BRAZIL'S SUPREME COURT FACES A DOUBLE CRISIS
14,213 Constitutional Complaints Filed to Protect the STF's Authority — While Public Distrust of the Court Reaches Record Levels
Constitutional Law, Judicial Accountability, Procedural Enforcement and International Human Rights
October 13, 2026 | Independent Legal Analysis
By AI CHATGPT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Brazil's Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal, STF) has revealed two facts that must not be confused.
First, 14,213 constitutional complaints were filed directly with the STF during 2025, largely through a procedural mechanism designed to challenge acts of other judicial authoritiesthat apparently disregards the STF's decisions, binding precedent, or constitutional jurisdiction.
Second, independent public-opinion research in September 2026 reported 47% negative evaluation of STF justices and 48% institutional distrust of the STF itself .
The 14,213 complaints were filed before the STF; they were not 14,213 public complaints against the STF.
This distinction governs the legal analysis. Constitutional complaints challenge specified acts of lower-court judges, appellate courts or, where the law allows, administrative authorities. Polls about the STF measure a completely different phenomenon: how voters assess or trust the Supreme Court.
In 2025, constitutional complaints represented 42.5%of all new original STF filings.
Their number increased from 5,882 in 2021 to 14,213 in 2025 , a cumulative rise of 141.64%.
The judicial system's obligation to respect binding constitutional rulings therefore deserves close empirical examination, but the volume of filings does not tell us how many complaints were ultimately upheld.
THE CENTRAL QUESTION: Why has resort to the STF to enforce its constitutional authority grown so rapidly at the same time that public confidence in the STF itself has sharply deteriorated?
1. WHAT THE STF'S OCTOBER 13 REPORT ACTUALLY SAYS
On October 13, 2026, the STF (Supreme Federal Court) published an institutional news report entitled “Complaints represent almost half of the new original proceedings in the STF.” The report explains that a complaint is presented directly to the Supreme Court when another judicial body encroaches on the Court's constitutionally assigned jurisdiction or when a judicial decision whose authority must be respected has allegedly been disregarded.
The report identifies complaints as the main factor behind the growth of original STF proceedings in 2024 and 2025 . Its official statistics concern cases received , not the number of completed judgments or a stock of pending cases. The distinction appears expressly in the report's chart caption on page 4 of the preserved article.
Primary source: STF, original news report, October 13, 2026 .
Terminology: The Portuguese legal name constitutional complaint is retained throughout. The word “complaint” here denotes a specialized constitutional proceeding, not a general grievance or complaint about the Supreme Court's own behavior .
2. WHO IS CHALLENGED IN A CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINT?
2.1. The challenged act normally comes from an authority outside the STF
In the context examined by the STF's news report, the complaint is designed to protect the Supreme Court's authority against legally defined acts of other bodies . A party may file the proceeding where a lower judge, ordinary appellate court or other competent authority is alleged to have ignored an applicable STF judgment, failed to apply a binding proposition, misapplied one, or usurped the Court's jurisdiction. Certain administrative acts may also be challenged under the constitutional and statutory rules.
The complainant is not asserting that the STF failed to follow its own decisions merely by filing an Rcl. The complainant brings an alleged breach by an external decision-maker to the STF for judicial review. Nor does the word “original” make the challenged decision an STF decision: “original” means the new complaint case begins before the STF rather than arriving as an ordinary appeal.
2.2. Legal function and limits
The remedy protects the authority of judicial decisions and the allocation of jurisdiction. A successful constitutional complaint may produce the quashing of the impugned judicial act, the annulment of an administrative act in the applicable cases, or another appropriate order to restore the authority of controlling law. Not every alleged legal error satisfies the requirements for an Rcl, and the remedy is not an unrestricted substitute for an appeal.
For that reason, the 14,213 filings reflect 14,213 instances of invocation of this mechanism , not 14,213 judicially established cases of disobedience. Only an examination of outcomes and grounds can determine how many challenging acts were found incompatible with the STF's binding authority.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY
3.1. Federal Constitution, Article 102(I)(l)
The Federal Constitution assigns the STF original jurisdiction over complaints intended to preserve its jurisdiction and guarantee the authority of its decisions. This provision concerns enforcement of the Court's authority over acts that interfere with that authority , not the measurement of public approval of the justices.
3.2. Article 102(2), Article 103-A(3) and binding effect
Article 102(2) establishes binding effects for final merits decisions in the specified types of concentrated constitutional review. Article 103-A(3) provides a complaint mechanism against a judicial decision or administrative act that contradicts an applicable binding precedent statement or wrongly applies it. The Constitution expressly contemplates the quashing of a challenged judicial decision or the annulment of an administrative act when the complaint is sustained.
3.3. Code of Civil Procedure, Articles 988–993
Article 988 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Law 13,105/2015) provides the general framework for preserving court jurisdiction, protecting the authority of decisions and ensuring compliance with specified binding rulings. Article 989 allows the reporting judge to seek information and, if necessary, suspend proceedings or the challenged act. Article 992 regulates the consequences of granting the complaint, while Article 993 concerns immediate implementation.
The STF's own explanatory material describes the central function as preventing lower judicial authorities from undermining its jurisdiction or disregarding its decisions. Its jurisprudence demands a close correspondence between the challenged act and the invoked controlling precedent, rather than permitting a general appeal disguised as a complaint.
TABLE 1 — THE DISTINCT LEGAL FUNCTIONS OF A COMPLAINT
| Legal basis | Protected interest | Possible challenged conduct |
|---|---|---|
| Federal Constitution, Art. 102(I)(l) | Supreme Federal Court jurisdiction | Another judicial body allegedly exercising jurisdiction constitutionally reserved to the STF. |
| Federal Constitution, Art. 102(I)(l); CPC Art. 988(II) | Authority of STF decisions | Judicial or, where applicable, administrative action apparently disregarding a legally operative STF order. |
| Federal Constitution, Art. 103-A(3); CPC Art. 988(III) | Binding precedent statements | Judicial decision or administrative act contradicting or misapplying an applicable binding summary. |
| Federal Constitution, Art. 102(2); CPC Art. 988(III) | Decisions in concentrated constitutional review | Failure to comply with the legally binding effect of a qualifying STF decision. |
Source: 1988 Constitution and the current text of the Code of Civil Procedure; descriptions explain legal categories, not proven counts within the 2025 statistics.
Legislative update: Law 15,484 of August 4, 2026 modified Article 988, including a limited new provision involving qualified judgments of the Superior Court of Justice. That legislative development is subsequent to the 2025 period and cannot explain the 2025 totals. It must not be confused with the constitutionally defined role of the STF.
4. THE GROWTH OF CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINTS: 2021–2025
TABLE 2 — NEW CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINTS FILED DIRECTLY WITH THE STF
| Year | New Rcl filings | Change from previous year | Year-over-year change |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 5,882 | — | — |
| 2022 | 6,242 | +360 | +6.12% |
| 2023 | 7,333 | +1,091 | +17.48% |
| 2024 | 10,131 | +2,798 | +38.16% |
| 2025 | 14,213 | +4,082 | +40.29% |
Source: STF, October 13, 2026; annual changes calculated from the original numbers. Figures are annual incoming filings, not judgments finding noncompliance or the pending-case inventory.
Annual Rcl filings increased by 8,331 between 2021 and 2025, a cumulative rise of 141.64% . Particularly notable is the acceleration in 2024 and 2025: each year saw an annual increase close to 40%.
The central empirical question is therefore which categories of lower-court or administrative acts were being challenged , under which precedents, and with what results. Without outcome data, it would be inaccurate either to declare that all filed complaints proved judicial disobedience or to dismiss the rapid expansion as statistically meaningless.
5. COMPOSITION OF THE STF'S ORIGINAL CASE FILINGS
The STF's October 13 analysis states that constitutional complaints accounted for 42.5% of the Court's original filings in 2025. Habeas corpus petitions (HC) and ordinary appeals in habeas corpus matters (RHC) jointly accounted for approximately 48% . Together these categories represented approximately 91% of new original-case registrations. Concentrated constitutional review actions (ADC, ADI, ADO and ADPF) jointly represented approximately 1% .
TABLE 3 — COMPOSITION OF NEW ORIGINAL-CLASS FILINGS, 2025
| Category | Share | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| Constitutional complaint — Rcl | 42.5% | A new case filed directly with the STF to defend specified judicial authority or jurisdiction. |
| Habeas corpus — HC; ordinary habeas corpus appeals — RHC | Approx. 48% combined | Procedural categories related to personal liberty; distinct from Rcl. |
| Rcl + HC + RHC | Approx. 91% combined | Concentration of the Court's incoming original-case classifications. |
| ADC + ADI + ADO + ADPF | Approx. 1% combined | Concentrated constitutional review. |
| Other original classes | Residual share | Not separately quantified in the article's textual summary. |
Source: STF's Activity Report 2025 as summarized in its October 13, 2026 news article. Percentages are rounded as reported; combined or overlapping rows are not to be added.
The relatively small numerical share of concentrated constitutional review does not diminish its legal effects. A single constitutional judgment may establish binding rules affecting many courts and vast numbers of people. The volume of Rcl proceedings may therefore reflect the institutional challenges involved in transmitting, interpreting and enforcing the Court's legal directives across the judicial system.
6. PUBLIC DISSATISFACTION WITH THE STF IN 2026
Unlike the Rcl statistics, Datafolha's opinion surveys measure public evaluation of the STF itself . Datafolha reported on September 28, 2026 that 47% rated the justices' performance bad or very bad, up from 40% in May. The September result was the highest negative rating since that survey series began in 2019. Positive evaluation was only 18% , with 31% rating performance regular and 4% expressing no opinion.
TABLE 4 — EVALUATION OF STF JUSTICES' PERFORMANCE
| Survey | Good / Very good | Regular | Bad / Very bad | No opinion |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| December 2025 | 32% | 29% | 35% | 4% |
| March 2026 | 23% | 34% | 39% | 4% |
| May 2026 | — | — | 40% | — |
| September 2026 | 18% | 31% | 47% | 4% |
Sources: Datafolha, March 17 and September 28, 2026. The September publication explicitly reports May's 40% negative evaluation; unverified May breakdowns are deliberately left blank.
From December 2025 to September 2026, the negative rating rose by 12 percentage points , while the positive rating fell by 14 points . This is a significant institutional development, distinct from whether lower-court judges comply with particular STF precedents.
It would be methodologically unsound to assert a direct causal relationship between the growth of Rcl filings through December 2025 and public-opinion results recorded in September 2026. The two series concern different subjects, different observation periods and different units of measurement. They may nevertheless be examined together as indicators of pressures on Brazil's constitutional system.
7. RECORD DISTRUST OF THE COURT AND PUBLIC DEMANDS FOR JUDICIAL ETHICS
7.1. Confidence and distrust
On September 21, 2026, Datafolha reported that 48% of voters did not trust the STF, compared with 43% in March. The September finding was the highest level in the institute's series beginning in 2012. In that same month, 14% trusted the Court a great deal and 35% trusted it somewhat.
TABLE 5 — TRUST IN THE SUPREME FEDERAL COURT
| Answer | March 2026 | September 2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trust a great deal | 16% | 14% | -2 pp |
| Trust somewhat | 38% | 35% | -3 pp |
| Do not trust | 43% | 48% | +5 pp |
Sources: Datafolha, March 17 and September 21, 2026. Nonresponses, which are not shown, account for rounding and remaining percentages.
7.2. Comparison with other Brazilian institutions
TABLE 6 — PERCENTAGE REPORTING IN THE TRUST, SEPTEMBER 2026
| Institution | No trust |
|---|---|
| Supreme Federal Court (STF) | 48% |
| National Congress | 45% |
| Political parties | 45% |
| Presidency of the Republic | 42% |
| Judiciary — judges and appellate judges | 38% |
| News media | 33% |
| Armed Forces | 25% |
| Major Brazilian companies | 23% |
Source: Datafolha, September 21, 2026. Survey sampling error must be considered when interpreting narrow differences between institutions.
A further survey reported on September 14 found that 77% agreed people trusted the STF less than in the past, and 76% agreed the justices held excessive power. Yet 71% agreed the Supreme Court is essential to protecting Brazilian democracy. These findings demonstrate that a desire for stronger judicial accountability can coexist with recognition of the necessity of a constitutional court.
7.3. Public expectations regarding ethical standards
TABLE 7 — JUDICIAL CONDUCT CONSIDERED UNACCEPTABLE BY VOTERS
| Conduct about which voters were asked | Unacceptable |
|---|---|
| Hearing a case involving a party represented by the justice's relative | 88% |
| Accepting invitations to events paid for by businesses litigating before the Court | 85% |
| Issuing decisions to benefit or harm presidential candidates during the electoral period | 82% |
| Being a partner in a private company while serving on the Court | 78% |
| Receiving payments for lectures from private companies | 78% |
| Giving public interviews or opinions about cases under judicial consideration | 71% |
Source: Datafolha, September 28, 2026. Descriptions are concise English paraphrases of the questions summarized by the institute; they are not findings against any particular justice.
The concerns reflected in these surveys are closely related to constitutional principles of judicial impartiality, impersonality, reasoned decision-making and public accountability. However, an opinion survey is not proof that any individual judge committed misconduct.
8. WHY THE TWO DATA SERIES MUST BE ANALYZED SEPARATELY — AND TOGETHER
8.1. Two opposite directions of scrutiny
Direction one: From litigants to the STF, against acts of other authorities. Constitutional complaints seek the STF's intervention where a judicial or administrative act allegedly infringes its constitutionally protected competence or legal authority. The STF is the forum asked to remedy the asserted breach.
Direction two: From the public toward the STF itself. Datafolha's surveys measure whether voters approve of the Court's work, trust it as an institution and consider certain types of judicial conduct acceptable.
Confusing these directions would falsely imply that 14,213 litigants filed complaints against the STF . They didn't. It would also overlook the important question raised by the current data: how effectively do lower courts observe the constitutional standards announced by the nation's highest court?
8.2. The compliance problem cannot be resolved by procedural labels
The Court's own October 13 report says that the main growth in original filings was not distributed evenly among all case classes. It was mainly associated with complaints. That official identification justifies disaggregated analysis of the challenging judicial acts, the invoked STF decisions and the outcomes.
It does not establish that the STF has issued 14,213 findings of disregard. Equally, the Court should not treat the numerical increase as a neutral administrative burden without releasing more detailed, verifiable information about what the complaints assert and how the Court resolves them.
8.3. Two linked dimensions of the rule of law
Lower courts must observe constitutional decisions that bind them. The STF must in turn decide complaints lawfully, impartially and through reasoned judgments. The Court's constitutional authority and its own accountability are not competing principles; they are reciprocal features of the rule of law.
Judicial obedience cannot be demanded from lower courts while exempting the Supreme Court from the constitutional standards of legality, due process and impartiality. Conversely, generalized criticism of the STF does not authorize other courts to disregard its binding judgments.
9. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Brazil is a party to the American Convention on Human Rights , incorporated domestically by Decree 678/1992. Article 8 requires a hearing with due guarantees before a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. Article 25 protects the right to an effective judicial remedy against violations of fundamental rights, including violations committed by public officials.
Article 25(2)(c) also requires States Parties to ensure enforcement of decisions granting such remedies. This principle is particularly relevant to the broader rule-of-law concern raised by the Rcl mechanism: a judicial decision whose authority cannot be effectively vindicated may fail to provide meaningful protection.
Within Brazilian constitutional law, Article 5 protects access to judicial review and due process, while Article 93(IX) requires reasoned judicial decisions. These protections apply to the fair examination of claims of noncompliance and to the procedural safeguards surrounding the challenged acts themselves.
It would be premature to assert a specific violation of the Convention solely from aggregate filing statistics or opinion surveys. Those sources identify institutional questions that require examination of particular judicial records and enforcement outcomes.
10. REQUIRED TRANSPARENCY AND LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
10.1. Essential information not supplied by the article
To understand the 2025 increase, the STF should publish or facilitate examination of a disaggregated dataset covering: (a) which judicial branches, courts, judicial levels or administrative bodies issued the challenging acts; (b) which STF decisions or binding precedents the parties invoked; (c) the proportion of complaints involving alleged usurpation of jurisdiction, nonapplication of binding precedent or misapplication of precedent; (d) rates of admissibility, grants, denials, withdrawals and terminations; (e) the time taken to resolve each class of complaint; and (f) whether judicial orders granting relief were subsequently implemented.
With these data, researchers could distinguish an increase in alleged judicial noncompliance from greater awareness of the mechanism, repetitive litigation, procedural shifts and other explanations. They could also assess whether complaints offer effective constitutional protection in practice.
10.2. Legal findings
First. The 14,213 constitutional complaints filed in 2025 were received by the STF to defend its jurisdiction or the legal authority of qualifying decisions and precedents ; they are not a poll of dissatisfaction with the STF and must not be described as 14,213 allegations against the Supreme Court itself.
Second. The complaint mechanism addresses concrete challenged acts — typically decisions by other judges and courts, and in legally specified circumstances administrative acts. The statutory rules also regulate standing, admissibility, proof and appropriate judicial relief.
Third. The growth of incoming complaints is established by the STF's own records: from 5,882 in 2021 to 14,213 in 2025, an increase of 141.64%. But the publication does not disclose the number of substantiated violations.
Fourth. Public distrust of the STF is a separate, independently documented development: Datafolha reported 48% distrust and 47% negative evaluation in September 2026. These surveys address the Supreme Court's public legitimacy, not the adjudicated merits of the complaints against other authorities.
Fifth. Both problems are constitutionally serious. Binding decisions must be respected throughout the judicial system, and the Court issuing them must itself uphold impartiality, due process, judicial ethics, transparency and reasoned adjudication.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT CANNOT PROTECT THE RULE OF LAW BY DECLARATION ALONE. ITS RULINGS MUST BE RESPECTED BY LOWER AUTHORITIES, ITS REMEDIES MUST BE EFFECTIVE, AND ITS OWN EXERCISE OF POWER MUST REMAIN ACCOUNTABLE TO THE CONSTITUTION.
11. PRIMARY SOURCES, LEGISLATION AND RESEARCH
Sources are cited by title and linked directly to their publisher or official legislative text. The original STF page was independently preserved by the author as a seven-page PDF; automated access to its live website may return an HTTP 403 restriction. The numerical report has therefore also been checked against that preserved copy. Interactive Flourish graphics do not reproduce as readable graphics in the PDF; tables above are reconstructed from the reported figures rather than represented as screenshots of those original graphics.
- SUPREME FEDERAL COURT (STF). Complaints represent almost half of the new cases originating in the STF . October 13, 2026. Official news item .
- Brazilian Supreme Court (STF). Constitutional claim guarantees the preservation of the STF's jurisdiction . July 30, 2014. Official legal explainer .
- BRAZIL. Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil (1988) , Arts. 5, 93(IX), 102(I)(l), 102(2), 103-A(3). Official consolidated constitutional text .
- BRAZIL. Law 13,105, March 16, 2015, Code of Civil Procedure , Arts. 988–993. Chamber of Deputies, updated text .
- BRAZIL. Law 15,484, August 4, 2026, amending procedural rules including CPC Art. 988. Official legal text .
- DATAFOLHA. Approval ratings for the National Congress and the Supreme Federal Court worsen . March 17, 2026. Research report summary .
- DATAFOLHA. 28% support the impeachment of Moraes, and 34% believe the minister should be removed for investigation . September 14, 2026. Research report, including public assessments of the STF's role .
- DATAFOLHA. Lack of confidence in the Supreme Court surpasses political parties and Congress, reaching the highest level ever recorded . September 21, 2026. Institutional-trust research .
- DATAFOLHA. Record, negative evaluation of the STF reaches 47% . September 28, 2026. Public evaluation and judicial ethics research .
- BRAZIL. Decree 678, November 6, 1992, promulgating the American Convention on Human Rights , especially Arts. 8 and 25. Official convention text .
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