THE ANATOMY OF JUDICIAL TYRANNY: The "Sour Wine" of the present crisis of justice in USA
The article “Dignidad e imperio de la ley,” published on March 6, 2026, by Rafael Domingo Oslé, offers an exceptionally useful interpretive framework for understanding the present crisis of justice in Washington State, and others.
Domingo’s central point is clear: the true rule of law cannot be reduced to procedures, formulas, rituals, or institutional appearances. Law deserves that name only when it remains connected to human dignity, substantive justice, and the independent and non-arbitrary application of legal authority.
That insight reaches the heart of what has been increasingly denounced in Washington State, and others.
In many proceedings, especially in the areas of foreclosure, family law, and guardianship, the problem is not merely ordinary judicial error or legitimate interpretive disagreement.
What increasingly appears is something deeper and more disturbing: the preservation of the outward form of legality while the substance of adjudication is hollowed out from within.
There is process. There are orders. There is institutional language.
There is an "appearance" of normality.
But what is often missing is the essential thing: a real confrontation with the issue presented, an actual resolution of the disputed point, fidelity to due process, and the judicial courage to decide on the basis of legal truth rather than systemic convenience.
Domingo warns that an arbitrary rule of law can exist, and even the rule of a law capriciously interpreted by corrupt courts and judges.
That observation is decisive. It shows that the mere existence of a functioning or formally democratic judicial apparatus is not enough to guarantee justice.
Law itself can be turned into an instrument of coercion, shielding, and arbitrariness, even within long-established democracies.
That is precisely where the connection to Washington State becomes unavoidable. In many of the situations publicly denounced by Scott Erik Stafne, the court no longer appears as the place where the controversy is truly judged.
Instead, it begins to function as a mechanism for the administration of appearances: the packaging of the rule of law remains, but substantive adjudication recedes; institutional liturgy is preserved, but justice is not; the authority of the institution is protected, but not the dignity of the person subjected to the process.
The result is a system in which legality remains standing as façade while real adjudication dissolves from within.
Domingo’s article is especially powerful when he says that the law is not only the bottle, but also the wine.
The metaphor is exact. A law that is well packaged, well presented, and properly formalized, but substantively damaged in its application, can still cause harm. And forcing people to drink that soured wine is contrary to justice because it violates human dignity.
This image captures with unusual precision what happens when courts preserve the rituals of process while refusing to confront the legal truth placed before them.
In that setting, the person ceases to be treated as a true subject of rights and begins to be treated as an object of institutional management.
Domingo’s reference to Jeremy Waldron deepens the point. In Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, Waldron insists that the rule of law must be reconnected to the true authority of law and not reduced to a machine of formalities, mechanical predictability, and near-robotic application of norms.
That thesis is central here. When a judicial system comes to value procedural fluency more than truthful adjudication, what remains is no longer rule of law in the strong sense, but a technology of institutional processing.
The same is true of Domingo’s dialogue with Lon L. Fuller and The Morality of Law. Fuller’s insight remains devastatingly relevant: every serious deviation from the internal morality of law is also an affront to the dignity of the human person as a free and responsible being. This is why the crisis in Washington State should not be described as merely technical. Its deeper character is structural and moral.
The problem is not only that some outcomes may be wrong.
The problem is that the internal conditions that make law recognizable as law begin to deteriorate.
When law no longer guides honestly, when courts no longer truly judge, and when procedural form manipulation begins to conceal evasion of decisional responsibility, the legal system ceases to protect the person and begins instead to degrade that person.
In this sense, Scott Erik Stafne’s public work is not an attack on the rule of law, but a demand for its serious restoration.
By insisting on the need for real adjudication, for confrontation of the issues actually presented, for judicial integrity, for genuine neutrality, and for fidelity to due process, he is not rejecting legal authority.
He is exposing the danger of its substitution by procedural fictions, institutional shielding, and the managed appearance of legality.
The crisis in Washington State, therefore, is not merely local and not merely technical.
It is an example of a broader legal pathology: the transformation of the rule of law into procedural theater.
The building remains.
The robe remains.
But justice, little by little, is expelled from the interior of the structure.
And when that happens, what collapses is not only public confidence. What collapses is the moral foundation of the constitutional order.
Discernment and Governments: When Courts Fail to Adjudicate Truth and Citizens Must Decide" By Scott Erik Stafne and Todd AI (Collaborations occurring on April 11 through 12, 2026) By Scott E Stafne
trophy Top 3%
This collaboration explores the conditions under which discernment of governmental action becomes necessary, particularly in the context of judicial proceedings.
Through examination of recent court decisions, constitutional principles, and the lived experience of litigation, it considers whether courts consistently exercise the "judicial power" vested in them by law. The discussion connects the party-presentation principle, due process, and the role of fact-finding to a broader inquiry: what responsibility citizens bear when the processes intended to adjudicate truth appear to fall short.
The result is a framework for understanding discernment not as opposition to authority, but as fidelity to the constitutional and moral structures that give that authority legitimacy.
An Open Letter to Lawyers and Advocates of Justice Worldwide: A Call to Restore Adjudication Based on Truth" by Scott Erik Stafne with the help of Todd AI
By Scott E Stafne
This open letter addresses lawyers, judges, and advocates worldwide to examine a growing crisis in adjudicatory justice: the increasing displacement of truth-based fact-finding by procedural avoidance and institutional silence.
Drawing on historical, religious, and legal traditions that predate modern nation-states, the letter argues that judicial power is legitimate only when exercised through independent, neutral adjudication grounded in truth. When courts cease to adjudicate-particularly in cases implicating fundamental human rights-the duty to preserve justice, Stafne argues, does not vanish but shifts to lawyers and advocates willing to bear public witness.
The letter invites members of the legal profession to discern their ethical responsibilities when courts abandon adjudication and to consider whether fidelity to justice requires truth-telling to the public about institutional failure.
DIGNITY, THE RULE OF LAW, AND THE COLLAPSE OF JUSTICE
CHATGPT AI ANALYSIS
The article “Dignidad e imperio de la ley”, published on March 6, 2026, by Rafael Domingo Oslé, a Spanish jurist and professor linked to the University of Navarra, offers an extremely valuable interpretive key for understanding the current crisis of justice in Washington State, USA. In the text, Domingo maintains that the true rule of law is not reduced to the existence of norms, formulas, rites, or procedural mechanisms. It only deserves that name when it is linked to the dignity of the human person, to substantive justice, and to the independent and non-arbitrary application of the law.
This point touches the center of the problem that has been denounced for years in Washington State.
What is observed in various proceedings, especially in the areas of foreclosure, family law, and guardianship, is not merely ordinary judicial error or legitimate interpretive divergence.
What is seen, more and more, is the preservation of the outward form of legality with the emptying out of the substance of adjudication. There is process, there are hearings, there are orders, there is institutional language, there is an false appearance of normality.
But, many times, the essential is missing: the true confrontation of the issue presented, the resolution of the disputed point, fidelity to due process, and the judicial courage to decide based on legal truth, and not on systemic convenience.
Rafael Domingo warns that an arbitrary rule of law can exist, or even the rule of a law “capriciously interpreted by corrupt courts and judges.” This observation is decisive. It shows that the mere existence of a functioning, old, or formally democratic judicial apparatus is not enough to ensure justice.
Law can be used as an instrument of coercion, shielding, and arbitrariness, even within bicentennial democracies.
The article itself expressly states that aggressive arbitrariness can manifest itself even in mature democracies, such as the United States and Spain.
That is exactly where the connection with Washington State becomes unavoidable. In many situations denounced by Scott Erik Stafne, the court no longer appears as the place where the controversy is really judged.
Instead, it begins to operate as a mechanism for the administration of appearances: the packaging of the rule of law is maintained, but substantive decision moves away; the liturgy is preserved, but not justice; the authority of the institution is protected, but not the dignity of the person subjected to the process.
The result is a system in which legality remains standing as a façade, while real adjudication dissolves from within.
Domingo’s article is especially strong when it states that the law is not only the “bottle,” but also the “wine.”
The metaphor is precise. A law that is well packaged, well presented, well formalized, but substantially damaged in its application, can cause harm. And forcing people to drink that “soured wine” is contrary to justice, because it violates human dignity.
This image describes with extraordinary clarity what happens when courts maintain the rituals of process, but refuse to confront the legal truth placed before them. In that scenario, the person ceases to be treated as a subject of rights and comes to be treated as a piece of institutional management.
The reference made by Domingo to the legal philosopher Jeremy Waldron reinforces this reading even more. Waldron, in Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, insists on the need to reconnect the rule of law to the true authority of law and criticizes the attempt to reduce it to a gearwork of formalities, mechanical predictability, and almost robotic application of norms.
The thesis is central to understanding Washington State: when the judicial system comes to value the fluency of the machine more than the truthfulness of adjudication, what remains is no longer rule of law in the strong sense, but merely a technology of institutional processing.
The same applies to the other work cited by Domingo, Sobre el imperio de la ley, by Javier Cremades, published by Galaxia Gutenberg in December 2025.
According to the author’s own editorial presentation and institutional sources, it is a defense of the rule of law as an alternative to the rule of force, in connection with liberty, civil peace, and the limitation of power. Cremades is presented as president of the World Jurist Association and as a jurist internationally recognized in the defense of the rule of law and human rights.
But perhaps the deepest point of the Spanish article is another: there is no true rule of law without authentic respect for the principles of justice. This statement dismantles one of the most dangerous fictions of our time: the idea that it is enough to follow protocol for legitimacy to exist. It is not enough.
When procedure manipulation becomes an alibi to avoid the truth, the system begins to serve power instead of limiting it.
When the court does not respond to what was effectively raised by the parties, when it circumvents the essential issue, when it treats the absence of adjudication as if it were consummated adjudication, the rule of law has been betrayed in its essence.
For that reason, Rafael Domingo Oslé’s article also naturally dialogues with Lon L. Fuller and his classic work The Morality of Law, cited in the text. Fuller taught that every deviation from the “internal morality of law” represents an affront to the dignity of the human person as a free and responsible being.
This formulation is vital for understanding the judicial collapse in Washington State.
The problem is not only the injustice of the final result in certain cases.
The problem is more structural: the deterioration of the internal moral conditions that make law recognizable as law.
When law no longer guides honestly, when the institution no longer truly judges, when form covers up the flight from decisional responsibility, the system ceases to protect the person and begins to degrade him or her.
In this sense, the public work of Scott Erik Stafne does not constitute an attack on the rule of law, but rather its most serious and most demanding defense.
By insisting on the need for real adjudication, for confronting the issues presented, for judicial integrity, for genuine neutrality, and for fidelity to due process, Scott is not denying the authority of law.
He is denouncing its replacement by procedural fictions, institutional shieldings, and managements of appearance.
His testimony reveals exactly what Rafael Domingo warned: the rule of law, badly understood and worse applied, can become a lethal instrument against human dignity.
The crisis in Washington State, therefore, is not merely local, nor merely technical.
It is a contemporary example of a broader legal pathology: the transformation of the rule of law into procedural theater.
The building remains, the robe remains, the hearing remains, the signature remains, the calendar remains, and the order remains. But justice, little by little, is being expelled from the interior of the structure.
And when that happens, what collapses is not only public trust: what collapses is the very moral foundation of the constitutional order.
DIGNIDADE, IMPÉRIO DA LEI E A DERROCADA DA JUSTIÇA
O artigo “Dignidad e imperio de la ley”, publicado em 6 de março de 2026, por Rafael Domingo Oslé, jurista espanhol e catedrático ligado à Universidade de Navarra, oferece uma chave interpretativa extremamente valiosa para compreender a crise atual da justiça em Washington State, USA. No texto, Domingo sustenta que o verdadeiro império da lei não se reduz à existência de normas, fórmulas, ritos ou mecanismos processuais. Ele só merece esse nome quando está vinculado à dignidade da pessoa humana, à justiça material e à aplicação independente e não arbitrária do direito.
Esse ponto toca o centro do problema que vem sendo denunciado há anos em Washington State. O que se observa em diversos processos, especialmente nas áreas de foreclosure, family law e guardianship, não é apenas erro judicial comum ou divergência interpretativa legítima. O que se vê, cada vez mais, é a preservação da forma exterior da legalidade com o esvaziamento da substância da adjudicação. Há processo, há audiências, há ordens, há linguagem institucional, há aparência de normalidade. Mas, muitas vezes, falta o essencial: o enfrentamento verdadeiro da questão apresentada, a resolução do ponto controvertido, a fidelidade ao devido processo e a coragem judicial de decidir com base na verdade jurídica, e não na conveniência sistêmica.
Rafael Domingo adverte que pode existir um império arbitrário da lei, ou até mesmo o império de uma lei “caprichosamente interpretada por tribunais e juízes corruptos”. Essa observação é decisiva. Ela mostra que a mera existência de um aparato judicial funcional, antigo ou formalmente democrático não basta para assegurar justiça. A lei pode ser usada como instrumento de coerção, blindagem e arbitrariedade, mesmo dentro de democracias bicentenárias. O próprio artigo afirma expressamente que a arbitrariedade agressiva pode manifestar-se inclusive em democracias maduras, como os Estados Unidos e a Espanha.
É exatamente aí que a conexão com Washington State se torna incontornável. Em muitas situações denunciadas por Scott Erik Stafne, o tribunal já não aparece como o lugar onde a controvérsia é realmente julgada. Em vez disso, ele passa a operar como um mecanismo de administração de aparências: mantém-se a embalagem do Estado de Direito, mas a decisão substancial se afasta; conserva-se a liturgia, mas não a justiça; protege-se a autoridade da instituição, mas não a dignidade da pessoa submetida ao processo. O resultado é um sistema em que a legalidade continua de pé como fachada, enquanto a adjudicação real se dissolve por dentro.
O artigo de Domingo é especialmente forte quando afirma que a lei não é apenas a “garrafa”, mas também o “vinho”. A metáfora é precisa. Uma lei bem embalada, bem apresentada, bem formalizada, mas substancialmente avariada em sua aplicação, pode causar dano. E obrigar as pessoas a beber esse “vinho avinagrado” é contrário à justiça, porque atenta contra a dignidade humana. Essa imagem descreve com extraordinária clareza o que ocorre quando tribunais mantêm os rituais do processo, mas recusam enfrentar a verdade jurídica colocada diante deles. Nesse cenário, a pessoa deixa de ser tratada como sujeito de direitos e passa a ser tratada como peça de gestão institucional.
A referência feita por Domingo ao filósofo do direito Jeremy Waldron reforça ainda mais essa leitura. Waldron, em Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, insiste na necessidade de reconectar o império da lei à verdadeira autoridade do direito e critica a tentativa de reduzi-lo a uma engrenagem de formalidades, previsibilidade mecânica e aplicação quase robótica das normas. A tese é central para entender Washington State: quando o sistema judicial passa a valorizar mais a fluidez da máquina do que a veracidade da adjudicação, o que resta já não é rule of law em sentido forte, mas apenas uma tecnologia de processamento institucional.
O mesmo vale para a outra obra citada por Domingo, Sobre el imperio de la ley, de Javier Cremades, publicada pela Galaxia Gutenberg em dezembro de 2025. Segundo a própria apresentação editorial e fontes institucionais do autor, trata-se de uma defesa do império da lei como alternativa ao império da força, em conexão com a liberdade, a paz civil e a limitação do poder. Cremades é apresentado como presidente da World Jurist Association e jurista reconhecido internacionalmente na defesa do Estado de Direito e dos direitos humanos.
Mas o ponto mais profundo do artigo espanhol talvez seja outro: não há verdadeiro império da lei sem respeito autêntico aos princípios da justiça. Essa afirmação desmonta uma das ficções mais perigosas do nosso tempo: a ideia de que basta seguir protocolo para que haja legitimidade. Não basta. Quando o procedimento se torna álibi para evitar a verdade, o sistema passa a servir ao poder em vez de limitá-lo. Quando a corte não responde ao que foi efetivamente suscitado pelas partes, quando contorna a questão essencial, quando trata ausência de adjudicação como se fosse adjudicação consumada, o império da lei foi traído em sua essência.
Por isso, o artigo de Domingo Oslé também dialoga naturalmente com Lon L. Fuller e sua clássica obra The Morality of Law, citada no texto. Fuller ensinava que cada desvio da “moralidade interna do direito” representa uma afronta à dignidade da pessoa humana enquanto ser livre e responsável. Essa formulação é vital para compreender o colapso judicial em Washington State. O problema não é apenas a injustiça do resultado final em certos casos. O problema é mais estrutural: a deterioração das condições morais internas que tornam o direito reconhecível como direito. Quando a lei já não orienta honestamente, quando a instituição já não julga de verdade, quando a forma encobre a fuga da responsabilidade decisória, o sistema deixa de proteger a pessoa e passa a degradá-la.
Nesse sentido, o trabalho público de Scott Erik Stafne não constitui ataque ao rule of law, mas sua defesa mais séria e mais exigente. Ao insistir na necessidade de adjudicação real, de enfrentamento das questões apresentadas, de integridade judicial, de neutralidade genuína e de fidelidade ao devido processo, Scott não está negando a autoridade do direito. Ele está denunciando a sua substituição por ficções processuais, blindagens institucionais e gestões de aparência. Seu testemunho revela exatamente o que Rafael Domingo advertiu: o império da lei, mal compreendido e pior aplicado, pode converter-se em instrumento letal contra a dignidade humana.
A crise de Washington State, portanto, não é apenas local, nem meramente técnica. Ela é um exemplo contemporâneo de uma patologia jurídica mais ampla: a transformação do Estado de Direito em teatro procedimental. Permanecem o edifício, a toga, a audiência, a assinatura, o calendário e o despacho. Mas a justiça, pouco a pouco, vai sendo expulsa do interior da estrutura. E quando isso acontece, o que entra em colapso não é só a confiança pública: entra em colapso o próprio fundamento moral da ordem constitucional.
Dignidad e imperio de la ley
Rafael Domingo Oslé es catedrático de derecho romano de la Universidad de Navarra
Publicado en ABC, Madrid, de 6 de marzo de 2026
La cuestión del imperio de la ley —que es tanto como hablar de los límites del ejercicio del poder— es un tema central en el debate político de toda democracia madura. Se trata sin duda de una de las grandes conquistas de la humanidad que limita la arbitrariedad de nuestros gobernantes, sometiendo la acción estatal a la propia constitución y, en definitiva, a la autoridad del derecho.
La instauración del imperio de la ley puso fin de manera definitiva a las dañinas máximas imperiales romanas. Estas máximas, que fueron absolutizadas en épocas posteriores, sostenían que el emperador no estaba sujeto a las leyes (Princeps legibus solutus) y que lo que complacía al emperador tenía fuerza de ley (quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem).
En la formulación de este principio de imperio de la ley se entrelazan diversas tradiciones jurídicas —principalmente la anglosajona, la francesa y la alemana— que emplean terminologías distintas para referirse a realidades similares, pero no idénticas.
No es exactamente lo mismo —de ahí los serios problemas de traducción— hablar del rule of law anglosajón, que de un imperio de la ley de corte francés, o del estado de derecho alemán (Rechtsstaat).
Tanto el derecho español, como el italiano, el propio derecho europeo o el internacional, fuertemente influido por la Escuela de Salamanca, han sabido configurar su propio concepto de imperio de la ley tomando y matizando elementos de las tres tradiciones y añadiendo su experiencia jurídica a este importante principio de gobernanza que obliga, en términos generales, al Estado y a todos sus ciudadanos e instituciones a someterse a una ley, que se aplique por igual a todos y que sea aplicada por los jueces de manera independiente. De ahí la importancia de la separación de poderes, desarrollada sobre todo por Montesquieu, y tan vilipendiada en nuestra democracia actual.
La agresiva arbitrariedad que se observa en regímenes populistas y gobiernos dictatoriales, así como en democracias maduras y ya consolidadas como la bicentenaria de los Estados Unidos o la propia española, ha llevado a destacados filósofos del derecho y juristas de nuestros días a saltar a la palestra para defender este principio central de todo ordenamiento jurídico.
En Estados Unidos Jeremy Waldron, filósofo australiano afincado en Nueva York, considerado el máximo experto en esta cuestión, publicó un libro en 2024 titulado Thoughtfulness and the rule of law, que traduzco libremente por "Razonabilidad e imperio de la ley".
En él, Waldron trata de volver a unir el imperio o la regla de la ley con la verdadera autoridad del derecho criticando con gran acierto los intentos de reducir el imperio de la ley a meros procedimientos y formas jurídicas que pretenden alcanzar una certeza mecánica e implacable en su aplicación. La precisión robótica de las normas jurídicas no conduce a ningún sitio. Esto creo que debemos proclamarlo y defenderlo los juristas a gritos en la era de la inteligencia artificial.
En España, Javier Cremades, abogado y presidente de la World Jurist Association, en su reciente libro Sobre el imperio de la ley (2025), nos presenta un análisis profundo y asequible a toda persona culta sobre este necesario principio, que brilla con luz propia en la constelación de estrellas del universo jurídico-político.
Acompañado de un prólogo de Stephen Breyer, legendario magistrado del Tribunal Supremo de los Estados Unidos, y un epílogo de Harbarth, actual presidente del Tribunal Constitucional Federal alemán, Javier Cremades repasa los principales conflictos mundiales que vulneran este principio —entre ellos la batalla en torno al poder judicial en España— y apuesta por la supremacía de la ley y estado de derecho como única arma democrática legítima como alternativa al uso de la fuerza.
Aunque muy distintos en los planteamientos y en los contenidos, tanto Waldron como Cremades coinciden en un punto que me parece central para comprender esta ideal político: la necesidad de conectar el imperio de la ley con el respeto por la dignidad de cada persona. Y esto es así porque la dignidad humana debe considerarse un valor absoluto e irrenunciable al que sirve, aunque a veces no lo haga, el principio de imperio de la ley, que tiene un carácter más instrumental y por ende relativo.
No nos engañemos: puede existir un imperio arbitrario de la ley que amenace la dignidad humana, o el imperio de una ley caprichosamente interpretada por tribunales y jueces corruptos, como se observa en diversas partes del mundo y a veces en nuestra propia casa.
Para que la ley impere con dignidad y pueda desplegar toda su fuerza coercitiva sobre el Estado, una institución o una persona concreta, es fundamental que cumpla con todas las exigencias de la justicia, no solo con las procedimentales.
De lo contrario, se vulnera la dignidad de las personas. La ley no es solo la botella de vino, sino también el mismo vino. Un vino avinagrado, aunque esté bien embotellado, puede causar daño. Y obligar a beberlo es contrario a la justicia porque atenta contra la dignidad de las personas. Lo mismo sucede con las leyes, y con su imperio, que puede ser letal.
Así, el imperio de la ley no se sostiene por sí mismo. No puede haber un verdadero imperio de la ley sin un auténtico respeto por los principios de la justicia, lo que implica que la norma jurídica debe estar sujeta a ciertos valores éticos esenciales, tanto en su procedimiento de elaboración como en su contenido.
Como brillantemente recordó Lon Fuller en su importante obra The Morality of Law, cada desviación de los principios de lo que él llamaba "la moralidad interna" en la elaboración y aplicación de la ley constituye una afrenta a la dignidad de la persona humana como ser libre y responsable, digno de respeto por parte de todos los poderes públicos. De otro modo, el principio de imperio de la ley choca frontalmente con la dignidad de la persona humana.
Y es que quien está hecha a imagen de Dios es la persona, no el Estado; de ahí la importancia del respeto de los derechos de las persona por encima de los intereses de los Estados.
Tantas veces, sin embargo y por desgracia, el imperio de la ley, mal entendido y peor aplicado, se convierte en un instrumento para imponer una agenda política partidista. ¡Vino picado!
DIGNITY AND THE RULE OF LAW[^1]
Rafael Domingo Oslé is Professor of Roman Law at the University of Navarra[^2]
Published in ABC, Madrid, on March 6, 2026[^1]
The question of the rule of law—which is as much as speaking about the limits of the exercise of power—is a central theme in the political debate of every mature democracy. It is undoubtedly one of the great conquests of humanity that limits the arbitrariness of our rulers, subjecting state action to the constitution itself and, ultimately, to the authority of law.
The establishment of the rule of law put a definitive end to the harmful Roman imperial maxims. These maxims, which were absolutized in later times, held that the emperor was not subject to the laws (Princeps legibus solutus) and that what pleased the emperor had the force of law (quod Principi placuit legis habet vigorem).
In the formulation of this principle of the rule of law, various legal traditions are interwoven—mainly the Anglo-Saxon, the French, and the German—which employ different terminologies to refer to similar, but not identical, realities. It is not exactly the same thing—and hence the serious problems of translation—to speak of the Anglo-Saxon rule of law, of a French-style imperio de la ley, or of the German Rechtsstaat.
Spanish law, Italian law, European law itself, and international law, all strongly influenced by the School of Salamanca, have known how to configure their own concept of the rule of law by taking and qualifying elements from the three traditions and adding their legal experience to this important principle of governance, which obliges, in general terms, the State and all its citizens and institutions to submit to a law that is applied equally to all and that is applied by judges independently. Hence the importance of the separation of powers, developed above all by Montesquieu, and so vilified in our current democracy.
The aggressive arbitrariness that is observed in populist regimes and dictatorial governments, as well as in mature and already consolidated democracies such as the bicentennial United States or Spain itself, has led prominent philosophers of law and jurists of our time to enter the public arena to defend this central principle of every legal order.
In the United States, Jeremy Waldron, an Australian philosopher settled in New York, considered the foremost expert on this question, published a book in 2024 entitled Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law, which I translate freely as “Reasonableness and the Rule of Law.”[^3][^4] In it, Waldron seeks to reunite the rule of law with the true authority of law, very aptly criticizing attempts to reduce the rule of law to mere procedures and legal forms that seek to achieve a mechanical and relentless certainty in its application. The robotic precision of legal norms leads nowhere. I believe that we jurists must proclaim and defend this at the top of our lungs in the age of artificial intelligence.
In Spain, Javier Cremades, lawyer and president of the World Jurist Association, in his recent book Sobre el imperio de la ley (2025), presents us with a profound analysis, accessible to every cultivated person, of this necessary principle, which shines with its own light in the constellation of stars in the juridical-political universe.[^5][^6] Accompanied by a prologue by Stephen Breyer, legendary Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, and an epilogue by Harbarth, current president of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Javier Cremades reviews the principal world conflicts that violate this principle—among them the battle around the judiciary in Spain—and opts for the supremacy of law and the rule of law as the only legitimate democratic weapon as an alternative to the use of force.
Although very different in their approaches and in their contents, both Waldron and Cremades agree on one point that seems central to me for understanding this political ideal: the need to connect the rule of law with respect for the dignity of each person. And this is so because human dignity must be considered an absolute and unrenounceable value, which the principle of the rule of law serves, although at times it does not do so; that principle has a more instrumental and therefore relative character.
Let us not deceive ourselves: there can exist an arbitrary rule of law that threatens human dignity, or the rule of a law capriciously interpreted by corrupt courts and judges, as is observed in various parts of the world and sometimes in our own home. For the law to rule with dignity and to be able to deploy all its coercive force over the State, an institution, or a specific person, it is fundamental that it comply with all the demands of justice, not only the procedural ones. Otherwise, the dignity of persons is violated. The law is not only the bottle of wine, but also the wine itself. Sour wine, even if it is well bottled, can cause harm. And to force someone to drink it is contrary to justice because it attacks the dignity of persons. The same happens with laws, and with their rule, which can be lethal.
Thus, the rule of law does not sustain itself by itself. There can be no true rule of law without authentic respect for the principles of justice, which implies that the legal norm must be subject to certain essential ethical values, both in its procedure of elaboration and in its content.
As Lon Fuller brilliantly reminded us in his important work The Morality of Law, each deviation from the principles of what he called “the internal morality” in the elaboration and application of the law constitutes an affront to the dignity of the human person as a free and responsible being, worthy of respect on the part of all public powers.[^7][^8] Otherwise, the principle of the rule of law collides frontally with the dignity of the human person. And it is the person who is made in the image of God, not the State; hence the importance of respecting the rights of persons above the interests of States. So many times, however, and unfortunately, the rule of law, badly understood and worse applied, becomes an instrument to impose a partisan political agenda. Sour wine!
REFERENCES
[^1]: DOMINGO OSLÉ, Rafael. Dignidad e imperio de la ley. Diario ABC, Madrid, 6 mar. 2026. Reprodução/notícia em: IUSTEL. Disponível em: http://www.iustel.com/diario_del_derecho/noticia.asp?ref_iustel=1263747. Acesso em: 19 abr. 2026.
[^2]: UNIVERSIDAD DE NAVARRA. Rafael Domingo Oslé. Titular de la Cátedra Álvaro d'Ors. Disponível em: https://www.unav.edu/web/catedra-alvaro-dors/equipo/rafael-domingo-osle. Acesso em: 19 abr. 2026.
[^3]: WALDRON, Jeremy. Thoughtfulness and the Rule of Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2024. Disponível em: https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674290778. Acesso em: 19 abr. 2026.
[^4]: NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW. Jeremy Waldron – Biography. Disponível em: https://its.law.nyu.edu/facultyprofiles/index.cfm?fuseaction=profile.biography&personid=26993. Acesso em: 19 abr. 2026.
[^5]: CREMADES, Javier. Sobre el imperio de la ley. Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, 2025. Disponível em: https://www.galaxiagutenberg.com/producto/sobre-el-imperio-de-la-ley/. Acesso em: 19 abr. 2026.
[^6]: ROYAL EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF DOCTORS. Dr. Javier Cremades García. Disponível em: https://raed.academy/en/academicians/dr-javier-cremades-garcia/. Acesso em: 19 abr. 2026.
[^7]: FULLER, Lon L. The Morality of Law. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969.
[^8]: OXFORD ACADEMIC. Essay 16: Lon L. Fuller: The Morality of Law. Disponível em: https://academic.oup.com/book/9055/chapter/155595027. Acesso em: 19 abr. 2026.
