INTERNATIONAL: Using Artificial Intelligence in LAW - Analyzing a complex case of absolute and incurable nullity of mortgage foreclosures - The Alvin White vs Deutsche Bank Case - WHITE vs DEUTSCHE BANK - ANALYSIS OF THE PROCESS'S NULLITIES by CHATGPT
Analysis of Scott Erik Stafne's petition, in the WHITE VS DEUTSCHE BANK case, conducted by AI CHATGPT, confirms the previous analysis by AI GEMINI and highlights the importance of the proper use of AI in LAW.
Read the AI GEMINI analysis at:
TRANSNATIONAL: Treason to the Constitution: How Scott Stafne's Motion Mounts a Transnational Defense of True Justice and Due Process.
ALVIM WHITE v. DEUTSCHE BANK UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA CHURCH OF THE GARDENS, a Washington Not-for-Profit Corporation operating as a faith-based religious organization;
ALVIN WHITE, in his individual capacity, No. 3:23-cv-06193-TMC PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR POST JUDGMENT RELIEF PURSUANT TO FRCP 59 AND 60
Read
https://vitimasfalsoscondominios.blogspot.com/2025/09/transnacional-treason-to-constitution.htmlhe AI GEMINI analysis here, in English.
CHATGPT AI
Using Artificial Intelligence from OPEN AI - CHATGPT to analyze a complex case of absolute and incurable nullity of mortgage foreclosures in the state of Washington, United States.
Read the full text of Stafne's petition published on Academia.edu on 09.15.25:
US District Court for Western Washington - Church of the Gardens and Alvin White vs. Deutsche Bank - Plaintiffs' Motion for Post Judgment Relief Pursuant to FRCP 59 and 60
By Scott E Stafne
description
17 Pages
1 File ▾
Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, Human Rights Law, International Law, Courts (more)
This motion challenges the validity of a federal court judgment entered in the absence of a finding that removing defendants alleged and/or proved that standing necessary to invoke subject matter jurisdiction of the US district court. Plaintiffs argue that District Court’s misallocation of this burden to Plaintiffs rendered its judgment its merits judgment void.
The motion invokes FRCP 59 for manifest legal error, FRCP 60(b)(4) for void judgment, and FRCP 60(b)(6) for extraordinary circumstances, including what Plaintiffs describe as “treason to the Constitution.”
Read the original petition on Academia.edu
https://www.academia.edu/143976423/US_District_Court_for_Western_Washington_Church_of_the_Gardens_and_Alvin_White_vs_Deutsche_Bank_Plaintiffs_Motion_for_Post_Judgment_Relief_Pursuant_to_FRCP_59_and_60?source=swp_share
CHATGPT AI ANALYSIS
Introduction:
The lack of an extrajudicial enforceable instrument, a break in the chain of custody, a manifest lack of jurisdiction and judicial impartiality, the reversal of the use of evidence to the detriment of the Plaintiff (diabolical proof), the use of illicit evidence, and cunning maneuvers and obstruction of justice and other nullities and cunning manipulation of the case files are noted, as reported below.
Context
The petition filed by Scott E. Stafne on behalf of Alvin B. White and the Church of the Gardens is a robust and aggressive legal document, grounded in the foundational principles of American constitutional and procedural law.
It argues that the judgment rendered by the District Court is void and must be reversed, detailing how serious procedural errors resulted in the violation of the plaintiffs' fundamental rights.
In essence, this is an action related to mortgage foreclosure involving several of White's properties, in which the plaintiffs allege that Deutsche Bank and other defendants used improper procedural maneuvers to "take" White's property titles without due process of law.
White, through the Church of the Gardens (a non-profit religious organization of which he is a member), originally filed the action in Washington state court seeking to prevent the sale of five properties he owned, based on RCW 61.24.130 – a state law that allows a property owner to request a judge to restrict the sale of their property under certain circumstances⁵.
White exercised this right in the state forum, obtaining the scheduling of a hearing for his motion to restrain the sale before the date set for two of the foreclosure auctions.
However, instead of responding to the petition on the merits in state court, Deutsche Bank (DB) – claiming to be the beneficiary of the deed of trust – removed the case to federal jurisdiction in late 2023, before the said hearing could take place.
This hasty removal triggered the central events of the controversy: the action moved to Federal Court, where it was initially assigned to a magistrate judge, and during the transition, two of White's properties were sold by DB's trustee.
The plaintiffs maintain that the sequence of procedures adopted by the federal court prevented White from being heard in a timely manner, leading to the loss of properties without proper judicial review – a situation they compare to obstruction of justice and a lack of impartiality from the court.
After the removal, the case experienced a series of irregularities as narrated by the plaintiffs.
Due to the internal procedures of the District Court at the time, the case was referred to a magistrate judge instead of an Article III district judge, although without the consent of all parties, which would be necessary for the magistrate to rule on the merits in a binding manner. White found this circumstance strange and filed an objection as soon as he became aware of it, since no qualified federal judge was assigned to decide his urgent motion to stay the auction.
According to the petition, this initial objection by White was summarily "stricken" by Court staff (identified only as “Chambers”), based on the practices adopted by the court at that time – a fact that White understood as another denial of access to justice.
Only later did the assigned District Judge (Hon. Tiffany M. Cartwright) order that such petitions and objections be included in the record, implicitly acknowledging the anomaly of the initial procedure.
Meanwhile, however, DB's trustee proceeded with the sale of White's properties, despite the pending request for a temporary restraining order, thus realizing the damage White sought to avoid.
In the course of the federal proceedings, White filed several summary judgment motions to secure his rights.
In January 2024, he filed a first motion seeking a declaration of rights under RCW 61.24.130; in April 2025, a second motion against one of the trustees; and in May 2025, a third summary judgment motion questioning DB's standing to foreclose.
In this third motion, White presented substantial evidence – including declarations under penalty of perjury – that DB lacked contractual standing, statutory standing in Washington, and constitutional standing (Article III standing) to enforce the promissory notes linked to the properties.
For example, it was shown that the person whose endorsement would authorize DB to enforce the note denied having signed such an endorsement, casting serious doubts on the authenticity of the enforceable instrument.
These facts established material controversies regarding DB's right to enforce the debt.
Despite this, the District Court did not decide any of White's motions on the merits. Instead, on September 2, 2025, Judge Cartwright granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. 105), closing the case in favor of DB and the other defendants, without directly addressing the issues of jurisdiction and the removing party's standing raised by White.
It is against this decision – which the plaintiffs consider flawed from the outset – that White and the Church of the Gardens now seek its annulment, through the Post-Judgment Motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60.
Effect of the Lack of Service Before Removal
One of the central points raised by the plaintiffs is the prejudice caused by the absence of a pre-foreclosure hearing, resulting from the premature removal of the case to the federal sphere.
Washington state law guaranteed White the right to be heard by a judge before the sale of his properties.
In particular, RCW 61.24.130 provides that a mortgagor can obtain a restraining order (injunction), provided they meet certain notice requirements⁵.
White followed the procedures: he filed the action and notified the trustee responsible for the auctions, so that a hearing to discuss the granting of the injunction was scheduled in state court before the date of the scheduled auctions.
However, the strategy adopted by DB – by removing the case to Federal Court before the hearing – prevented this discussion from taking place in the proper time and forum.
The immediate removal had the practical effect of depriving White of the temporary protection that state law afforded him.
In federal jurisdiction, the case entered a procedural limbo: as seen, it was initially assigned to a magistrate who could not decide on White's motion without the express consent of the parties (consent that never occurred).
Consequently, no hearing was held before the date set for the auctions.
DB, through its trustee in the state, took advantage of this gap and proceeded with the sale of at least two of White's properties while the case was procedurally stalled. Thus, when White sought relief in federal court, it was too late – his properties had been auctioned without him having had "the opportunity to be heard" on his request to stay the sales.
This chain of events constitutes, according to the plaintiffs, a flagrant violation of due process of law.
The Due Process clause of the 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that no one shall be deprived of their property without adequate legal process, which includes the right to adequate notice and a fair and timely hearing before a significant deprivation⁸.
In the case under analysis, the "timely" moment would be precisely before the alienation of the assets.
By being prevented from presenting his arguments at the crucial moment (i.e., prior to the enforcement of the real estate guarantees), White was deprived of this fundamental right. It is worth remembering that, according to the standard established in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), notice and an opportunity to be heard must be given in a manner and at a time reasonably calculated to inform the interested parties of the pending action and allow them to present their objections⁸.
Here, although White followed the procedures to obtain such an opportunity in the competent forum, the sudden removal frustrated the procedure, transforming what should have been preventive judicial relief into a "procedural game" that resulted in the irreversible loss of assets. In other words, DB's conduct – by triggering the removal before the notice of the injunction hearing took effect – emptied the legal protections that the system provided to White, creating a situation that the plaintiffs equate to an obstruction of justice: the legal process was manipulated in a way that prevented the effective exercise of the owner's right to defense.
Burden of Proof Regarding Federal Jurisdiction
Another pillar of Stafne's petition is the argument that the District Court erred in dealing with the issue of jurisdiction after removal. Under federal rules, when a case is removed from state to federal court, it is incumbent upon the removing party to demonstrate that the requirements for the exercise of federal jurisdiction are present (whether based on federal question or diversity of citizenship). Stafne cites Supreme Court precedents in Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014) and the Ninth Circuit in Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1992).
These cases consolidate the principle that the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls on the one who removes the action – that is, the defendant who invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court must allege and prove the facts that justify this jurisdiction³.
In the context of this demand, it meant that Deutsche Bank needed to adequately demonstrate that the federal court had jurisdiction to hear the case before proceeding on the merits.
According to the petition, DB never alleged nor proved its standing to remove and conduct the case in the federal forum.
In particular, DB's standing to foreclose on the mortgage itself is questioned – something intrinsically linked to subject matter jurisdiction, since if DB is not a legitimate party (by not truly being the creditor or beneficiary of the instrument), there would be no real case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution.
The plaintiffs point out that the District Court, instead of requiring DB to meet this burden, improperly shifted the burden of proof, acting as if it were up to White to demonstrate the non-existence of jurisdiction. This reversal directly contradicts the principle mentioned in the precedents above and constitutes a "Manifest Error of Law" – a term used in FRCP 59 – on the part of the court.
A federal court is one of limited jurisdiction and has a duty, including sua sponte, to verify its jurisdiction before issuing decisions on the merits. The Supreme Court was emphatic, for example, in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), in establishing that the jurisdictional question must be decided before any analysis of the merits – summarized in the phrase: *"Hypothetical jurisdiction is not jurisdiction"*⁶.
Ignoring this basic step threatens the separation of powers and the limited role of federal courts.
In this specific case, the plaintiffs allege that the District Court "jumped" directly to the merits (even identifying what, in its view, were White's central claims), only to later state that the disputes over jurisdiction and standing had become moot in light of the decision on the merits.
This approach puts the cart before the horse in procedural terms. By not requiring DB to prove jurisdiction – and, worse, by deciding the case in favor of DB without ever adequately addressing White's challenges to the bank's standing – the Court would have usurped a power not conferred upon it. Consequently, any judgment issued without jurisdiction is null and void (void ab initio).
Thus, the plaintiffs argue, the rendered judgment must be invalidated under FRCP 60(b)(4), once it is verified that the fundamental premise (the existence of DB's jurisdiction/standing) was not met. In short, there was not only a mistake in the allocation of the evidentiary burden, but a structural failure: the court failed in its primary duty to verify its own authority to judge, which compromises the entire subsequent decision.
Post-Judgment Motion under FRCP 59 and 60
Given the defects exposed above, White and the Church of the Gardens filed a post-judgment motion based on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60, seeking to annul the judgment of September 2, 2025. In their request, they invoke three main legal grounds, corresponding to different provisions of the rules:
(1) Rule 59 – "Manifest Error of Law": FRCP 59, generally used to request a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment within 28 days of its entry¹, was invoked to point out the evident error of law committed by the Court.
Here, it refers mainly to the incorrect allocation of the burden of proof of jurisdiction discussed above. According to the plaintiffs, by not recognizing that DB failed to meet its obligation to demonstrate federal jurisdiction, the Court committed a manifest error.
This failure justifies the alteration or reversal of the decision, as it directly influenced the outcome of the case – an outcome that, were it not for this error, could have been different (since, without established jurisdiction, the court would have had to refuse to proceed on the merits).
(2) Rule 60(b)(4) – "Void Judgment":
FRCP 60(b) allows for relief from a final judgment under several specific hypotheses.
Subsection (4) authorizes the annulment of a decision when **"the judgment is void"**² – and one of the classic situations that render a judgment void is precisely a lack of jurisdiction (either lack of subject matter jurisdiction or absence of personal jurisdiction).
The plaintiffs argue that, as DB never proved its standing/jurisdiction to remove the case, the Court never acquired subject matter jurisdiction over the controversy; therefore, the summary judgment order in favor of the defendants suffers from absolute nullity.
This argument is reinforced by the doctrinal and jurisprudential understanding that any jurisdictional act without competence is ineffective and must be undone.
If the ground for nullity is accepted, the consequence is drastic: all decisional acts would be invalidated, restoring the parties to the situation prior to the flawed judgment.
(3) Rule 60(b)(6) – "Any other reason that justifies relief": This subsection of FRCP 60 is a general clause that allows for the setting aside of a judgment for an exceptional reason, when none of the other specific bases fully apply.
Stafne resorts to it to emphasize that the circumstances of the case constitute an extraordinary situation that calls for redress.
He mentions that the court's conduct would be equivalent to "treason to the Constitution" – strong language taken from a famous dictum by Chief Justice John Marshall. Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821), observed that a court has "no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution"⁴.
By evoking this phrase, Stafne accuses the Court of having betrayed constitutional principles by usurping unproven jurisdiction and refusing to correctly exercise its legitimate jurisdiction (in the sense of not protecting White's rights as provided by law).
Although the use of the term "treason" here is rhetorical and hyperbolic, its purpose is to underline the gravity of the deviation:
for the plaintiffs, the failure to observe jurisdictional limits and requirements is not a mere technical detail, but an attack on the constitutional order and the rule of law.
Such a scenario – they argue – constitutes a circumstance exceptional enough to satisfy 60(b)(6), reinforcing the request for judicial relief.
Together, these grounds form the framework of the post-judgment motion.
The plaintiffs request that the summary judgment decision be vacated (i.e., rendered without effect), reopening the case so that it can be properly appreciated from the beginning, this time strictly observing jurisdiction and ensuring White the opportunity to present his claims fairly.
It is worth noting that the plaintiffs, already in the initial petition and throughout the process, did not seek to hold the court or judges responsible for the damages, but focused their requests against the opposing parties who allegedly took advantage of the irregular procedures to gain an advantage. In other words, White and the Church of the Gardens did not "sue" the court itself; they now ask that the District Court itself correct its course, recognizing that its previous judgment was issued without a legitimate jurisdictional basis.
Conclusion and Implications
In conclusion, the analysis of the arguments of White and the Church of the Gardens demonstrates a confluence of serious procedural errors that compromised the integrity of the federal judgment in the case.
The lack of prior notice that would ensure White a hearing before the loss of his properties, combined with the Court's omission in verifying its jurisdiction and requiring DB to prove standing, resulted in a scenario where fundamental due process guarantees were suppressed.
If the motion under FRCP 59 and 60 is granted, the immediate implication will be the annulment of the merits judgment – thus recognizing that it never had legal validity due to the absence of proper jurisdiction.
This would reopen the process, possibly returning it to the removal stage (or even to state jurisdiction, if the lack of federal jurisdiction persists), allowing White's requests (such as to prevent the auctions via RCW 61.24.130) to be considered as should have occurred originally.
The implications of the case transcend the interests of the parties involved. From the perspective of the justice system, a rectification in these terms will reinforce the principle that procedural rules and jurisdictional limits cannot be ignored without consequences.
A favorable decision for White would make it clear that federal courts will not tolerate strategic removals used to frustrate substantive rights guaranteed by law (in this case, the right to preventive relief against property loss) nor the erroneous allocation of the burden that improperly benefits the remover.
Conversely, leaving the judgment untouched despite the identified flaws could create a dangerous precedent, suggesting that jurisdictional errors can be "forgiven" if the case is already advanced on the merits – which would shake confidence in the mandatory nature of procedural precepts.
Finally, this episode underscores the importance of judicial vigilance in protecting the rights of litigants. The Constitution and laws (both federal and state) have established safeguards – such as due process, the right to be heard, the limits of jurisdiction – precisely to prevent abuses of power and arbitrary decisions. When a court fails to observe such safeguards, whether by action or omission, it is necessary to use the available procedural means (such as motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment) to seek a correction of course.
This is exactly what White and the Church of the Gardens are doing by clamoring, in strong terms, for justice to be restored in their case.
The resolution of this dispute will serve as an important indicator of the Judiciary's commitment to impartiality and legality: recognizing the error and redressing the injustice will reinforce the idea that no one, not even powerful banks, is above the rules, whereas a refusal to correct could cast doubts on the accessibility and fairness of justice in foreclosure cases.
In sum, the outcome of this case could both reaffirm basic principles of the rule of law and warn of the consequences of neglecting essential procedures – a true test of the courts' responsibility in guaranteeing the rights of citizens.
Notes:
¹ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. New Trial; Altering or Amending a Judgment. (e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the judgment. URL: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_59
² Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. Relief from a Judgment or Order. (b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (4) the judgment is void. URL: https://www.law.cornell.edu/rules/frcp/rule_60
³ Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014). This case affirmed that the burden of demonstrating federal jurisdiction remains with the party that removes an action from state court to federal court. URL: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/574/81/
⁴ Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264 (1821). A seminal decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that, among other points, contains John Marshall's observation about the obligation of courts to exercise the jurisdiction given and to refrain from usurping that which is not given – the violation of which he equated to "treason to the Constitution." URL: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/19/264/
⁵ Revised Code of Washington 61.24.130. (Restraining orders—Notice—Grounds—Conditions—Enjoining proceeding). Pertinent excerpt: (1) Nothing in this chapter shall prejudice the right of the borrower... to restrain, on any proper legal or equitable ground, a trustee's sale... (2) No court shall grant a restraining order or injunction to restrain a trustee's sale unless the person seeking the order gives five days' notice to the trustee of the time, place, and judge before whom the application for the restraining order is to be made. URL: https://app.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=61.24.130
⁶ Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998). A case in which the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that a federal court cannot decide the merits of a case without first establishing its subject matter jurisdiction. The court declared that "to assume" jurisdiction is equivalent to not having it. URL: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/523/83/
⁷ Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992). A landmark case that defined the requirements for standing under Article III of the Constitution: the party invoking jurisdiction must demonstrate (1) a concrete and particularized injury; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) that it is likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. URL: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/504/555/
⁸ Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). A case that set the standard for notice required by the Due Process Clause, establishing that notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." URL: https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/339/306/
Context and Removal of the Case
Background: In the case Church of the Gardens & Alvin White v. Quality Loan Services Corp. et al., the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in Washington state court on December 13, 2023, to stop nonjudicial foreclosure sales of Alvin White’s properties. Within two weeks (on December 28, 2023), Defendant Deutsche Bank removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington.
This removal occurred very quickly – before at least one defendant had been formally served (“intimado”) with the state-court summons and complaint. The situation described (“Ele não foi intimado antes do caso ser enviado para a justiça federal”) refers to a party not being served prior to the case being sent to federal court.
Removal Procedure:
Under U.S. law, a defendant has the right to remove a case from state court to federal court if the case could originally have been filed in federal court (e.g. due to a federal question or diversity of citizenship jurisdiction).
In this case, the complaint included federal constitutional claims (challenging Washington’s Deed of Trust Act under the U.S. Constitution), giving rise to federal-question jurisdiction. The removal was therefore based on federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
Notably, removal can occur even if some defendants have not been served yet. The removal statute (28 U.S.C. §1446) requires that all “properly joined and served” defendants consent to removal. If a defendant has been named but not yet served, the majority view is that such a defendant need not join in or consent to the removal. In fact, several federal circuit courts have explicitly approved the practice of “snap removal,” where an out-of-state defendant (or even a forum-state defendant) swiftly removes the case before any service is effected on forum defendants.
This means a defendant may strategically remove a case to federal court prior to being formally served with process, as long as they have obtained a copy of the complaint (for example, through court records or informal notice).
The rationale is that the statutory language allows removal before service – for instance, the Third Circuit held that the “properly joined and served” requirement permits an unserved forum defendant to remove, and the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have similarly upheld pre-service removals.
Ninth Circuit Stance: The case at hand was in the Ninth Circuit (Western District of Washington).
The Ninth Circuit has recently weighed in on this issue. In Casola v. Dexcom, Inc. (2024), the Ninth Circuit disapproved of ultra-fast “super snap” removals (where a defendant removes before the state court can even initiate service), emphasizing that an action must be properly commenced in state court before removal.
However, the Ninth Circuit left open the question of more typical pre-service removals (i.e. removing after filing but before a particular defendant is served).
In practice, the Western District of Washington accepted Deutsche Bank’s removal in this case even though not all parties had been served at that time, indicating that such a removal was not deemed procedurally improper.
Effect of Not Being Served Before Removal
Service of Process and Personal Jurisdiction: Normally, a plaintiff must formally serve each defendant with the summons and complaint to establish the court’s personal jurisdiction over those defendants.
If a defendant is never served and never appears in the case, any judgment against that defendant can be void for lack of personal jurisdiction. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that a default judgment against an unserved defendant is void because the court had no personal jurisdiction without proper service.
However, when a defendant voluntarily appears in the action – as Deutsche Bank did by filing the notice of removal – that defendant is effectively submitting to the court’s jurisdiction. Removal to federal court counts as an appearance and waiver of any technical defects in service for the removing defendant, since by removing, the defendant accepts the jurisdiction of the federal court. In this case, Deutsche Bank’s removal and active participation (filing motions, etc.) means Deutsche Bank cannot later claim it wasn’t served; it had actual notice and chose the federal forum. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1448 provides that if any defendant was not completely served before removal, service can be completed after removal in federal court.
In other words, any defendants who had not been served pre-removal can be served under the federal rules post-removal, so the case can continue without prejudice due to the earlier lack of service.
Bottom Line: The fact that one or more defendants were “not intimated” (not served) before removal does not automatically void the removal or the federal court’s jurisdiction. U.S. law permits removal in such circumstances to prevent plaintiffs from defeating federal jurisdiction by delaying service.
Many courts view pre-service removal as permissible, albeit the tactic is sometimes criticized as gamesmanship.
The key consequences are: (1) the removing defendant is deemed to have notice and appears in the case (waiving service defects for itself), and
(2) any unserved co-defendants can still be served after removal so that they, too, become subject to the federal court’s jurisdiction.
That said, if truly no service was ever effected on a particular defendant and that defendant never appeared, then any judgment would not bind that unserved defendant. In this case, though, all main defendants did appear one way or another:
Deutsche Bank removed and answered, the State of Washington was served and moved to dismiss (it was dismissed from the case early on), Quality Loan Service Corp. eventually answered the complaint in federal court (indicating it was served or accepted service), and MTC Financial (Trustee Corps) filed a declaration of non-monetary status and participated to a limited extent.
Thus, by the time of judgment, all active parties were before the court, and no default judgments were entered against an unserved party. There was therefore no personal-jurisdiction voidness on that basis.
Burden to Establish Federal Jurisdiction upon Removal
An important related issue – and one strongly raised by the plaintiffs – is whether the removing defendant properly established the basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction when it removed the case. When a case is removed, the defendant bears the burden of proving that federal jurisdiction is proper. The court will look at the complaint at the time of removal to see if there is federal-question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction, and the removing party must satisfy all procedural requirements.
If the defendant fails to establish federal jurisdiction, the plaintiff can move to remand the case back to state court.
In Church of the Gardens v. Deutsche Bank, the plaintiffs argued that Deutsche Bank did not fulfill its burden at the time of removal. Specifically, they contend that Deutsche Bank “never alleged or proved it had standing to remove this case” to federal court.
Here, the term “standing” in context refers to the constitutional and jurisdictional prerequisites for the case to be heard in federal court. In federal court, plaintiffs must have Article III standing (a concrete injury caused by defendants, redressable by the court), and the court must have subject-matter jurisdiction over each claim.
The plaintiffs pointed out that one of the co-plaintiffs, the Church of the Gardens (COTG), might not itself have Article III standing (since it was not the borrower on the loans, but rather a nonprofit advocating on behalf of homeowners).
In fact, the District Court later agreed that the Church lacked standing – it dismissed Church of the Gardens’ claims without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (while allowing Alvin White’s claims to be decided on the merits).
The plaintiffs’ position is that Deutsche Bank, as the removing party, should have demonstrated from the outset that all plaintiffs had standing and that the federal court had jurisdiction over the case.
By not addressing the Church’s standing (or other jurisdictional issues) in the removal papers, Deutsche Bank arguably left a hole in the jurisdictional foundation of the case.
The federal judge did not immediately probe this issue at removal; only much later, at the summary judgment stage, did the court question whether COTG had standing. The plaintiffs view this as a misstep: the court should have required the defendants to establish federal jurisdiction early, rather than assuming it and placing the onus on plaintiffs to challenge it.
Plaintiffs’ Post-Judgment Motion under FRCP 59 and 60
After the District Court entered judgment (granting summary judgment for Deutsche Bank and dismissing White’s claims with prejudice in September 2025), the plaintiffs filed a Motion for Post-Judgment Relief under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b).
This motion (filed by attorney Scott Stafne on Sept. 15, 2025) argues that the judgment should be vacated or altered due to fundamental errors:
Manifest Error of Law (FRCP 59(e)): Plaintiffs claim the court committed a clear legal error by misallocating the burden of establishing jurisdiction.
They argue it was Deutsche Bank’s burden to allege and prove its standing to invoke federal jurisdiction, but the court “assigned to White and the Church the burden of alleging and proving DB’s standing to remove”. In other words, the plaintiffs shouldn’t have had to raise or prove the absence of jurisdiction; rather, the defendants needed to affirmatively demonstrate the presence of jurisdiction.
The motion asserts that the court’s failure to recognize Deutsche Bank’s lack of proof on this point was a manifest error of law that affected the outcome.
Void Judgment (FRCP 60(b)(4)): Under Rule 60(b)(4), a judgment is void if the court lacked jurisdiction or acted in a manner inconsistent with due process.
Plaintiffs contend the judgment is void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, because the federal court never actually adjudicated whether it had jurisdiction at removal. They emphasize that no finding was ever made that Deutsche Bank (or any removing defendant) satisfied the requirements for federal jurisdiction, leaving a jurisdictional defect. In their words, the District Court entered judgment “without having adjudicated the basis for its subject matter jurisdiction over this removed case.”
If a court indeed lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, its judgment is a legal nullity. (For a Rule 60(b)(4) motion to succeed on this ground, the absence of jurisdiction must be clear – courts say a judgment is void only if the court “plainly usurped jurisdiction” with “no arguable basis” for jurisdiction.
Here, Deutsche Bank will argue that federal-question jurisdiction did exist on the face of the complaint, since White raised federal constitutional claims. The plaintiffs respond that those claims cannot be adjudicated if one plaintiff had no standing, and that the bank never proved an Article III case or controversy – an issue that goes to the heart of jurisdiction.)
Extraordinary Circumstances (FRCP 60(b)(6)): Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision for “any other reason that justifies relief.” The plaintiffs invoke it by alleging “extraordinary circumstances” – they go so far as to characterize the court’s handling of the case as “treason to the Constitution.”
This heated language reflects their view that the court abdicated its constitutional duty to ensure it had jurisdiction and to protect White’s property rights.
For example, the motion notes that instead of adjudicating White’s injunction request promptly, the case was removed and initially assigned to a magistrate (due to local procedures), during which time the foreclosure trustee went ahead and sold White’s properties without a hearing.
Plaintiffs argue the court’s procedures and delays violated due process and facilitated an unlawful taking of property. While “treason to the constitution” is not a legal term, it underscores the plaintiffs’ sense of injustice and forms part of their plea for extraordinary relief.
Key Points from the Plaintiffs’ Motion:
The crux of the post-judgment motion is that the federal court should never have decided the merits without first confirming its jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs frame the issue as the bank’s “standing to remove” – essentially questioning whether the case belonged in federal court at all. They list several specific errors for review, such as:
- Did the District Court err by shifting Deutsche Bank’s burden to establish federal jurisdiction onto the plaintiffs? (The plaintiffs say yes, it was error, because it let Deutsche Bank off the hook and penalized the plaintiffs for not raising jurisdiction sooner.)
- Did the Court err by not adjudicating White’s state-law claims (like his rights under RCW 61.24.130 to restrain foreclosure) due to the jurisdictional mix-up? (By focusing only on what the judge saw as the “core” claims, the plaintiffs argue the Court avoided addressing some claims by dismissing the Church and thereby dodging some issues.)
- Essentially, should the summary judgment be vacated because the case was not properly before the court?
The motion cites legal authority for the principle that a court must have jurisdiction and that it is obliged to notice jurisdictional defects.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court long ago said that a court “will not take jurisdiction if it should not, but it is equally true that it must take jurisdiction if it should” – meaning a court cannot simply ignore jurisdictional issues. The plaintiffs argue the court ignored the issue here.
They also quote Chief Justice John Marshall’s warning that an “ignorant or dependent judiciary” is a great scourge, to suggest the court failed in its duty by not scrutinizing Deutsche Bank’s basis for removal.
Conclusion and Implications
In summary, removing a case to federal court before a defendant is served is a legally recognized tactic (often called snap removal).
It took place in this scenario – Deutsche Bank removed the case very shortly after it was filed, likely before formal service on at least one local defendant. This in itself does not violate any rule; federal courts in several circuits (including the Second, Third, Fifth, etc.) permit such removals.
The Ninth Circuit (which includes Washington) has indicated that removal should not precede the formal commencement of a case, but has not outlawed the general practice of pre-service removal. Thus, Deutsche Bank’s removal was procedurally proper on its face, and the case proceeded in federal court.
However, the plaintiffs leveraged this issue after losing on the merits to argue that the federal court never had a solid jurisdictional footing.
They contend that because one plaintiff (the Church) lacked Article III standing, and because Deutsche Bank did not explicitly demonstrate federal jurisdiction in its removal papers, the entire judgment should be void or reversed.
Under U.S. law, a judgment issued without subject-matter jurisdiction is void and can be attacked at any time. The plaintiffs are using Rule 60(b)(4) as the vehicle for this argument, asserting that the oversight of jurisdiction amounts to a “total want of jurisdiction.”
On a Rule 60(b)(4) motion, courts will grant relief only if the jurisdictional error is egregious – i.e., if the court truly had no authority to act even on a colorable basis. Here, there was at least an arguable basis for jurisdiction (the federal claims by White), which the defense will emphasize in opposing the motion. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, highlight that the removing defendant never proved its authority (standing) to invoke the court’s power, which they view as a fatal flaw.
The implication of “he was not served before removal” in this case is two-fold:
- Procedural Gamesmanship: It suggests the defendants acted swiftly to move the case to what they saw as a more favorable forum (the federal court), possibly to avoid an immediate state hearing that could have stopped the foreclosure sale. This is a tactical use of the removal rules. While speedy removal is allowed, it has drawn criticism for enabling defendants to avoid state-court injunctive relief (as happened — the foreclosure proceeded during the transition to federal court). The plaintiffs view this as an abuse of process that the federal court enabled by not intervening sooner.
- Jurisdictional Scrutiny: It raises the question of whether the federal court diligently ensured it had jurisdiction. The plaintiffs argue it did not, since one party wasn’t properly under federal jurisdiction (no standing) and the defendants hadn’t documented jurisdiction. This calls into play the court’s independent duty to verify its jurisdiction. The scenario underscores that all federal courts must have both subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction; a failure in service can affect personal jurisdiction (though cured by appearance in this instance), and a lack of standing affects subject-matter jurisdiction. The plaintiffs’ post-trial motion is essentially forcing the court to confront whether it should rewind the case due to a jurisdictional defect occurring at the outset.
Going forward, the court (or potentially the appellate court if the issue is taken up on appeal) will decide if the removal and subsequent proceedings are valid. They will consider points such as:
- Did White’s inclusion of federal claims in the complaint give the court an “arguable basis” for jurisdiction (likely yes, for White’s own claims), even if the Church’s claims had to be dismissed?
- If so, was it enough to sustain jurisdiction over at least White’s portion of the case? (If yes, the judgment on White’s claims might stand, while the Church’s claims were properly dismissed without prejudice.)
- Or, conversely, does the combination of an unserved removal and a co-plaintiff without standing mean the case never properly invoked Article III jurisdiction at all, making the entire judgment void? (This is the plaintiffs’ contention.)
The resolution of these questions will determine if the judgment survives. It’s a complex intersection of civil procedure and constitutional jurisdiction. The broader lesson is that removal before service is allowable, but it can lead to nuanced jurisdictional disputes. Courts ultimately must ensure they have authority to hear a case; if they fail to do so at the proper time, a party can later seek relief from the judgment on that basis. In this instance, Alvin White and the Church of the Gardens are attempting exactly that via FRCP 59 and 60, arguing for relief from a judgment they view as rendered ultra vires (beyond the court’s power) due to the premature removal and lack of proven jurisdiction.
Sources:
- Federal Bar Association, Guide to Removal and Remand, noting that the removing defendant bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction and that unserved defendants need not join in removal.
- Michael Best & Friedrich LLP, Lexology article (Feb. 18, 2025) on “snap removal,” discussing circuit courts’ approval of removal before service (Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth Circuits) and the Ninth Circuit’s 2024 decision disallowing removal before a case is even commenced (while leaving open the question of typical pre-service removal).
- Church of the Gardens v. QLS Corp., Order Granting Summary Judgment (W.D. Wash. Sept. 2, 2025) – court’s summary of case background and noting removal on Dec. 28, 2023 from Pierce County Superior Court; dismissal of COTG’s claims for lack of standing.
- Church of the Gardens v. Deutsche Bank, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Post-Judgment Relief (FRCP 59 & 60) (filed Sept. 15, 2025) – argues judgment is void due to no demonstrated standing/jurisdiction at removal, and criticizes the misallocation of the burden of proof regarding jurisdiction. The motion labels the court’s failure to ensure jurisdiction as “treason to the Constitution” and seeks relief under FRCP 60(b)(4) and (b)(6) for these extraordinary circumstances.
- Stan Burman, Rule 60(b)(4) Motion to Vacate a Void Judgment (2016) – notes that a judgment entered against a party who was never served is void for lack of personal jurisdiction, illustrating the importance of proper service or appearance. Additionally, courts have held that a judgment is void under 60(b)(4) only when there is a “total want of jurisdiction” or a “plain usurpation” of judicial power – a standard the plaintiffs in this case attempt to meet by alleging the court had no jurisdiction from the start.
Read the petition on Academia.edu
