CONTINUAR A DESCUMPRIR AS LEIS E ORDENS JUDICIAIS TRANSITADAS EM JULGADO DESDE 1996 ?

Nova regra obriga Caixa, Itaú, Bradesco, Banco do Brasil e outras instituições financeiras a cancelarem contas de vários usuários em breve

Por Carolina Carvalho 27/10/2025 Em Geral

https://diariodocomercio.com.br/mix/nova-regra-obriga-caixa-itau-bradesco-banco-do-brasil-e-outras-instituicoes-financeiras-a-cancelarem-contas-de-varios-usuarios-em-breve/

A partir desta segunda-feira (27), a Federação Brasileira de Bancos (Febraban) anunciou novas regras para instituições financeiras envolvendo as chamadas “contas laranja”. 

A Federação instituiu regras mais rigorosas para os bancos bloquearem essas contas de passagem, comumente usadas em golpes e fraudes.

Além dos bancos e instituições financeiras serem obrigados a adotarem políticas mais rigorosas envolvendo esse tipo do conta, os bancos também terão a obrigação de encerrar contas de empresas de apostas online (Bets) irregulares, que atuam no país sem a autorização da Secretaria de Prêmios e Apostas (SPA) do Ministério da Fazenda.

Segundo o comunicado oficial da Febraban, o objetivo dessas novas regras é “fortalecer o compromisso do setor bancário contra o crime organizado e impedir o uso de contas para qualquer atividade ilícita.”

O comunicado também define o que são essas contas irregulares:

Contas de passagem (“laranja”): abertas regularmente, mas usadas de forma ilícita, com anuência do titular, para circulação de recursos de transações ilegais, fraudes, golpes ou ataques cibernéticos;

Contas frias: abertas ilicitamente sem conhecimento do titular.

Confira as regras que instituições financeiras terão que seguir:

Políticas rígidas e critérios próprios para verificação de contas fraudulentas (“laranja” e frias) e contas usadas por Bets irregulares;

Recusa de transações e imediato encerramento de contas ilícitas, com comunicação ao titular;

Reporte obrigatório ao Banco Central, permitindo o compartilhamento das informações entre instituições financeiras;

Monitoramento e supervisão do processo, pela Autorregulação da Febraban, que pode solicitar, a qualquer tempo, evidências de reporte e encerramento de contas ilícitas;

Participação ativa das áreas de prevenção a fraudes, lavagem de dinheiro, jurídica e ouvidoria dos bancos, que, inclusive, participaram da elaboração das novas regras;

No caso de descumprimento, haverá punições, desde pronto ajuste de conduta e advertência até exclusão do sistema Autorregulação.

QUANDO O PRETEXTO DA CELERIDADE VIOLA DIREITOS HUMANOS INDISPONÍVEIS À AMPLA DEFESA, CONTRADITÓRIO E DEVIDO PROCESSO LEGAL by Marcia Almeida

 

O DEVIDO PROCESSO LEGAL É O PROCESSO JUSTO

por Marcia Almeida 

Sim, para o jurista Luiz Guilherme Marinoni, a ideia de que o devido processo legal é sinônimo de processo justo é central, pois o primeiro é o princípio que abriga e garante todos os demais direitos processuais e garantias fundamentais que asseguram a justiça de um processo. Isso inclui a ampla defesa, o contraditório, a imparcialidade do juiz e a igualdade de armas entre as partes, garantindo um processo efetivo e adequado para a tutela dos direitos. 

Devido processo legal como princípio abrangente: Para Marinoni, o devido processo legal é um princípio guardião de outros princípios processuais, como a isonomia (igualdade de tratamento), a publicidade, a razoável duração do processo e o direito a uma decisão fundamentada. 

Processo justo como expressão do devido processo: A ideia de "processo justo" é a forma como o devido processo legal se manifesta na prática, garantindo que o processo seja um meio eficaz para a proteção de direitos. 

Garantia de participação e igualdade: O devido processo legal, ao se manifestar como processo justo, assegura que as partes tenham participação ativa, com a possibilidade de apresentar provas, contradizer acusações e se manifestar sobre decisões que possam afetar seus direitos, em um ambiente de paridade. 

Papel do juiz: A concepção de processo justo, sob a ótica de Marinoni, também impõe ao juiz o papel de um colaborador ativo, que deve garantir o efetivo contraditório e a aplicação adequada do direito, e não apenas um mero aplicador da lei de forma passiva. 

A manifesta violação dos princípios estruturantes do Estado Democrático de Direito que se constata, tanto no Brasil, como nos Estados Unidos da América do Norte, está aumentando exponencialmente.

A situação caótica que se observa nos tribunais, com manipulações ardilosas dos autos, com mentiras descaradas sendo aceitas por juízes corruptos,  fraudes nos registros dos sistemas de informação e controle dos processos nos tribunais por servidores dos cartorios judiciais e extrajudiciais, com ocultação de dados qualificadores das partes, nomes de advogados e especialmente endereços de citação e intimação, para impedir a formação da relação processual triangular entre as partes, uso de corrupção judicial e nos correios, para simular regularidade de citacoes e intimações para atos personalissimos de constituição de advogado de defesa, e para ocultar a falta das condições da ação, o cadastramento inexplicável de advogado dos autores na qualidade de advogados do réu ( eu mesma) na capa dos autos pelo cartório judicial,  usando certidões materialmente falsas, com assinaturas falsificadas de terceiros não identificados, a subtração de provas e de peticoes de defesa dos autos dos processos judiciais, a obstrução do acesso à justica mediante acusações mentirosas e caluniosas de defensores publicos e de advogados corruptos, e de falsos testemunhos de partes impedidas por lei, o abuso do direito de petição,  a admissão de provas ilicitas ja declaradas ilegais pelos tribunais estaduais e federais com fins de extorsão e esbulho possessorio de bens de família, a manifesta má vontade, falsidade material e ideológica de auxiliares administrativos dos Tribunais e de advogados e de promotores de justiça e de magistrados comprometidos com crimes hediondos, a omissão inconstitucional das corregedorias de justiça,  aas mentiras descaradas de juizes e registradores em processos judiciais, correicionais e administrativos, os crimes contra a honra e a dignidade humana das vitimas de abusos cometidos por familiares, vizinhos, bancos, carteiros, servidores públicos e as ameaças de morte,  de prisão,  as calúnias e processos disciplinares contra advogados dignos e o acogertamenro de advogados e de servidores públicos e de membros do Poder Judiciário, no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos da América do Norte,  estão robustamente documentados de forma INCONTROVERSA.

Tudo isso evidencia o "aparelhamento" politico do Poder Judiciário, que esta cada vez mais desmoralizado perante o povo e a sociedade de juristas dignos, nacionais e internacionais.

A tramitação de processos fraudulentos, void ab initio, querela nulitatis insanabilis,  seja por ausencia de direitos materiais a serem tutelados e uso de provas ilicitas para burlar as leis e a Constituição Federal e Estadual , e as leis de organização e divisão judiciárias dos estados envolvidos, seja pela mais absoluta incompetencia em razão da matéria ou da pessoa através de provas ilicitas e forum shopping para enganar e/ou cooptar odo juizo, seja pela falta  imparcialidade dos juizes e dos demais atores envolvidos, seja pela ausencia da formação da regular  relação processual triangular entre as partes, dissimulada através de avisos de recebimento fraudulentos falsificados, grosseiramente, ou não,  mediante fraudes nos cartorios judiciais e nos correios para uso de documentos publicos falsificados ( crimes federias) para simular revelias de réus que jamais foram citados, seja pela aplicação de multas estratofericas e ilegais contra partes que ousaram denunciar os crimes as corregedorias dos tribunais de justiça,  que "lavam as mãos" negando o direito de petição contra a má conduta judicial, seja pelas ameaças e prisões de advogados corajosos que se recusam à violar os seus princípios eticos cristãos e o juramento que fizeram de defender a Constituição Federal e os direitos humanos de seus clientes, e que atingem o apice com o cancelamento dos registros de advogados dignos,  e tudo isso envolvendo abusos de autoridade,  abuso de poder de juízes corruptos para fins de vingança por terem sido deunciadis pelas vitimas dos crimes hediondos, tudo isso DESMORALIZA o PODER JUDICIÁRIO no BRASIL e nos ESTADOS UNIDOS DA AMÉRICA DO NORTE e comprova a percepção de milhões de brasileiros e de norte-americanos que ESTAMOS VIVENDO UMA CRISE SEM PRECEDENTES DE FALTA DE DIGNIDADE E INTEGRIDADE JUDICIAL.

CELERIDADE JUDICIAL INCONSTITUCIONAL, QUANTIDADE ABUSIVA DE PROCESSOS SEM CAUSA, CIVEIS E CRIMINAIS, AUMENTO DA CRIMINALIDADE DESVAIRADA DENTRO E FORA DOS TRIBUNAIS DE JUSTIÇA, DECISÕES TERATOLOGICAS QUE EVIDENCIAM A VENDA DE SENTENÇAS, CAPTURA DOS TRIBUNAIS E DAS ASSOCIAÇÕES DE ADVOGADOS - WS BAR, ETC, DEFENSORIA E MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO 

TODAS ESSAS ILEGALIDADES, INCONSTITUCIONALIDADES, QUE ESTÃO SENDO DENUNCIADAS PÚBLICAMENTE, POR MILHARES DE VITIMAS DE ABUSOS JUDICIAIS ESTRUTURAIS NÃO PODEM CONTINUAR OCORRENDO SOB PENA DE RETROCESSO POLITICO SOCIAL E JURIDICO DE CONSEQUENCIAS GRAVISSIMAS, E DE DERROCADA DO ESTADO DEMOCRÁTICO DE DIREITO.

ATÉ QUANDO O CNJ , O CONSELHO FEDERAL DA ORDEM DOS ADVOGADOS DO BRASIL, OS JURISTAS E ADVOGADOS DIGNOS, O PROCURADOR GERAL DA REPÚBLICA OS PRESIDENTES DOS TRIBUNAIS E MEMBROS DOS PODERES PÚBLICOS CONTINUARÃO " ENFIANDO A CABEÇA NO BURACO", COMO AVESTRUZES????

Os riscos da execução sem intimação do executado: Quando a simplicidade processual se volta contra a efetividade

Vanessa Kruschewsky

O opinativo analisa os impactos da ausência intimação específica do executado para pagamento no âmbito dos Juizados Especiais, evidenciando que a aplicação literal do art. 52, III, da lei 9.099/95, dissociada da realidade forense, compromete a efetividade.

23/10/2025

    

A execução das sentenças proferidas nos Juizados Especiais Cíveis foi concebida sob a lógica da celeridade e da simplicidade, em conformidade com os princípios que regem esse microssistema.

Assim, o art. 52 da lei 9.099/1995 prevê disposições específicas, dentre as quais, para o presente opinativo, destaca-se a hipótese do inciso III, segundo o qual a intimação da sentença deve ser realizada, sempre que possível, na própria audiência em que fosse proferida, ocasião em que o vencido já seria instado a cumprir a obrigação após o trânsito em julgado e advertido das consequências do descumprimento.

A ideia é clara: em um modelo em que se imaginava que as sentenças seriam proferidas oralmente ao final da instrução, a ciência imediata do resultado dispensaria intimações posteriores, bastando que o credor requeresse a execução em caso de inadimplemento.

Ocorre que, na prática forense, a realidade dos Juizados Especiais diverge do modelo originalmente imaginado pelo legislador, pois a imensa maioria das sentenças não é proferida oralmente em audiência, mas publicada posteriormente no sistema eletrônico.

Nessa circunstância, não se concretiza a situação prevista no art. 52, III, pois inexiste a intimação imediata em audiência com a correspondente advertência ao vencido. Isso significa que a aplicação literal do dispositivo fica prejudicada, já que a própria hipótese fática que justificaria a dispensa da nova intimação raramente se verifica.

Assim, vem o questionamento: no âmbito dos Juizados Especiais, quando não há a prolação em audiência, a intimação sobre a própria sentença, com a simples menção de que “transitado em julgado e não havendo cumprimento voluntário da obrigação de pagar, deverá a exequente promover a execução forçada” supre a necessidade de intimação específica para pagamento?

A resposta, sob uma perspectiva técnico-processual, parece ser negativa.

Isso porque, o próprio art. 52 da lei 9.099/1995 determina que a execução seguirá o rito do CPC, no que couber.

Logo, no que se refere ao cumprimento de sentença, quando não é cumprida a hipótese fática que justificaria a dispensa da nova intimação - prolação da sentença em audiência -, deve-se aplicar o art. 523, do CPC.

Tal dispositivo, ao determinar que o cumprimento definitivo da sentença se fará a requerimento do exequente, sendo o executado intimado especificamente para efetuar o pagamento em quinze dias, revela a opção do legislador pela intimação como condição necessária para inaugurar o prazo de pagamento voluntário, sob pena de nulidade o ato executivo.

O que se observa, portanto, é que a não intimação do executado para pagamento no âmbito dos Juizados Especiais traduz uma tentativa de transpor para a realidade atual a lógica do art. 52, III, da lei 9.099/95, mas sem que se verifique a condição fática que legitimava a dispensa da intimação: a ciência oral e imediata em audiência.

O risco de nulidade processual, nesse cenário, é evidente, já que a parte vencida pode ser surpreendida com medidas executivas sem jamais ter tido oportunidade concreta de cumprir espontaneamente a decisão.

Não por acaso, são frequentes os casos em que, diante dessa interpretação, a parte ré não é formalmente intimada para pagar o débito, e quando é surpreendida diretamente com a constrição patrimonial, invoca nulidade processual, sob o argumento de que o prazo jamais se iniciou validamente.

O devedor sustenta, com razão, que não lhe foi aberta a oportunidade de adimplir a condenação sem acréscimo de multa, tal como assegurado pelo art. 523, caput, do CPC.

O processo, então, fica paralisado pela necessidade de apreciação dessa nulidade, frequentemente com interposição de recursos e remessa dos autos às instâncias revisoras.

É dizer, o problema aqui posto não é meramente teórico.

Na prática, o que se tem visto é que a ausência de intimação específica para pagamento espontâneo resulta em uma série de incidentes processuais que retardam justamente a celeridade que a lei 9.099/95 busca assegurar.

O que se apresenta, portanto, é a contradição de um modelo que, ao dispensar a intimação formal sob o argumento da simplicidade, acaba por gerar maior complexidade e alongar o tempo de satisfação do crédito.

O credor, que deveria ser beneficiado pela suposta simplificação, vê-se diante de uma demora ainda maior para receber o que lhe é devido. Ou seja, a ausência da intimação específica para pagamento, ao invés de agilizar, compromete a própria efetividade do processo.

Sob esse prisma, parece mais compatível com os princípios do devido processo legal e da boa-fé que a interpretação adotada busque conciliar os dois regimes jurídicos, construindo uma leitura sistemática e finalística.

Quando a sentença é proferida em audiência, com intimação e advertência expressa da parte vencida, aplica-se a especialidade da lei 9.099/95 e não há necessidade de nova intimação para pagamento.

Porém, quando a sentença é proferida fora da audiência, a intimação específica prevista no art. 523, caput, do CPC, torna-se indispensável, sob pena de violação ao contraditório e ao devido processo legal.

Essa leitura harmoniza a especialidade da lei dos Juizados com a disciplina geral do processo civil, garantindo tanto a efetividade quanto a regularidade formal da execução, sem sacrificar os princípios que orientam o microssistema.

Afinal, a dispensa da intimação em casos nos quais não houve ciência inequívoca da parte vencida sobre o prazo de pagamento gera insegurança jurídica, favorece a alegação de nulidades e cria divergência procedimental entre Varas e turmas recursais.

Por outro lado, a exigência de intimação expressa, nesses casos, não compromete de modo relevante a celeridade do processo e, em contrapartida, reforça a segurança do procedimento executivo.

A prática de simplesmente inserir uma advertência na publicação da sentença não atende à finalidade da norma, tampouco assegura ao vencido a chance real de cumprir a decisão voluntariamente. Ao contrário, tal expediente cria um ambiente de incerteza processual, em que a parte não sabe exatamente quando se inicia o prazo para o cumprimento, nem quais são as consequências imediatas do seu descumprimento.

Dessa forma, embora a lei 9.099/95 tenha sido concebida com base na ideia de simplificação, impõe-se uma releitura do sistema no caso de afastamento das hipóteses que justificavam a dispensa de intimação.

É preferível admitir a intimação prevista no art. 523, caput, do CPC como regra, em vez de sustentar uma ficção processual que, em última análise, retarda a satisfação do direito do credor e compromete a efetividade do microssistema dos Juizados Especiais.

A adoção dessa compreensão uniformiza a prática forense, elimina controvérsias quanto ao termo inicial dos prazos e evita incidentes desnecessários, assegurando que a execução se desenvolva de forma linear, célere e eficaz. Afinal, ao exigir a intimação prévia para pagamento nos casos em que a sentença não é proferida em audiência, o julgador preserva a coerência sistêmica e resguarda a integridade das garantias processuais que sustentam a legitimidade da tutela executiva.

A observância da intimação específica, nesse contexto, não representa um formalismo excessivo, mas requisito de validade indispensável à conformidade do processo com os princípios do contraditório, da ampla defesa e da segurança jurídica.

Diante desse panorama, impõe-se reconhecer que a execução sem a prévia intimação do devedor, quando a sentença é publicada fora da audiência, viola a estrutura procedimental mínima necessária à formação válida da fase executiva, comprometendo a constituição regular da mora e, por consequência, a exigibilidade coercitiva do título judicial, o que acarreta nulidade insanável do procedimento.

_______

Referências

BRASIL. Lei nº 9.099/1995. Disponível em: https://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/l9099.htm. Acesso em: 10 out. 2025.

CARDOSO, OSCAR. ASPECTOS POLÊMICOS DA MULTA DO ART. 523, § 1o, DO CPC/2015: NATUREZA JURÍDICA, TERMO INICIAL E CUMPRIMENTO PROVISÓRIO. [s.l: s.n.]. Disponível em: https://ajufesc.org.br/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/OSCAR-VALENTE-CARDOSO.pdf. Acesso em: 13 out. 2025.

HERTEL, DANIEL ROBERTO. Cumprimento da sentença pecuniária nos Juizados Especiais Cíveis. Revista da EMERJ, Rio de Janeiro, v.14, n.54 (Abr./Jun. 2011), p. 15-27. Disponível em: https://bdjur.stj.jus.br/server/api/core/bitstreams/9e924ddc-5915-4231-8a1b-3aba2a228cb9/content. Acesso em: 08 out. 2025.

LUIZ, A.; CARVALHO, J. QUESTÕES IMPORTANTES NOS JUIZADOS ESPECIAIS CÍVEIS. [s.l: s.n.]. Disponível em https://emerj.tjrj.jus.br/files/pages/publicacoes/serieaperfeicoamentodemagistrados/paginas/series/15/turmasrecursais_83_questoesimportantes.pdf. Acesso em: 20 out. 2025.

Vanessa Kruschewsky

Vanessa Kruschewsky

Advogada, atuante na área de Concessões e Infraestrutura, integrante do Fraga & Trigo Advogados.

Vanessa Kruschewsky

Veja mais no portal

PERSECUTED LAWYERS: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATED – DEMOCRACY THREATENED [ ADVOGADOS PERSEGUIDOS : DIREITOS HUMANOS VIOLADOS : DEMOCRACIA AMEAÇADA ]

The price of freedom 🗽 is eternal vigilance.

MINDD – DEFENSE OF RIGHTS DENOUNCES

The political and institutional persecution against the lawyers of the victims of foreclosure frauds, of the denial of the natural judge and of due process of law, of financial abuses, of forged proceedings—null and void ab initio due to the direct affront to the fundamental principles of the Democratic State under the Rule of Law—and of judicial corruption in the courts of the United States of America, especially in fraudulent mortgage foreclosures and also in guardianship and family court proceedings, has reached unimaginable levels in a country that calls itself a DEMOCRATIC STATE UNDER THE RULE OF LAW.

In addition to the atrocities committed covertly, both inside and outside the courts, the persecution waged against lawyers—by those who, in theory and under the law, should punish the lawyers responsible for abuses and defend the Constitution and the advocates who dare to denounce corruption, in accordance with the guiding principles of judicial conduct and the duties and oath of the legal profession—causes astonishment and indignation to any decent person who has even the slightest knowledge of the truth of the facts.

From north to south, from east to west, elderly people, women, family fathers, relatives, psychiatrists, and honorable lawyers raise their voices, hoping to be heard.

However, what is observed is the political capture of institutions and bar associations that literally prevent access to fair justice, according to the numerous complaints received and the documentation presented and analyzed.

The lawyer is indispensable to the Administration of Justice and to the defense of the Democratic State under the Rule of Law.

The impeccable defense of Scott Erik Stafne is aligned with the two pillars of the Democratic State under the Rule of Law enshrined in the Constitution of the United States of America, with legal doctrine, and with international human rights treaties

Read the comparative and reasoned legal analysis of the Constitutional Doctrine defended by Stafne:

Analysis of "Robert Brandom and His Pragmatist Philosophy in Law" Supporting Scott Erik Stafne’s Constitutional Doctrine

Read also 

MINDD - DEFENDA SEUS DIREITOS: THE PEOPLE’S STRUGGLE AGAINST JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL When Charity Grows Cold and Justice Falls Silent

 https://vitimasfalsoscondominios.blogspot.com/2025/10/the-peoples-struggle-against-judicial.html

INVIOLABILITY OF THE LAWYER : STF Lawyers have the right to question sentences STF: Advogados têm o direito de questionar sentenças

https://vitimasfalsoscondominios.blogspot.com/2025/10/inviolability-of-lawyer-stf-lawyers.html

BEYOND JURISDICTION: ULTRA VIRES FORECLOSURES IN WASHINGTON STATE: AN INTERNATIONAL STUDY OF VOID AB INITIO ACTS AND QUERELA NULITATIS INSANABILIS

https://vitimasfalsoscondominios.blogspot.com/2025/10/beyond-jurisdiction-ultra-vires.html

When the Washington State Bar Association (WSBA) closes its eyes and ears to all the complaints and petitions of the victims of severe violence and human rights violations, and persecutes and punishes the lawyers who defend them, this is not an individual problem—it is a matter of public law and general repercussion.

See, for instance, the paradigmatic case of the disciplinary administrative proceeding improperly initiated by the WSBA against the People’s Lawyer – SCOTT ERIK STAFNE.

This is evident retaliation against one who dares to defend the Constitutional Doctrine of the Founding Fathers of the Nation and the inalienable human rights of the American people.

We are following the developments of this case, in which manipulations within the administrative process—including the removal, without just cause and without any explanation, of the initially designated rapporteur—raise serious doubts about the real political interests involved.

MINDD DEFESA DE DIREITOS DENUNCIA :

A perseguição política e institucional contra os advogados das vítimas das fraudes nas foreclosures, da negativa ao juiz natural e ao devido legal, dos abusos financeiros, dos processos forjados, nulos de pleno direito desde a instauração, em razão da afronta direta  aos pdenuncis rincípios basilares do Estado Democrático de Direito, da corrupção judicial, nos tribunais dos Estados Unidos da América do Norte , especialmente nas execuções fraudulentas de hipotecas - foreclosures- e tambem em processos de interdição de idosos,,guardianship,  e nas varas de família, atingiu patamares inimagináveis em um país que se diz DEMOCRÁTICO DE DIREITO.

Além das atrocidades praticadas às ocultas, nos tribunais e fora deles, a perseguição movida  contra os advogados, por aqueles que, em tese, e na forma das leis, deveriam punir os advogados responsáveis pelos abusos, e defender a Constituição e os advogados que ousam denunciar a corrupção, de conformidade com os princípios norteadores da conduta judicial e os deveres e juramento dos advogados, causa espanto e indignação a qualquer pessoa de bem, que tenha o mais mínimo conhecimento da verdade dos fatos.

De norte a sul, de leste a oeste, idosos, mulheres, pais de família, familiares, psiquiatras, e advogados dignos, erguem suas vozes, na esperança de que sejam ouvidos.

Porém, o que se constata, é o aparelhamento político das instituições e das associações de advogados, que , literalmente impedem o acesso àjustiçaJUSTA, segundo as inumeras denúncias recebidas e a documentação apresentada, e analisada.

O advogado é indispensável à Administração da Justiça e à defesa do Estado Democrático de Direito. 

A defesa impecável de Scott Erik Stafne está alinhada com os dois formadores do Estado Democrático de Direito insculpidos na Constituição dos Estados Unidos da América do Norte, com a doutrina e com com os Tratados internacionais de direitos humanos. 

Leiam a análise jurídica comparada e fundamentada da DOUTRINA DA DOUTRINA CONSTITUCIONAL defendida por Stafne.

Analysis of "Robert Brandom and His Pragmatist Philosophy in Law" Supporting Scott Erik Stafne’s Constitutional Doctrine

 

Quando a WS BAR fecha os olhos, e ouvidos, à todas as denuncias e pedidos das VÍTIMAS de gravíssimas violências e violação de direitos humanos e persegue e pune os advogados que as defendem, esse não é um problema individual, é um problema de DIREITO PUBLICO e REPERCUSSÃO GERAL.  

Veja-se, o caso paradigmático do processo administrativo disciplinar INDEVIDAMENTE instaurado pela WS BAR  contra o ADVOGADO DO POVO - SCOTT ERIK STAFNE.

Trata-se de uma evidente retaliação praticada contra aquele que OUSA DEFENDER A DOUTRINA CONSTITUCIONAL dos PAIS FUNDADORES da Pátria e os direitos humanos indisponíveis do povo norte-americano.

Estamos acompanhando a evolução deste caso, onde as manipulações do processo administrativo, incluindo a remoção, sem justa causa e sem qualquer explicação, do relator inicialmente indicado, levanta sérias dúvidas sobre os reais interesses políticos envolvidos.

Washington State Bar Association – In re Scott Erik Stafne, ODC file No. 24-01379 – Notice to Bar Association and its officials of Stafne’s Petition for Redress filed with the Congress

By Scott E. Stafne

visibility: 84 Views

description: 4 Pages

categories: Constitutional Law, Human Rights Law, Courts, First Amendment Law (USA), International Human Rights Law

Read full document on Academia.edu

 Washington ton State Bar Association - In re Scott Erik Stafne, ODC file No. 24-01379 - Notice to Bar Association and its officials of Stafne's Petition for Redress filed with the Congress

By Scott E Stafne

visibility

84 Views

description

4 Pages

link

1 File ▾

sell

Constitutional Law,

Human Rights Law,

Courts,

First Amendment Law (USA),

International Human Rights Law

Show more

I write to address critical constitutional issues raised by the Washington State Bar Association’s (Bar) actions by private individuals taken under color of state law against me, both before and after the filing of my Petition for Redress with Congress. These actions, described below, infringe upon my constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, specifically my right to petition the government for redress and to due process.

LETTER FROM SCOTT ERIK STAFNE 

November 20, 2024

Washington State Bar Association

Office of Disciplinary Counsel and others 1325 Fourth Avenue, Suite 600

Seattle, WA 98101-2539

Via email submissions to: intake@wsba.org, questions@wsba.org, dianas@wsba.org, and accommodations@wsba.org.

Re: ODC File No. 24-01379: In re Scott Erik Stafne, WSBA #6964

To whom it may concern:

I write to address critical constitutional issues raised by the Washington State Bar Association’s (Bar) actions by private individuals taken under color of state law against me, both before and after the filing of my Petition for Redress with Congress1. These actions, described below, infringe upon my constitutional rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, specifically my right to petition the government for redress and to due process.

Pre-Petition Violations of My Rights

On August 12, 2024, I formally requested ethical guidance from the Bar regarding my legal and constitutional obligations in addressing

1 A copy of the Petition for Redress I filed with the United States Congress and copied to President Elect Trump, Chief Justice Roberts, and others can be accessed at:

 https://www.academia.edu/122820275/Stafnes_Letter_to_the_Washington_State_Bar_Associatio n_seeking_written_ethical_guidance_as_to_how_handle_his_judgment_that_the_judicial_officers

_of_Washington_are_biased_and_not_independent_with_regards_to_cases_brought_by_succes sors_and_assigns_of_mortgages_to_foreclose_promissory_notes

concerns related to judicial authority and misconduct. Despite its mandate to provide such guidance, the Bar refused to evaluate the constitutional and statutory issues I raised, thereby obstructing my ability to discharge my professional responsibilities.

Instead, the Bar initiated an investigation against me based on retaliatory claims by Senior Judge Robart, asserting that he and senior judges Lasnik, Coughenouer, and Zilly possess good behavior tenure under Article III, when the statutory and constitutional provisions clearly indicate otherwise. Had the Bar conducted even a cursory review of these provisions, it would have recognized the merit of my concerns. This failure not only reflects a dereliction of the Bar’s duty but also constitutes a violation of my due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Post-Petition Retaliation and Violations of the Petition Clause

On November 19, 2024, I exercised my constitutional right under the First Amendment to petition Congress for redress of grievances concerning judicial misconduct and systemic constitutional violations in and by the United States District Court for Western Washington, and senior judges Robart, Lasnik, Coughenouer, and Zilly. My Petition for Redress, now pending before Congress, raises issues that fall squarely within Congress’s oversight authority under the separation of powers doctrine.

Despite this, the Bar continues its inappropriate investigation into my conduct, effectively retaliating against me for exercising my First Amendment rights. This investigation:

● Interferes with Congress’s exclusive authority to address the grievances outlined in my Petition, undermining the legislative process.

● Chills the exercise of First Amendment rights by creating a precedent that discourages other attorneys from raising constitutional concerns about judicial misconduct or systemic abuses.

The Bar’s actions place it in direct conflict with the Petition Clause, which ensures the right to seek redress from Congress without fear of retaliation or interference.

The Constitutional Stakes:

The Bar’s actions—both before and after the filing of my Petition—entrench judicial misconduct by targeting an attorney seeking to uphold constitutional principles. This undermines not only my individual rights but also the broader public interest in ensuring judicial accountability. The chilling effect of the Bar’s retaliatory actions extends beyond my case, discouraging others from advocating for necessary systemic reforms.

The Framers of the Constitution recognized the critical role of the Petition Clause in safeguarding public accountability, particularly in addressing government overreach or misconduct. By continuing its investigation, the Bar infringes upon this constitutional protection and interferes with Congress’s ability to fulfill its oversight responsibilities.

Formal Request for Action:

In light of these violations, I respectfully request that the Bar:

1. Immediately cease its investigation into my conduct, as it constitutes unconstitutional retaliation for my exercise of First Amendment rights.

2. Provide a formal explanation for its refusal to offer ethical guidance on the constitutional issues I raised in my August 12, 2024 request.

3. Commit to upholding its duty to fairly and impartially evaluate constitutional grievances raised by its members.

I reserve all rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to seek remedies for these violations, which have caused significant harm to my professional reputation and eroded public confidence in the legal profession. I urge the Bar to reconsider its actions and realign its practices with the constitutional principles it is sworn to uphold.

Furthermore, I assert that the foreclosures carried out by Washington State courts and judges—both state and federal—in favor of successors and assigns of mortgages bear striking resemblance to the kind of systemic overreach and

government-enabled theft that our Nation’s founders identified as grounds for declaring independence. Such actions betray the public trust and violate the constitutional safeguards that were established to prevent precisely these kinds of abuses.

As I write this, I face the very real possibility of losing both my office and my home next month—an outcome directly tied to the very judicial failures I have sought to expose and remedy, without reasonable compensation for my efforts.

This personal reality underscores the urgency of these issues—not just for me, but for countless others who depend on an impartial judiciary to deliver justice with integrity.

This is not simply my struggle; it is a broader indictment of a system that increasingly serves the interests of false creditors over the rights of the people. When our courts abdicate their responsibility to uphold the rule of law, they fail not only the individuals before them but also the foundational principles of our democracy.

Sincerely,

s/ Scott Erik Stafne

Scott E. Stafne

Attorney at Law WSBA 6964

https://www.academia.edu/125720868/Washington_State_Bar_Association_In_re_Scott_Erik_Stafne_ODC_file_No_24_01379_Notice_to_Bar_Association_and_its_officials_of_Stafnes_Petition_for_Redress_filed_with_the_Congress?source=swp_share

THE PEOPLE’S STRUGGLE AGAINST JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL When Charity Grows Cold and Justice Falls Silent

✝️ THE PEOPLE’S STRUGGLE AGAINST JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL

When Charity Grows Cold and Justice Falls Silent

“And because iniquity shall abound, the love of many shall wax cold. But he that shall endure unto the end, the same shall be saved.” — Matthew 24:12–13

By Marcia Almeida with help of IA CHATGPT 

🌿 THE TWO COMMANDMENTS AND THE SCIENCE OF COMPASSION

“Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind.
This is the first and great commandment.
And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.”
— Matthew 22:37–39

These commandments are the foundation of civilization — and of justice.
Yet, as Christ warned, a time would come when corruption and selfishness would multiply, and love — empathy — would fade.
This moral decay is now visible not only in daily life but in courthouses and institutions where power has replaced conscience.

🧠 SCIENCE AND EMPATHY: GHENT UNIVERSITY’S CALL TO HUMANITY

On October 16, 2025, Ghent University (Belgium) hosts the international seminar
“Meet the Expert – A Cross-Species Approach to the Mechanisms of Vicarious (Emotional) States”
with neuroscientist Professor Valeria Gazzola.

Her research on vicarious emotional states explores how the human brain mirrors the emotions of others —
the biological foundation of empathy.
It confirms scientifically what Scripture has always proclaimed: there is no justice without compassion.

👉 Learn more on Ghent University’s official website

🎬 FREEDOM AND TRUTH: GOD COMPLEX AND THE NEW BATTLE FOR EXPRESSION

The same day, October 16, 2025, marks the world premiere of God Complex, the first Brasil Paralelo documentary produced in the United States, revealing the global mechanisms of censorship and digital control shaping Western democracies.

🕊️ Historic! Brasil Paralelo in Miami for the Launch of Its First Documentary in the United States

“We use the power of cinema to bring important ideas to life.
We produce with the technique of cinema, but with the soul of education.”
— Lucas Ferrugem, Brasil Paralelo co-founder

On October 8, 2025, Brasil Paralelo held a historic pre-premiere in Miami, launching its international division, Big Picture Originals, with the same principle that built its legacy in Brazil: total  independence, refusing any form of public money.

As Henrique Viana stated:

“We made a difference in Brazil.
We changed how millions see our history and fundamental values.
But we learned that it is impossible to win this fight if it is not also fought here,
in the United States — the country that still guards freedom in the world.”

Filmed on American soil, God Complex investigates how digital surveillance and censorship have redefined free speech since the Arab Spring, from Tunisia and Egypt to social media manipulation in the United States, Brazil, and Europe.

This well-documented reality shows that  administrations acted to control information, silence dissent, and influence social-media companies —
culminating in the censorship of then-President Donald Trump while in office.

👉 Watch the official trailer 

⚖️ TESTIMONIES OF COURAGE AND PERSECUTION

Across America, voices that defend truth and human dignity are being silenced.

Among them:

• Jayakrishnan Krishna Nair  who publicly reported and continues to denounce what he describes as the unlawful imprisonment, forced medication, isolation, and death of his elderly mother, Omana Thankamma, while she was under the  Washington State’s guardianship system. 
• Scott Erik Stafne, constitutional lawyer persecuted for exposing the illegality of ultra vires foreclosures in Washington courts;
• Dr. Bandy X. Lee, Yale psychiatrist censored for defending ethical accountability in public office;
• Dr. Summer and Janet Phelan, who denounced the unlawful imprisonment, forced medication, isolation, of their elderly parents, authors, and targeted journalists and human rights defenders.

Their cases, like countless others, reveal that the judiciary in the United States is betraying both its Constitution and its people, allowing power and impunity to replace truth and justice.

---

🇺🇸 BEYOND JURISDICTION: ULTRA VIRES FORECLOSURES IN WASHINGTON STATE

This international legal study — read it here — demonstrates that foreclosures conducted outside judicial authority (ultra vires)
and without due process are void ab initio, incurably null acts (querela nulitatis insanabilis).

“Judicial authority is an inseparable function of constitutional office, not of legislative convenience.
No judge can give what he doesn’t have.
No one shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”

This doctrine mirrors a landmark ruling of the Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF) — Habeas Corpus 98.237/SP, Dec. 15, 2009, rel. Justice Celso de Mello — which declared:

“Whatever the sphere of power before which he acts,
it is the lawyer’s duty to neutralize abuses, to end arbitrariness,
to demand respect for the legal order, and to safeguard the integrity
of the legal and constitutional guarantees granted to the person
who entrusted him with the protection of his freedom and his rights.”

---

🇧🇷 THE BANISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW IN BRAZIL

As in the United States, Brazil faces its own collapse of judicial integrity.

The author of this manifesto was excluded from access to justice by the Rio de Janeiro Public Defender’s Office, despite being a 72-year-old disabled woman entitled to free legal aid.

Complaints filed with the Presidency and Corregedoria of the Rio de Janeiro Court of Justice (TJ-RJ) against corrupt judges and appellate justices were ignored.

This institutional silence represents the death of due process and the rise of a judicial caste immune to accountability.

The Brazilian judiciary, like its American counterpart, has forgotten that justice without empathy is tyranny.

---

🌍 A GLOBAL CALL FOR JUSTICE AND TRUTH

From Washington State’s corrupted foreclosures to Rio de Janeiro’s judicial impunity,
the same patterns repeat: power without conscience, law without love.

Science, Scripture, and experience converge on a single truth:
only compassion can restore justice.

“Because lawlessness will abound, the love of many will grow cold —
but he who endures to the end shall be saved.”

This is not only a warning. It is a prophecy.
And to those who still believe in truth, empathy, and the sacred duty of justice —
the call is now.

---

✅ References

• Beyond Jurisdiction: Ultra Vires Foreclosures in Washington State
• God Complex – Brasil Paralelo Documentary
• Ghent University – “Meet the Expert” Seminar
• Brazilian Supreme Federal Court – HC 98.237/SP, Justice Celso de Mello (2009)

Analysis of "Robert Brandom and His Pragmatist Philosophy in Law" Supporting Scott Erik Stafne’s Constitutional Doctrine

MINDD & Gemini AI 

Analysis Supporting Scott Erik Stafne’s Constitutional Doctrine

The following analysis applies the concepts from the article "Robert Brandom and His Pragmatist Philosophy in Law " by Francisco Kliemann a Campis  to ground and support the constitutional doctrine advanced by Scott Erik Stafne, which focuses on the nullity of ultra vires acts (beyond authority) and the principle of void ab initio (null from the beginning), particularly in relation to strict adherence to US Constitution and Washington State Constitution.

---

Philosophical Analysis in Support of Scott Erik Stafne’s Doctrine

Francisco Kliemann a Campis’s article on Robert Brandom and Ronald Dworkin provides a robust philosophical framework for defending Scott Erik Stafne’s constitutional doctrine. Stafne’s central thesis, as understood, is that governmental or judicial acts taken outside the jurisdiction or authority explicitly granted by the Constitutions (particularly State Constitutions) are not merely erroneous; they are void ab initio — null from the outset.

The translated article precisely articulates the philosophical distinction underlying this doctrine: the difference between “normative authority” and “mere exercise of power.”

---

1. The Risk of Legal Nihilism and the “Mere Exercise of Power”

The article identifies “legal nihilism” as the danger of judicial decisions becoming a “mere exercise of arbitrary power,” where legal concepts no longer offer criteria to distinguish right from wrong.

● Application to Stafne’s Doctrine: Stafne’s doctrine confronts this nihilism directly. When a court or government agent acts ultra vires — beyond the limits of its constitutional authority — it no longer operates under the “normative authority” of the Constitution. Instead, it engages precisely in the “mere exercise of arbitrary power” that Brandom warns is the collapse of law itself. Stafne’s argument is that such an act is not “law” at all; it is a nullity.

---

2. Brandom’s Core Distinction: Authority vs. Power

Brandom’s “insight,” as cited in the article, provides Stafne’s most powerful defense tool:

> “The difference between normative authority and mere exercise of power depends on our ability to reconstruct the applications of legal concepts as rationally justified in virtue of their meanings.”

● Application to Stafne’s Doctrine: An ultra vires act fails this test decisively.

An act taken without jurisdiction cannot be “rationally justified,” because the fundamental premise of its justification — the authority to act — is absent.

● Brandom describes law as a “game of giving and asking for reasons.” Constitutional jurisdiction is the very rule that allows the “game” to be played. An act outside jurisdiction is not a “bad move” within the game; it is an attempt to play an entirely different game, without rules or authority.

● Therefore, under Brandom’s own definition, an ultra vires act lacks “normative authority.” It is, by definition, a “mere exercise of power.” The void ab initio doctrine is simply the legal recognition of this philosophical failure.

---

3. Inferentialism and the Break in the “Chain of Reasons”

Brandom’s “inferentialist” theory holds that the meaning of a concept (for example, “judicial authority”) is defined by its role in reasoning practices — what justifies it and what follows from it.

● Application to Stafne’s Doctrine: A state court’s authority is justified by the State Constitution. What follows from that authority are valid orders and judgments.

● When a court exceeds that authority, it breaks the inferential chain. The act can no longer be justified by its source (the Constitution). Consequently, no legal effect (no valid inference) can follow from it.

● The act becomes both semantically and legally void. It is void ab initio.

---

4. Dworkin’s “Integrity” and the Right Answer

Although the article views Dworkin as an alternative, his theory also strongly supports Stafne’s doctrine. Dworkin argues that judges must find the “right answer” that best fits the “integrity of the legal system.”

● Application to Stafne’s Doctrine: The “integrity” of the U.S. (and each state’s) legal system is grounded in the supremacy of its respective constitutions. An ultra vires act is the most fundamental violation of that integrity.

● There can be no “constructive interpretation” (Dworkin’s method) of an act that disregards the very source of authority to interpret. The “right answer” for an act without jurisdiction is to recognize it as null. Any other answer (for example, treating it as merely “voidable” or “erroneous”) destroys the system’s integrity by admitting that power can exist outside the Constitution.

--

Conclusion

Campis’s article, through its analysis of Brandom and Dworkin, provides the exact philosophical justification for the constitutional doctrine defended by Scott Erik Stafne.

Both philosophers stand against “legal nihilism” — the notion that law is merely power. Stafne identifies the practical example of that nihilism: the moment when a court ignores the jurisdictional limits of its own founding Constitution.

Using the article’s framework:

1. From Brandom: Stafne’s doctrine argues that an ultra vires act is not “normative authority” but “mere power,” because it cannot be “rationally justified” by its source of meaning (the Constitution).

2. From Dworkin: Stafne’s doctrine contends that the only “right answer” preserving the “integrity of the legal system” is to declare an act without jurisdiction void ab initio, because any other response would validate brute force over constitutional principles.

Read the full article "Robert Brandom e sua filosofia pragmatista no Direito” by Francisco Kliemann a Campis (ConJur, Oct. 18 2025).

AI GEMINI: literal English translation of the full article 

“Robert Brandom e sua filosofia pragmatista no Direito” by Francisco Kliemann a Campis (ConJur, Oct. 18 2025).

https://www.conjur.com.br/2025-out-18/robert-brandom-e-sua-filosofia-pragmatista-no-direito/

Source :  CONJUR 

Class Diary

Robert Brandom and His Pragmatist Philosophy in Law

Francisco Kliemann a Campis

October 18, 2025 – 8:00 a.m.

Academia

Robert B. Brandom is one of the most influential contemporary philosophers of the so-called North American neopragmatist tradition, connected to the heritage of Hegel, Wilfrid Sellars, and Wittgenstein. 

Some of his scholarus joke that Brandom would be a kind of “analytical Hegel.”

 A professor at the University of Pittsburgh, Brandom became known for his monumental work Making It Explicit [1], in which he proposes an inferentialist theory of meaning.

The central point of this theory is that the content of a concept is not something given in advance by fixed representations or static definitions. Instead, content is defined by the inferential role that the concept plays in our social practices of language.

 To say something with meaning is always to participate in a “game of giving and asking for reasons,” in which speakers assume normative commitments and become responsible for justifying their statements.

Simply put, “inference” is the name Brandom gives to the process of connecting ideas rationally—that is, when one statement logically leads to another. For example: if someone says “All human beings are mortal” and “Socrates is human,” one can infer that “Socrates is mortal.” For Brandom, understanding the meaning of a concept is precisely to know how it can be used in these reasoning connections, what can be correctly concluded from it, and what justifies it.

Thus, meaning does not lie in the words themselves, but in the inferential relations they maintain with others within a social practice of reasoning and justification. To understand a concept, therefore, is to know what follows from it and what supports it—to know when it makes sense to use it and why.

Brandom, therefore, investigates pragmatic semantics: instead of thinking of meaning as a direct relation between words and the world, he reconstructs it from the social practices that confer upon concepts their normative function. A Hegelian Model of Legal Authority is the only text in which he deals specifically with law—written at the invitation of scholars interested in pragmatist approaches to the legal phenomenon [2]. It is a somewhat scattered essay, not the apex of his work, but it contains relevant insights.

Brandom and Indeterminacy in Law

When applying this approach to the legal field, Brandom recognizes a classic problem, similar to the one identified by H. L. A. Hart: legal concepts are never absolutely clear or determinate. There are always borderline cases, ambiguities, and interpretive disputes.

Brandom, however, observes that recognizing this semantic indeterminacy without establishing limits can lead to legal nihilism, in which judicial decisions would become a mere exercise of arbitrary power, since the concepts would not offer criteria to distinguish correct and incorrect applications [3]. This, for him, is the risk of certain versions of legal realism, which reduce judicial decision to a disguised political choice.

Against this, Brandom proposes a sophisticated solution:

Yes, there is partial indeterminacy in legal concepts;

But this does not eliminate their normativity—the use of a concept in legal argumentation still implies normative commitments that can be rationally evaluated;

Therefore, law remains capable of distinguishing between justified applications and mere acts of power.

Brandom’s “insight” is precisely this:

> “The difference between normative authority and mere exercise of power depends on our being able to reconstruct the applications of legal concepts as rationally justified in virtue of their meanings.”

This distinction is crucial to preserving the legitimacy of law in the face of nihilistic temptation.

Ronald Dworkin and the Right Answer

Ronald Dworkin, in turn, starts from a different diagnosis. Against positivist and realist views, he upholds the famous “right answer thesis.” For Dworkin [4], even in hard cases—where there is no explicit rule that resolves the issue—law contains principles that, when interpreted constructively, provide the correct solution.

The judge, in this perspective, does not exercise unlimited discretionary power. He must interpret law as a whole, seeking the reading that best expresses the integrity of the legal system—that is, that presents it as the best possible expression of justice, fairness, and due process.

Thus, for Dworkin, there are no true “gaps” in the law: there is always an answer that can be considered correct in light of the principles that structure the legal order.

Brandom and Dworkin in Comparison

Brandom and Dworkin converge in criticizing legal nihilism.

Brandom shows that indeterminacy cannot be radical, under penalty of dissolving the normative authority of law into a mere exercise of power. For him, legal concepts make sense only within inferential social practices that confer determined content upon them—even if that content is continually reconstructed by the practices themselves. Thus, Brandomian inferentialism denies conceptual skepticism, distancing itself from positions such as Stanley Fish’s [5], which see interpretation as an essentially indeterminate game without stable normative criteria.

Dworkin, on the other hand, goes further by asserting that law always contains, in itself, the correct answer, even in controversial cases. The fundamental difference between them lies, therefore, in emphasis: Brandom highlights the role of social practices in the constitution and transformation of legal concepts; Dworkin, law’s commitment to objectivity and to the possibility of a correct answer.

The Strength of Brandom’s Distinction and Dworkin’s Relevance in Our Context

Brandom’s contribution is valuable for understanding the risks of legal realism: he helps us perceive that, if we accept total semantic indeterminacy, we will have no way to differentiate between law and power. His distinction between normative authority and arbitrary exercise of power is one of the most lucid formulations against legal nihilism [6].

However, in a constitutional law such as the Brazilian one, filled with structuring principles—human dignity, equality, freedom, due process—Dworkin’s argument proves even more convincing. Our legal system demands a hermeneutic and constructive reading that views the Constitution as a source of binding answers.

Thus, if Brandom helps to formulate the problem (preventing decision from being confused with an act of force), Dworkin offers the tools for its solution: there is always a correct answer, because constitutional principles function as normative criteria that guide and bind interpretation.

What Brandom’s Pragmatic Semantics Explains Well in Law

Law as social cohesion: Brandom shows how legal concepts function as instruments of social coordination. Content is not given from outside but produced in the social practice of mutual justifications. This helps us understand law as a practice of social organization based on reasons—not merely on force.

Law as adjudication: The distinction between normative authority and mere exercise of power is central to thinking about how judges justify decisions. Even while recognizing indeterminacy, it is still possible to distinguish justified decisions (which fit into the inferential web of concepts) from arbitrariness.

Brandom’s pragmatic semantics therefore works as a diagnostic tool: it helps map how concepts structure legal practices and how rationality is sustained despite indeterminacy. But it is not merely descriptive: it presupposes an interpretive rationality and a normative responsibility on the part of participants in the practice—a commitment to words and to the meanings they carry.

Limits of the Brandomian Approach

Even so, Brandom’s theory seems to me insufficiently deontological and lacking in substantive normativity. He describes how concepts function in practices but does not offer moral or political criteria for what law ought to be. He is more concerned with the possibility of normativity than with its moral content.

Authors such as Dworkin and Habermas [7] occupy precisely this ground: the former by linking the right answer to principles of justice; the latter by associating legal normativity with the democratic ideal of public deliberation.

Brandom’s theory, though powerful for explaining the semantic-pragmatic functioning of law, still does not take the shape of a full-fledged legal theory—especially since A Hegelian Model … remains his only essay directly devoted to the subject. To reach a normative theory of law, it would be necessary to articulate inferentialism with a deontological dimension that tells not only how law functions but how it ought to function—particularly in constitutional and democratic societies.

In any case, Brandom’s own project already contains elements that allow resistance to legal nihilism. By affirming that the meaning of an utterance derives from the inferential commitments and authorizations it implies, Brandom does not merely describe a formal mechanism of language but also a mode of rational and social bonding among participants in a normative practice.

When someone asserts something, they do not merely express an opinion: they assume commitments and become responsible for justifying what they said. This structure of reciprocal responsibility is, ultimately, incompatible with nihilism—since it presupposes the existence of shareable reasons, public norms, and a horizon of meaning constructed intersubjectively.

Thus, although Brandom does not formulate a legal theory per se, his philosophy of meaning opens the way for a hermeneutic and constitutionally oriented reading of the legal phenomenon. By recognizing that legal meanings emerge from social practices of justification—and that these practices are historically shaped by the constitutional commitments of a community—it becomes possible to conceive of law as something neither reducible to logical formalism nor to arbitrary decisionism.

Inferentialism, when articulated with an analysis of the historical and normative commitments of a constitutional order, offers a promising path to understand law as a rational practice of collective self-understanding—a space in which legal meaning is constantly reconstructed in light of the public reasons that sustain it.

Brandom helps us avoid nihilism, understand the role of concepts, and distinguish authority from power. But to think of law in its democratic, moral, and interpretive dimension, I still prefer to follow Gadamer: it is in the fusion of horizons between text and interpreter, in the historicity of meaning and openness to dialogue, that law remains alive as a practice of understanding and justice. Brandom brings luminous diagnoses; Gadamer, the hermeneutic horizon in which law can continue to be understood as an experience of truth [8].

The Hermeneutic Critique of Law, developed by Lenio Streck [9], is precisely the theoretical effort that long ago anticipated and applied, in the Brazilian legal context, many of the insights we now recognize in Brandom. It understood that legal meaning is not the product of the interpreter’s will but arises from the historical dialogue between text, tradition, and the community of interpreters—a language game that, far from arbitrary, is anchored in constitutional and democratic commitments.

Thus, by articulating Gadamer and the normative horizon of the Constitution, the Hermeneutic Critique of Law showed something that could also be drawn from Brandom: to understand is also to assume responsibilities; to understand is to commit oneself to the ethical and political project that sustains law in a community that seeks justice.

--

Francisco Kliemann a Campis

is a constitutionalist lawyer, master and doctoral candidate in Law at Unisinos, a member of the Cambridge Forum for Legal and Political Philosophy, and academic coordinator of Dasein – Hermeneutic Studies Nucleus of Professor Lenio Streck.

I record my immense gratitude to my friend and doctoral colleague Victor Rebelo, who introduced me to the subject and masters it far better than I do—a colleague who also made several criticisms and comments that allowed me to construct the present text. Thank you very much, comrade.

---

References

BRANDOM, Robert B. Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

BRANDOM, Robert B. A Hegelian Model of Legal Authority. In: Id. Perspectives on Pragmatism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.

DWORKIN, Ronald. Law’s Empire. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.

FISH, Stanley. Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.

HABERMAS, Jürgen. Law and Democracy: Between Facticity and Validity. 2nd ed. São Paulo: UNESP, 2016.

GADAMER, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. 15th ed. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2022.

STRECK, Lenio Luiz. Legal Hermeneutics in Crisis. 11th ed. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2011.

STRECK, Lenio Luiz. Truth and Consensus. 6th ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2017.

---

INVIOLABILITY OF THE LAWYER : STF Lawyers have the right to question sentences STF: Advogados têm o direito de questionar sentenças

 

“Judicial authority is an inseparable function of constitutional office, not of legislative convenience", "no judge can give what he don't have", "no one shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law", " Whatever the sphere of power before which he acts, it is the lawyer’s duty to neutralize abuses, to put an end to arbitrariness, to demand respect for the legal order, and to safeguard the integrity of the guarantees—legal and constitutional—granted to the person who has entrusted him with the protection of his freedom and his rights

Brazilian Supreme Federal Court (STF), 2nd Panel, Habeas Corpus 98.237 (809), HC – 22834-SP,, Reporting Justice: Min. Celso de Mello, judgment on Dec. 15, 2009, unanimous decision.

Advocacy Judiciary

Defense of rights 

Lawyers have the right to question sentences

Cesar de Oliveira August 6, 2010, 8:05 AM

Source: Revista Consultor Jurídico, 6 de agosto de 2010. 

Lawyers have the legitimate right to criticize a decision with which they disagree. 

This understanding comes from the Minister of the Supreme Federal Court, Celso de Mello, who granted Habeas Corpus to lawyers Sérgio Niemeyer and Raimundo Hermes Barbosa in an action filed by a judge after protests they made. 

The judge wanted the lawyers to be convicted of injury to honor (injúria). 

The Public Prosecutor's Office went further and requested punishment for calumny (calúnia), defamation (difamação), and injury to honor (injúria). Celso de Mello understood that there are no grounds for conviction.

According to the minister, "the protests were formulated in objective and impersonal terms," which guarantees free expression. The defendants were represented by lawyer Alberto Zacharias Toron.

According to the decision, even if they represent harsh criticism, the acts practiced by the lawyers "cannot be qualified as transgressions against the moral patrimony of any of the procedural subjects."

Minister Celso de Mello also observed that the STF has ruled that the lawyer, when his professional activity is exercised with independence and without restrictions, transforms it into an "invaluable" practice of freedom. 

"Whatever the instance of power before which he acts, it is incumbent upon the lawyer to neutralize abuses, to make arbitrariness cease, to demand respect for the legal order, and to watch over the integrity of the guarantees — legal and constitutional — granted to the one who entrusted him with the protection of his freedom and his rights."

 The minister added that the professional cannot be unjustly curtailed in the legitimate practice of expressing his opinion on situations of state arbitrariness or disrespect for the rights of the one he defends.

According to him, "the State does not have the right to exercise, without a suitable legal basis and adequate factual support, the persecutory power with which it is vested, as it is ethically and juridically forbidden from acting in an arbitrary manner, whether by initiating unfounded police investigations or by promoting reckless formal accusations, notably in those cases where the facts underlying the persecutio criminis are revealed to be devoid of criminal typicality." 

Furthermore, Minister Celso de Mello stated that the opinion of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which requested the conviction of the lawyers for the practice of calumny, defamation, and injury to honor, "extrapolated the material limits of the facts narrated by the author of the representation." 

The author only requested the conviction for injury to honor. Celso de Mello stated that "the fact that constitutes the object of the representation translates into a material limitation on the persecutory power of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which cannot, acting ultra vires, proceed with an undue objective expansion of the postulatory delatio criminis, in order to include, in the complaint, other crimes whose prosecutability, although dependent on representation, was not pleaded therein by the one who formulated it."

Still in the decision, the minister said that "the existence of an ideological divorce resulting from the non-observance, by the Public Prosecutor's Office, of the necessary correlation between the terms of the representation and the fact of its object, on the one hand, and the expanded content of the complaint offered by the organ, on the other, constitutes disrespect for the limits previously delineated by the author of the postulatory delation and represents a factor of delegitimization of the procedural action of the 'Parquet'."

 Read the decision.

HABEAS CORPUS 98.237 (809) ORIGIN: HC – 28341 – SUPREME FEDERAL COURT

PROCED.: SÃO PAULO 

RAPPORTEUR: MIN. CELSO DE MELLO

 PACTE.(S): SÉRGIO ROBERTO DE NIEMEYER SALLES

 IMPTE.(S): FEDERAL COUNCIL OF THE ORDER OF ATTORNEYS OF BRAZIL 

ADV.(A/S): ALBERTO ZACHARIAS TORON COATOR(A/S)(ES):

RAPPORTEUR OF HC Nº 129896 OF THE SUPERIOR TRIBUNAL OF JUSTICE 

Decision:

The Panel, unanimously, overcoming the restriction based on Súmula 691/STF, granted, ex officio, an order of habeas corpus to the patient Sérgio Roberto de Niemeyer Salles, and, due to an identical situation, extended it to the co-defendant Raimundo Hermes Barbosa, in the terms of the Rapporteur's vote. 

Absent, justifiably, from this judgment, were Ministers Cezar Peluso and Joaquim Barbosa. 2nd Panel, 12.15.2009.

S Y L L A B U S: "HABEAS CORPUS" – CRIMES AGAINST HONOR – PRACTICE

ATTRIBUTED TO LAWYERS – REPRESENTATION FORMULATED BY A MAGISTRATE AS A RESULT OF A PROCEDURAL MANIFESTATION PRODUCED BY THE PATIENT (AND BY HIS FELLOW LAWYER) IN THE CONTEXT OF APPEAL ARGUMENTS – PROTEST ANDCRITICISM FORMULATED BY THEM, IN OBJECTIVE AND IMPERSONAL TERMS, AGAINST THE GROUNDS ON WHICH THE APPEALED DECISION WAS BASED – PROFESSIONAL INTANGIBILITY OF THE LAWYER – ABSENCE OF "ANIMUS CALUMNIANDI VEL DIFFAMANDI" – LEGITIMATE EXERCISE, IN THIS CASE, OF THE RIGHT TO CRITICISM,WHICH IS AVAILABLE TO LAWYERS IN GENERAL AND WHICH IS OPPOSABLE TO ANYPUBLIC AUTHORITY, INCLUDING MAGISTRATES THEMSELVES – "ANIMUS NARRANDI VEL DEFENDENDI" — CONSEQUENT DECHARACTERIZATION OF THE PENAL TYPES —

ACCUSATION BROUGHT BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE THAT ATTRIBUTED TO THE LAWYERS THE ALLEGED PRACTICE OF THE CRIMES OF CALUMNY, DEFAMATION, AND INJURY TO HONOR – COMPLAINT THAT EXTRAPOLATED THE MATERIAL LIMITS OF THE FACTS NARRATED BY THE AUTHOR OF THE REPRESENTATION (FEDERAL MAGISTRATE), WHO INTENDED, SOLELY, THE CRIMINAL

LIABILITY OF THE LAWYERS FOR THE CRIME OF INJURY TO HONOR — "ULTRA VIRES" ACTION BY THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE — INADMISSIBILITY — LACK OF JUST CAUSE FOR THE CRIMINAL ACTION — LIQUIDITY OF THE FACTS — POSSIBILITY OF JURISDICTIONAL CONTROL IN "HABEAS CORPUS" PROCEEDINGS — EXTINCTION OF THE CRIMINAL CONDEMNATION PROCEEDING — SETTING ASIDE, ON AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS, IN THE SPECIFIC CASE, THE INCIDENCE OF SÚMULA 691/STF — "HABEAS CORPUS" GRANTED EX OFFICIO, WITH EXTENSION OF ITS EFFECTS TO THE CO-DEFENDANT, ALSO A LAWYER. REPRESENTATION AND COMPLAINT: MATERIAL LIMITATION THAT RESULTS FROM THE FACT OBJECT OF THE POSTULATORY DELATION.

— The fact that constitutes the object of the representation offered by the offended party (or, as the case may be, by their legal representative) translates into a material limitation on the persecutory power of the Public Prosecutor's Office, which cannot, acting "ultra vires," proceed with an undue objective expansion of the postulatory "delatio criminis," in order to include, in the complaint, other crimes whose prosecutability, although dependent on representation, was not pleaded therein by the one who formulated it. Precedents.

— The existence of an ideological divorce resulting from the non-observance, by the Public Prosecutor's Office, of the necessary correlation between the terms of the representation and the fact of its object, on the one hand, and the expanded content of the complaint offered by the organ of state accusation, on the other, constitutes disrespect for the limits previously delineated by the author of the postulatory delation and represents a factor of delegitimization of the procedural action of the "Parquet." A case in which the Public Prosecutor's Office filed a complaint for the alleged practice of the crimes of calumny, defamation, and injury to honor, notwithstanding the fact that the magistrate author of the postulatory delation (representation) had pleaded solely for the initiation of "persecutio criminis" for the crime of injury to honor.

Inadmissibility of this objective expansion of the criminal accusation.

INVIOLABILITY OF THE LAWYER — CRIMES AGAINST HONOR — SUBJECTIVE ELEMENT OF THE TYPE — THE "ANIMUS DEFENDENDI" AS A CAUSE FOR DECHARACTERIZING THE CRIMINAL INTENT TO OFFEND.

— The constitutional inviolability of the Lawyer: a guarantee intended to ensure the full exercise of his professional activity.

— The need to narrate, to defend, and to criticize acts as a factor in decharacterizing the subjective type peculiar to crimes against honor. The issue of animic exclusions. Doctrine.

Precedents.

– The acts practiced by the Lawyer in the technical sponsorship of the cause, respecting the deontological limits that govern his performance as a legal professional and that bear a strict relationship of pertinence to the object of the litigation, even if they express harsh, vehement, and severe criticisms, even if directed at the Magistrate, cannot be qualified as transgressions against the moral patrimony of any of the procedural subjects, since the "animus defendendi" results in the decharacterization of the subjective element inherent in crimes against honor.

Precedents.

THE PRACTICE OF LAW AND THE NEED FOR RESPECT FOR THE PROFESSIONAL PREROGATIVES OF THE LAWYER.

— The Supreme Federal Court has proclaimed, in repeated decisions, that the Lawyer – in fulfilling the duty to provide assistance to the one who retained him, providing legal guidance before any organ of the State – converts his professional activity, when exercised with independence and without undue restrictions, into an invaluable practice of freedom. Whatever the instance of power before which he acts, it is incumbent upon the Lawyer to neutralize abuses, to make arbitrariness cease, to demand respect for the legal order, and to watch over the integrity of the guarantees — legal and constitutional — granted to the one who entrusted him with the protection of his freedom and his rights.

— The exercise of the power-duty to question, to scrutinize, to criticize, and to seek the correction of abuses committed by public bodies and by agents and authorities of the State, including magistrates, reflects an inalienable prerogative of the Lawyer, who cannot, for this very reason, be unjustly curtailed in the legitimate practice of acts aimed at neutralizing situations that configure state arbitrariness or disrespect for the rights of the one in whose favor he acts. — Respect for the professional prerogatives of the Lawyer constitutes a guarantee for society itself and for people in general, because the Lawyer, in this context, plays an essential role in the protection and defense of fundamental rights and freedoms.

JURISDICTIONAL CONTROL OF THE STATE'S PERSECUTORY ACTIVITY: AN INHERENT REQUIREMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC STATE OF LAW.

— The State does not have the right to exercise, without a suitable legal basis and adequate factual support, the persecutory power with which it is vested, as it is ethically and juridically forbidden from acting in an arbitrary manner, whether by initiating unfounded police investigations or by promoting reckless formal accusations, notably in those cases where the facts underlying the "persecutio criminis" are revealed to be devoid of criminal typicality.

Precedents.

— The anomalous extinction of the criminal condemnation proceeding, in "habeas corpus" proceedings, although exceptional, is possible, provided that the absence of just cause is evidenced – based on situations of liquidity. For this to be possible, it is imperative that there be no situation of objective doubt as to the facts underlying the criminal accusation or even the criminal conviction itself. Precedents.

O advogado é indispensável à Administração da Justiça e à defesa do Estado Democrático de Direito.

DEFESA DE DIREITOS

Advogados têm o direito de questionar sentenças

Cesar de Oliveira 

06 de agosto de 2010

Fonte: Conjur

Advogados têm o direito legítimo de criticar uma decisão da qual discordem. O entendimento é do ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal, Celso de Mello, que concedeu Habeas Corpus aos advogados Sérgio Niemeyer e Raimundo Hermes Barbosa em ação movida por um juiz após protestos feitos por eles. 

O juiz queria que os advogados fossem condenados por injúria. O Ministério Público foi além e pediu a punição por calúnia, difamação e injúria. Celso de Mello entendeu que não há motivos para condenação.

De acordo com o ministro, “os protestos foram formulados em termos objetivos e impessoais”, o que garante a livre manifestação. Os réus foram representados pelo advogado Alberto Zacharias Toron.

De acordo com a decisão, mesmo que representem duras críticas, os atos praticados pelos advogados “não podem ser qualificados como transgressões ao patrimônio moral de qualquer dos sujeitos processuais”.

O ministro Celso de Mello observou, também, que o STF tem decidido que o advogado transforma a sua atividade profissional, quando exercida com independência e sem restrições, em prática “inestimável” de liberdade. 

“Qualquer que seja a instância de poder perante a qual atue, incumbe, ao advogado, neutralizar os abusos, fazer cessar o arbítrio, exigir respeito ao ordenamento jurídico e velar pela integridade das garantias — legais e constitucionais — outorgadas àquele que lhe confiou a proteção de sua liberdade e de seus direitos”. 

O ministro acrescentou que o profissional não pode ser cerceado injustamente na prática legítima de expor sua opinião sobre situações de arbítrio estatal ou desrespeito aos direitos daquele a quem defende.

De acordo com ele, “ Estado não tem o direito de exercer, sem base jurídica idônea e suporte fático adequado, o poder persecutório de que se acha investido, pois lhe é vedado, ética e juridicamente, agir de modo arbitrário, seja fazendo instaurar investigações policiais infundadas, seja promovendo acusações formais temerárias, notadamente naqueles casos em que os fatos subjacentes à persecutio criminis revelam-se destituídos de tipicidade penal”.

Além disso, o ministro Celso de Mello afirmou que o parecer do Ministério Público, que pediu a condenação dos advogados pela prática de calúnia, difamação e injúria, “extrapolou os limites materiais dos fatos narrados pelo autor da representação”. 

O autor pediu apenas a condenação por injúria. Celso de Mello afirmou que “o fato que constitui objeto da representação traduz limitação material ao poder persecutório do Ministério Público, que não poderá, agindo ultra vires, proceder a uma indevida ampliação objetiva da delatio criminis postulatória, para, desse modo, incluir, na denúncia, outros delitos cuja perseguibilidade, embora dependente de representação, não foi nesta pleiteada por aquele que a formulou”.

Ainda na decisão, o ministro disse que “a existência de divórcio ideológico resultante da inobservância, pelo Ministério Público, da necessária correlação entre os termos da representação e o fato dela objeto, de um lado, e o conteúdo ampliado da denúncia oferecida pelo órgão, de outro, constitui desrespeito aos limites previamente delineados pelo autor da delação postulatória e representa fator de deslegitimação da atuação processual do ‘Parquet’”.

Leia a decisão.

HABEAS CORPUS 98.237 (809)

ORIGEM :HC – 28341 – SUPREMO TRIBUNAL FEDERAL

PROCED. :SÃO PAULO

RELATOR :MIN. CELSO DE MELLO

PACTE.(S) :SÉRGIO ROBERTO DE NIEMEYER SALLES

IMPTE.(S) :CONSELHO FEDERAL DA ORDEM DOS ADVOGADOS

DO BRASIL

ADV.(A/S) :ALBERTO ZACHARIAS TORON

COATOR(A/S)(ES) :RELATORA DO HC Nº 129896 DO SUPERIOR

TRIBUNAL DE JUSTIÇA Decisão: A Turma, à unanimidade, superando a restrição fundada na Súmula 691/STF, concedeu, de ofício, ordem de habeas corpus ao paciente Sérgio Roberto de Niemeyer Salles, e, por identidade de situação, estendeu-a ao co-réu Raimundo Hermes Barbosa, nos termos do voto do Relator. Ausentes, justificadamente, neste julgamento, os Senhores Ministros Cezar Peluso e Joaquim Barbosa. 2ª Turma, 15.12.2009.

E M E N T A: "HABEAS CORPUS" – CRIMES CONTRA A HONRA – PRÁTICA ATRIBUÍDA A ADVOGADOS – REPRESENTAÇÃO FORMULADA POR MAGISTRADO EM DECORRÊNCIA DE MANIFESTAÇÃO PROCESSUAL PRODUZIDA PELO PACIENTE (E POR SEU COLEGA ADVOGADO) EM SEDE DE RAZÕES DE APELAÇÃO – PROTESTO E CRÍTICA POR ELES FORMULADOS, EM TERMOS OBJETIVOS E IMPESSOAIS, CONTRA OS FUNDAMENTOS EM QUE SE SUSTENTAVA A DECISÃO RECORRIDA – INTANGIBILIDADE PROFISSIONAL DO ADVOGADO – AUSÊNCIA DO "ANIMUS CALUMNIANDI VEL DIFFAMANDI" – EXERCÍCIO LEGÍTIMO, NA ESPÉCIE, DO DIREITO DE CRÍTICA, QUE ASSISTE AOS ADVOGADOS EM GERAL E QUE SE REVELA OPONÍVEL A QUALQUER AUTORIDADE PÚBLICA, INCLUSIVE AOS PRÓPRIOS MAGISTRADOS – "ANIMUS NARRANDI VEL DEFENDENDI" —CONSEQUENTE DESCARACTERIZAÇÃO DOS TIPOS PENAIS — ACUSAÇÃO DEDUZIDA PELO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO QUE ATRIBUIU, AOS ADVOGADOS, A SUPOSTA PRÁTICA DOS CRIMES DE CALÚNIA, DIFAMAÇÃO E INJÚRIA – DENÚNCIA QUE EXTRAPOLOU OS LIMITES MATERIAIS DOS FATOS NARRADOS PELO AUTOR DA REPRESENTAÇÃO (MAGISTRADO FEDERAL), QUE PRETENDIA, UNICAMENTE, A RESPONSABILIZAÇÃO PENAL DOS ADVOGADOS PELO DELITO DE INJÚRIA — ATUAÇÃO "ULTRA VIRES" DO MINISTÉRIO PÚBLICO — INADMISSIBILIDADE — AUSÊNCIA DE JUSTA CAUSA PARA A AÇÃO PENAL — LIQUIDEZ DOS FATOS — POSSIBILIDADE DE CONTROLE JURISDICIONAL EM SEDE DE "HABEAS CORPUS" — EXTINÇÃO DO PROCESSO PENAL DE CONDENAÇÃO — AFASTAMENTO, EM CARÁTER EXCEPCIONAL, NO CASO CONCRETO, DA INCIDÊNCIA DA SÚMULA 691/STF — "HABEAS CORPUS" CONCEDIDO DE OFÍCIO, COM EXTENSÃO DOS SEUS EFEITOS AO CO-RÉU, TAMBÉM ADVOGADO. REPRESENTAÇÃO E DENÚNCIA: LIMITAÇÃO MATERIAL QUE RESULTA DO FATO OBJETO DA DELAÇÃO POSTULATÓRIA.

— O fato que constitui objeto da representação oferecida pelo ofendido (ou, quando for o caso, por seu representante legal) traduz limitação material ao poder persecutório do Ministério Público, que não poderá, agindo "ultra vires", proceder a uma indevida ampliação objetiva da "delatio criminis" postulatória, para, desse modo, incluir, na denúncia, outros delitos cuja perseguibilidade, embora dependente de representação, não foi nesta pleiteada por aquele que a formulou. Precedentes.

— A existência de divórcio ideológico resultante da inobservância, pelo Ministério Público, da necessária correlação entre os termos da representação e o fato dela objeto, de um lado, e o conteúdo ampliado da denúncia oferecida pelo órgão da acusação estatal, de outro, constitui desrespeito aos limites previamente delineados pelo autor da delação postulatória e representa fator de deslegitimação da atuação processual do "Parquet". Hipótese em que o Ministério Público ofereceu denúncia por suposta prática dos crimes de calúnia, difamação e injúria, não obstante pleiteada, unicamente, pelo magistrado autor da delação postulatória (representação), instauração de "persecutio criminis" pelo delito de injúria. Inadmissibilidade dessa ampliação objetiva da acusação penal.

INVIOLABILIDADE DO ADVOGADO — CRIMES CONTRA A HONRA — ELEMENTO SUBJETIVO DO TIPO — O "ANIMUS DEFENDENDI" COMO CAUSA DE DESCARACTERIZAÇÃO DO INTUITO CRIMINOSO DE OFENDER.

— A inviolabilidade constitucional do Advogado: garantia destinada a assegurar-lhe o pleno exercício de sua atividade profissional.

— A necessidade de narrar, de defender e de criticar atua como fator de descaracterização do tipo subjetivo peculiar aos delitos contra a honra. A questão das excludentes anímicas. Doutrina. Precedentes.

– Os atos praticados pelo Advogado no patrocínio técnico da causa, respeitados os limites deontológicos que regem a sua atuação como profissional do Direito e que guardem relação de estrita pertinência com o objeto do litígio, ainda que expressem críticas duras, veementes e severas, mesmo se dirigidas ao Magistrado, não podem ser qualificados como transgressões ao patrimônio moral de qualquer dos sujeitos processuais, eis que o "animus defendendi" importa em descaracterização do elemento subjetivo inerente aos crimes contra a honra. Precedentes.

O EXERCÍCIO DA ADVOCACIA E A NECESSIDADE DE RESPEITO ÀS PRERROGATIVAS PROFISSIONAIS DO ADVOGADO.

— O Supremo Tribunal Federal tem proclamado, em reiteradas decisões, que o Advogado – ao cumprir o dever de prestar assistência àquele que o constituiu, dispensando-lhe orientação jurídica perante qualquer órgão do Estado – converte, a sua atividade profissional, quando exercida com independência e sem indevidas restrições, em prática inestimável de liberdade. Qualquer que seja a instância de poder perante a qual atue, incumbe, ao Advogado, neutralizar os abusos, fazer cessar o arbítrio, exigir respeito ao ordenamento jurídico e velar pela integridade das garantias — legais e constitucionais — outorgadas àquele que lhe confiou a proteção de sua liberdade e de seus direitos.

— O exercício do poder-dever de questionar, de fiscalizar, de criticar e de buscar a correção de abusos cometidos por órgãos públicos e por agentes e autoridades do Estado, inclusive magistrados, reflete prerrogativa indisponível do Advogado, que não pode, por isso mesmo, ser injustamente cerceado na prática legítima de atos que visem a neutralizar situações configuradoras de arbítrio estatal ou de desrespeito aos direitos daquele em cujo favor atua.

— O respeito às prerrogativas profissionais do Advogado constitui garantia da própria sociedade e das pessoas em geral, porque o Advogado, nesse contexto, desempenha papel essencial na proteção e defesa dos direitos e liberdades fundamentais.

CONTROLE JURISDICIONAL DA ATIVIDADE PERSECUTÓRIA DO ESTADO: UMA EXIGÊNCIA INERENTE AO ESTADO DEMOCRÁTICO DE DIREITO.

— O Estado não tem o direito de exercer, sem base jurídica idônea e suporte fático adequado, o poder persecutório de que se acha investido, pois lhe é vedado, ética e juridicamente, agir de modo arbitrário, seja fazendo instaurar investigações policiais infundadas, seja promovendo acusações formais temerárias, notadamente naqueles casos em que os fatos subjacentes à "persecutio criminis" revelam-se destituídos de tipicidade penal. Precedentes.

— A extinção anômala do processo penal condenatório, em sede de "habeas corpus", embora excepcional, revela-se possível, desde que se evidencie – com base em situações revestidas de liquidez – a ausência de justa causa. Para que tal se revele possível, impõe-se que inexista qualquer situação de dúvida objetiva quanto aos fatos subjacentes à acusação penal ou, até mesmo, à própria condenação criminal.

 Precedentes