The Myth of Human Infallibility — How Much a “National Council of Justice” Is necessary in the United States
Critical analysis of Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, 71 F.4th 665, in light of the Constitution of the United States and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
THE MYTH OF HUMAN INFALLIBILITY — HOW MUCH A “NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUSTICE” IS NEEDED IN THE UNITED STATES
Critical analysis of Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, 71 F.4th 665, in light of the Constitution of the United States and the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
1. The request that gave rise to this analysis
I asked for an analysis of the decision that did not consider entirely wrong the act of a judge who ordered the police to arrest two children inside their father’s home, on the argument that “a judge has authority to issue arrest orders,” and that only considered legally reprehensible the fact that he himself did not have authority to personally arrest the children, remain at the place while they were stripped of part of their clothes and belongings, and accompany their custody, because this would be the “authority” of the jailer.
I vehemently disagree with this decision.
I also disagree with the article itself published in the Missouri Law Review, although it has the merit of criticizing the breadth of judicial immunity. The criticism by the university student is important, but it still seems insufficient to me, because it accepts as its starting point the traditional logic of absolute judicial immunity and does not confront, with the necessary depth, the central constitutional, human, and ethical problem: a judge cannot transform children into objects of state coercion under the formal disguise of a judicial order.
The case reveals something much greater than a technical discussion about jurisdiction. It reveals the danger of the myth of the human infallibility of judges in the United States and the lack of an effective, external, and independent system of control of the judiciary, capable of examining not only the formal validity of decisions, but also the abuse of judicial power, the violation of fundamental rights, and the destruction of public trust in Justice.
2. The Rockett case: minor children, custody dispute, and judicial abuse
The case is Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on June 22, 2023. The action was brought by D. Bart Rockett (father), as representative of his minor children K.R. and B.R., against Judge Eric Eighmy, a Missouri judge. The mother of the children was Kami Ballard (mother). The opinion itself identifies Bart Rockett as the father who sued the judge on behalf of the minor children, K.R. and B.R.
The background was a custody dispute between Bart Rockett (father) and Kami Ballard (mother). The opinion recounts that both had divorced in Missouri, then moved to California, where the children, who aspired to acting careers, lived with their parents. The mother, dissatisfied with shared custody and with the delay of the California courts, filed a second action in Missouri, which came before Judge Eric Eighmy.
The essential fact, which cannot be minimized, is this: the children were not in the courtroom. They were in the lobby of the courthouse, while the adults and the attorneys negotiated a custody agreement. The opinion states:
“When they arrived at the courthouse, the children waited in the lobby while Ballard and Rockett, along with their attorneys, worked out an agreement.”
Translation:
“When they arrived at the courthouse, the children waited in the lobby while Ballard (mother) and Rockett (father), along with their attorneys, worked out an agreement.”
Then the opinion records another decisive point: the judge was already unrobed when he intervened in the children’s resistance. The text says:
“Judge Eighmy, by this time unrobed, saw what was happening and tried to intervene.”
Translation:
“Judge Eighmy, by this time unrobed, saw what was happening and tried to intervene.”
This completely changes the analysis. The children were not before a judge in a formal hearing act. They were not inside the courtroom. They were not being heard as witnesses. They were not being tried. They were not in contempt committed “during the session” and “in the immediate presence” of the court. They were in the lobby, in an emotional situation of family conflict, and the judge, unrobed, physically entered the situation.
3. The first episode: the judge personally took the children to jail
The opinion recounts that the children did not want to live with Kami Ballard (mother), not even for a short period, and protested in the lobby. The judge then took them into a conference room and told them that they needed to leave Hollywood, or they would not grow up “normal.” When they continued to protest, he decided to put them in jail to show “what [he] can do.”
The passage is extremely serious:
“Judge Eighmy decided to put them in jail to show ‘what [he] can do.’ He took them there himself.”
Translation:
“Judge Eighmy decided to put them in jail to show ‘what [he] can do.’ He took them there himself.”
This sentence demonstrates the intimidating nature of the act. It was not a protective, precautionary, or technically necessary measure. The very statement narrated by the opinion reveals a logic of demonstration of power: to show the children “what he could do.”
The opinion also states that the children were ordered to remove shoes, socks, jackets, and jewelry before entering separate cells. After approximately one hour, the judge returned and asked whether they were ready to “listen” and “comply.” The children finally agreed to go with Kami Ballard (mother), but only after the threat of placement in foster care.
There is no way to treat this as a simple error of procedural management. There was physical and psychological coercion against minors.
4. The second episode: judicial order, police, Miranda warnings, and solitary confinement
Months later, when Bart Rockett (father) and the children, then living in Louisiana, failed to attend a hearing in Missouri, Judge Eighmy issued a writ of bodily attachment against the father and a pick-up order against the children. In executing the order, Louisiana officers came to the children’s door, gave them Miranda warnings, and placed both of them in solitary confinement in a juvenile-detention center.
The passage from the opinion is this:
“Louisiana officers came to their door, gave the children Miranda warnings, and placed them both in solitary confinement in a juvenile-detention center.”
Translation:
“Louisiana officers came to their door, gave the children Miranda warnings, and placed them both in solitary confinement in a juvenile-detention center.”
This is the point at which the decision of the Eighth Circuit becomes more problematic. The court recognized that the personal conduct of the judge, in taking the children to jail, was not protected by judicial immunity. But it recognized immunity as to the second conduct, because issuing a pick-up order would be, in the abstract, a typical judicial function.
The distinction made by the court is formalistic:
if the judge personally arrests, he acts as a jailer;
if the judge signs an order that activates third parties to arrest or confine the children, he performs a judicial act.
This separation is constitutionally insufficient. The harm to the children does not depend on who opened the cell door. The harm arises from the use of judicial power to activate the state apparatus against minors in the context of a family dispute.
5. What the opinion decided correctly
The Eighth Circuit was right to deny judicial immunity to the judge as to the first episode.
The court explained that judicial immunity depends on a functional test: it is not enough for the agent to be a judge; it is necessary to know whether the function performed is normally performed by a judge and whether the parties were dealing with him in his judicial capacity. The opinion cites the distinction between judicial acts and administrative, legislative, or executive functions occasionally performed by judges.
On this point, the court’s conclusion was correct: Judge Eighmy “crossed the line” when he personally escorted the children to jail, stood there while they removed clothes and belongings, and came back about one hour later to release them.
The opinion also recognized three decisive facts:
- the children were not in the courtroom;
- they could not be punished for direct contempt, because the conduct did not occur during a court session nor in the immediate presence of the court;
- judges do not accumulate the function of jailers.
The opinion expressly stated:
“For another, judges do not do double duty as jailers.”
Translation:
“For another, judges do not do double duty as jailers.”
And also:
“the children were never parties, they never stepped foot in the courtroom, and Judge Eighmy personally locked them up himself.”
Translation:
“the children were never parties, they never stepped foot in the courtroom, and Judge Eighmy personally locked them up himself.”
These passages are devastating to any attempt to present the first arrest as a regular judicial act.
6. Where the Eighth Circuit erred
The error lies in the second part of the decision.
The court accepted that the pick-up order was a judicial act, because Missouri law allows judges to issue orders to take physical custody of children in certain situations. Then it considered that, even if the order had been wrong, irregular, or contrary to the UCCJEA, the judge still had general jurisdiction over civil child-custody cases. Therefore, absolute judicial immunity was maintained as to the second episode.
But this analysis is too narrow.
The correct question should not be only:
“Can a judge, in the abstract, issue a pick-up order?”
The constitutionally adequate question should be:
“Can a judge use the form of a judicial order to cause the seizure, intimidation, Miranda warnings, and solitary confinement of children in a juvenile-detention center, in a custody dispute, without personal civil liability?”
The judicial form of the order does not eliminate the substance of the coercion. The Constitution of the United States protects against state abuses, not only against abuses manually practiced by the judge himself.
7. What UCCJEA is
The acronym UCCJEA means Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.
In simple language: it is a law adopted by Missouri and by almost all American states to avoid simultaneous custody disputes in different states. It defines which state should decide custody and seeks to prevent one parent from looking for another, more convenient court while there is already a custody proceeding in another state.
In the Rockett case, the argument of Bart Rockett (father) was that there was already a custody proceeding in California. Therefore, Missouri should not exercise jurisdiction. The opinion itself recognizes that the UCCJEA was adopted by Missouri to avoid overlapping review in child-custody disputes and that one of its provisions establishes that Missouri courts should not exercise jurisdiction when there is already a custody proceeding initiated in a court of another state.
The problem is that the Eighth Circuit, applying Missouri case law, concluded that this rule limits only the statutory authority to grant a particular remedy, but not the general constitutional jurisdiction of the state court. Thus, even if the judge had interpreted the UCCJEA wrongly, he would remain immune because he had not acted in the “complete absence of all jurisdiction.”
This reasoning is precisely the weak point of the American system: the distinction between “complete absence of jurisdiction” and “excess of jurisdiction” is used to shield extremely serious judicial acts, even when there is violation of clear legal limits.
8. The insufficiency of the Missouri Law Review article
The Missouri Law Review article, written by Grace N. Rowden, has merit in arguing that judicial immunity should be restricted when a judge acts against a clear statutory prohibition. The author states that judicial immunity is a “necessary evil,” but that it should not be extended beyond what is necessary, especially when the judge acts without specific legal authority.
However, this criticism is still limited.
The problem is not only statutory. It is not only a matter of whether the UCCJEA removed or did not remove Missouri’s authority. The problem is constitutional and ethical: judicial power was used to subject minor children to an experience of custody, intimidation, and confinement.
The author is right to criticize the breadth of immunity. But the criticism needs to go further: the Rockett case demonstrates that absolute judicial immunity, as applied, can protect the disproportionate use of state power against vulnerable persons, provided that the abuse is packaged in the form of a judicial order.
9. Constitution of the United States: First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments
The federal action itself alleged violation of the children’s rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The opinion records that the complaint alleged that placing them in jail and, later, in a juvenile-detention facility violated these constitutional rights.
The First Amendment is relevant because the children protested against the decision to go with the mother. If the arrest functioned as a response to the protest, there is an appearance of retaliation against expression.
The Fourth Amendment is central because there was physical seizure of persons. Children were deprived of liberty, first by direct conduct of the judge, then by an order executed by police agents.
The Fourteenth Amendment is indispensable because it imposes due process of law on the states. It is not enough that there be a judicial order. The order must respect proportionality, legality, dignity, protection against arbitrariness, and minimum guarantees of fair procedure.
The formalism of judicial immunity cannot be used to empty these guarantees.
10. Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct
Applied to the Rockett case, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct were affected.
10.1. Independence
Judicial independence is not a personal privilege of the judge. It is an institutional guarantee so that he may decide according to the Constitution and the law. It is not a license for intimidation.
When independence is transformed into a shield for abuse, it stops protecting Justice and starts protecting personal power.
10.2. Impartiality
Impartiality requires the judge to remain as a neutral third party. A judge who, unrobed, leaves the formal position of adjudicator, intervenes in a discussion in the lobby, and takes children to jail ceases to appear to be an impartial arbiter and begins to appear to be an agent of coercion.
10.3. Integrity
Judicial integrity requires conduct compatible with public trust. Placing children in separate cells to show “what the judge can do” destroys the perception of institutional integrity.
10.4. Propriety and decorum
Judicial decorum is not limited to external appearance. The judge, unrobed, outside the courtroom, personally intervening in a family conflict and taking children to jail, breaks the minimum of sobriety, restraint, and self-control expected of a magistrate.
10.5. Equality
Children are subjects of rights. They are not objects of transfer between adults. They are not instruments to punish the father. They are not persons who may be bent by carceral force to accept a custody solution.
10.6. Competence and diligence
Competence is not only knowing procedural technique. It is understanding the constitutional limits of one’s own power. Diligence is not acting with force; it is acting with prudence, care, and proportionality.
11. The Reuters investigation and the systemic problem of lack of judicial control
The Rockett case should not be seen in isolation. The Reuters investigation into judicial misconduct in the United States identified 1,509 cases of state and local judges who resigned, retired, or were publicly disciplined between 2008 and 2019, in addition to thousands of disciplinary cases kept without public disclosure of essential details. Reuters also concluded that 9 out of every 10 sanctioned judges were allowed to return to the bench.
This fact is fundamental because it demonstrates that the problem is not only doctrinal. It is institutional.
Absolute judicial immunity, combined with weak disciplinary mechanisms, produces a system in which victims may even obtain reversal of an order, but do not necessarily obtain recognition, reparation, or effective accountability for the judicial abuse suffered.
Reuters also observed that this type of behavior may erode trust in the courts and, without severe consequences, give judges license to act with impunity.
This is exactly why the Rockett case reveals the lack, in the United States, of an independent national body for judicial oversight, capable of examining the conduct of magistrates beyond the narrow appellate debate.
12. The central thesis
The central thesis of this article is simple:
Judicial authority cannot be confused with human infallibility. The robe does not transform abuse into justice. And the absence of the robe, in the Rockett case, makes it even more evident that the judge was not exercising a regular adjudicatory function when he personally intervened against children in the courthouse lobby.
The Eighth Circuit was right to recognize that the judge did not have immunity for the physical act of personally taking the children to jail. But it erred by not sufficiently confronting the constitutional gravity of the second order, which resulted in Miranda warnings and solitary confinement in a juvenile-detention center.
The distinction between “I personally arrested” and “I ordered the State to arrest” is not sufficient to protect the constitutional dignity of children.
13. Conclusion
The Rockett case exposes a deep flaw in the American doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
Judge Eric Eighmy did not merely commit a procedural error. According to the facts accepted as true at that procedural stage, he personally intervened in a family discussion in the courthouse lobby, unrobed, against children who were not in a hearing, were not parties before him in that act, had never stepped into the courtroom, and could not be punished for direct contempt. Then, he took them to jail to show “what he could do.”
The Eighth Circuit recognized that this crossed the line. But the system still protected the second conduct, because it was practiced through a formal order.
That is precisely where the danger lies.
When a judicial order can produce intimidation, custody, Miranda warnings, and solitary confinement of children, and still be shielded by absolute immunity because it appears “judicial” in form, Justice stops protecting the vulnerable and starts protecting the institutional appearance of power itself.
Judicial independence is indispensable. But independence is not impunity. Immunity is not infallibility. Jurisdiction is not a license for abuse. And no serious constitutional system can accept that children be used as objects of demonstration of force by a judge.
The myth of the human infallibility of judges must be overcome. In the United States, the absence of external, effective, and independent judicial control continues to allow the robe — or even its absence — to be used to cover abuses that no democratic Constitution should tolerate.
References in ABNT format, with expanded URLs
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT. Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, No. 21-3903, 71 F.4th 665, filed June 22, 2023. Available at: https://ecf.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/23/06/213903P.pdf. Accessed on: May 3, 2026.
ROWDEN, Grace N. Narrowing Judicial Immunity: Holding Judges Accountable For Exercising Jurisdiction Where They Are Statutorily Barred From Doing So. Missouri Law Review, published Apr. 26, 2024; updated Dec. 8, 2025. Available at: https://lawreview.missouri.edu/narrowing-judicial-immunity-holding-judges-accountable-for-exercising-jurisdiction-where-they-are-statutorily-barred-from-doing-so/. Accessed on: May 3, 2026.
UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME — UNODC. The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/ji/training/bangaloreprinciples.pdf. Accessed on: May 3, 2026.
BERENS, Michael; SHIFFMAN, John. Thousands of U.S. judges who broke laws or oaths remained on the bench. Reuters Investigates, June 30, 2020. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-judges-misconduct/. Accessed on: May 3, 2026.
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Narrowing Judicial Immunity: Holding Judges Accountable For Exercising Jurisdiction Where They Are Statutorily Barred From Doing So
SUMMARY of the article by AI CHATGPT:
The article analyzes the case Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, involving the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity.
The author explains that the Rockett family was involved in a custody dispute between the parents, Bart Rockett and Kami Ballard. The children, K.R. and B.R., had moved between different states, including Missouri, California, and Louisiana.
During the custody proceedings in Missouri, presided over by Judge Eric Eighmy, the children protested against a decision determining that they would stay with their mother for one month. The judge then personally took the children to a jail cell and left them detained for about one hour. Afterward, he threatened to send them to foster care if they did not go with their mother.
Months later, in another stage of the case, Judge Eighmy issued a pick-up order, that is, a judicial order for the physical search and seizure/custody of the children, after they and their father failed to attend a hearing. The children were again confined, this time in a juvenile detention center in Louisiana.
The Supreme Court of Missouri later issued a writ of prohibition, ordering the judge to vacate that order.
After that, Bart Rockett filed suit against Judge Eighmy in federal court, alleging violation of the children’s rights under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
The judge claimed absolute judicial immunity. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the case, and he appealed to the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit decided in a divided manner:
1. As to the first act, personally taking the children to jail, the court understood that the judge did not have absolute judicial immunity, because that conduct was not a function normally performed by a judge. The court stated that judges “do not do double duty as jailers.”
2. As to the second act, issuing the order to pick up the children, the court understood that the judge did have absolute judicial immunity, because the issuance of an order of that kind is a typical judicial act, even if the order was later vacated.
The article explains that absolute judicial immunity has existed for centuries in the common law and has been recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States since the nineteenth century. Its purpose is to protect judges against personal lawsuits brought by dissatisfied litigants, allowing them to decide cases according to their conviction, without fear of personal civil liability.
However, the author criticizes the breadth of this doctrine. According to her, immunity should not protect judges when they act against a clear statutory prohibition.
The author distinguishes three situations:
the judge acting within his or her jurisdiction;
the judge acting in excess of jurisdiction;
the judge acting when a law expressly prohibits him or her from exercising that jurisdiction.
The central thesis of the article is that, when a law expressly removes or blocks the judge’s authority to act, judicial immunity should be restricted.
The author argues that, in the Rockett case, the legislation on interstate child custody — the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, known as UCCJEA — prevented Missouri from exercising jurisdiction while a custody proceeding was pending in another state. Even so, the court held that the judge still had general constitutional jurisdiction, and that the violation of statutory law was not enough to remove immunity.
The author disagrees with that conclusion. For her, allowing judges to violate clear statutory laws without civil consequence harms public confidence in the Judiciary. She states that judicial immunity is a “necessary evil,” but that it should not be expanded beyond what is necessary.
The article also mentions studies on judicial misconduct in the United States, including a Reuters investigation indicating that many judges who violated laws or duties remained on the bench.
The author uses these data to argue that traditional disciplinary mechanisms — such as impeachment, suspension, or administrative sanctions — rarely produce serious consequences.
The conclusion of the article is that the Eighth Circuit was correct in denying immunity to the judge for the physical act of taking the children to jail, but that the case reveals an important opportunity to restrict the doctrine of judicial immunity.
The author argues that judges should not be protected from civil liability when they act contrary to a clear legal prohibition, because the judicial system depends on the competence of judges and lawyers to know and apply the law.
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I SAID : I vehemently disagree.
Then I asked CHATGPT AI to analyze the conduct of the judge and decision of the 8th Circuit and the article below.
I want you to analyze the decision that did not find that the judge had done anything wrong by ordering the police to arrest two children inside their father’s house, on the argument that “a judge has jurisdiction to issue arrest orders,” and considered him “liable” because he did not have jurisdiction to personally arrest the children and remain there watching them being undressed and having their belongings seized, because that is the “jurisdiction” of the jailer.
Analyze the judge’s conduct and the decision that granted, in part, and denied, in part, the judge’s appeal, in light of the United States Constitution and the 6 principles of the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct.
CHATGPT AI SAID:
Vou tratar a questão em três planos: a conduta concreta do juiz, a técnica decisória da imunidade judicial no 8º Circuito, e a compatibilidade disso com Constituição dos EUA e Princípios de Bangalore.
A sua crítica é juridicamente forte porque a decisão do 8º Circuito separou a função formal do ato da gravidade constitucional do resultado. Em outras palavras: o tribunal reconheceu que o juiz não podia “fazer papel de carcereiro” quando levou pessoalmente as crianças à cela, mas aceitou que a segunda privação de liberdade ficou protegida pela imunidade judicial porque veio sob a forma de uma ordem judicial típica. Essa distinção é tecnicamente coerente com a doutrina tradicional de absolute judicial immunity, mas é moral, constitucional e institucionalmente insuficiente.
1. O ponto central da decisão: forma judicial versus abuso material
No caso Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, o 8º Circuito afirmou que a questão, naquele estágio processual, era apenas saber se a imunidade judicial absoluta protegia os atos do juiz. O tribunal manteve a negativa de imunidade quanto ao ato de levar pessoalmente as crianças para a prisão, mas reconheceu imunidade quanto à ordem posterior de busca/apreensão das crianças, porque expedir uma ordem judicial desse tipo foi tratado como “ato judicial” dentro da jurisdição geral do tribunal estadual.
Essa construção cria uma distinção perigosa: o juiz não é imune quando executa fisicamente a coerção, mas pode ser imune quando instrumentaliza a polícia, agentes de custódia ou centros de detenção para produzir o mesmo resultado material. A decisão, portanto, condena o juiz quando ele age como carcereiro, mas protege o juiz quando ele usa o aparato estatal para que terceiros façam a coerção.
Esse é o ponto mais grave: a Constituição dos Estados Unidos não protege apenas contra a violência física direta praticada por um juiz; ela protege contra o uso abusivo do poder estatal para privar pessoas — especialmente crianças — de liberdade, dignidade, segurança e devido processo.
2. À luz da Constituição dos Estados Unidos
A conduta descrita atinge diretamente três eixos constitucionais:
Primeiro, a Quarta Emenda. A detenção de crianças, seja por condução pessoal do juiz, seja por ordem de apreensão física, envolve uma “seizure” — uma apreensão estatal da pessoa. Mesmo em contexto de família, a coerção física estatal precisa ser razoável, legalmente autorizada e proporcional. A ideia de usar cadeia ou centro juvenil como instrumento de disciplina em disputa de custódia é constitucionalmente alarmante.
Segundo, a Décima Quarta Emenda. O devido processo substantivo e procedimental limita o poder do Estado sobre liberdade, integridade corporal e relações familiares. Quando crianças são privadas de liberdade por protestarem contra uma decisão ou por não comparecimento a audiência, a questão não é apenas “competência judicial”; é saber se houve processo regular, necessidade, proporcionalidade, contraditório e respeito à dignidade pessoal.
Terceiro, a Primeira Emenda. Se as crianças foram punidas por protestarem, expressarem recusa ou oposição à decisão de custódia, há um problema adicional: a reação judicial pode ser lida como retaliação contra expressão verbal, ainda que em contexto emocionalmente difícil.
A decisão do 8º Circuito reconhece parte desse problema, mas o reduz a uma pergunta funcional: “isso é função normalmente exercida por juiz?”. O problema é que essa pergunta é pequena demais para o tamanho da violação. A análise constitucional deveria perguntar também: o juiz usou o cargo para transformar uma discordância familiar em privação coercitiva de liberdade?
3. O erro estrutural: confundir jurisdição geral com licença para violar limites legais
A decisão aceitou que o juiz tinha jurisdição geral em matéria de família, embora pudesse não ter autoridade estatutária específica para agir daquela forma. A Missouri Law Review critica exatamente esse ponto: quando uma lei clara impede o exercício da autoridade judicial, a imunidade não deveria proteger o juiz como se fosse mero erro interno de julgamento.
Essa distinção entre “ausência total de jurisdição” e “excesso de jurisdição” é uma das bases da imunidade judicial norte-americana. Mas, aplicada rigidamente, ela gera um resultado institucionalmente perverso: quanto mais amplo for o rótulo da jurisdição geral do tribunal, mais difícil será responsabilizar o juiz por atos concretamente proibidos ou abusivos.
Em matéria de custódia interestadual, a UCCJEA foi criada justamente para impedir conflitos entre estados e evitar manipulações jurisdicionais em disputas de crianças. A própria nota da Missouri Law Review afirma que, se há procedimento de custódia pendente em um estado, outro estado não deve exercer jurisdição sobre a mesma disputa, salvo hipóteses específicas.
Portanto, a questão não é apenas se o juiz “tinha uma vara de família”. A questão é se ele podia, diante de limites legais concretos, usar o poder judicial para ordenar captura física e detenção de crianças.
4. À luz dos Princípios de Bangalore
Tecnicamente, os Princípios de Bangalore são organizados em seis valores, não cinco: independência, imparcialidade, integridade, propriedade/decoro, igualdade, competência e diligência. O UNODC apresenta esses valores como padrões internacionais de conduta judicial voltados à preservação da confiança pública no Judiciário.
4.1. Independência judicial
A independência judicial não é privilégio pessoal do juiz. É garantia institucional para que o juiz decida segundo a Constituição e a lei, sem pressões externas. Ela não autoriza arbitrariedade.
No caso Rockett, a independência foi deformada quando o poder judicial parece ter sido usado como autoridade pessoal sobre crianças em conflito familiar. Quando o juiz transforma sua ordem em instrumento de intimidação, a independência deixa de funcionar como proteção da justiça e passa a parecer blindagem do poder.
4.2. Imparcialidade
A imparcialidade exige aparência e realidade de neutralidade. Um juiz que ameaça crianças com foster care, leva-as à prisão ou emite ordem que resulta em nova detenção pode criar a aparência de que deixou de ser árbitro e passou a atuar como parte coercitiva do conflito.
Mesmo que a intenção declarada fosse cumprir uma decisão de custódia, o método importa. A imparcialidade judicial é destruída quando o jurisdicionado percebe que o juiz não está apenas decidindo, mas punindo, intimidando ou dobrando emocionalmente pessoas vulneráveis.
4.3. Integridade
A integridade exige que o juiz use o cargo de modo compatível com a confiança pública. A detenção de crianças em contexto de disputa familiar, especialmente sem fundamento penal, fere essa confiança.
A frase usada pelo 8º Circuito — juízes “do not do double duty as jailers” — é importante porque reconhece que o juiz cruzou uma linha funcional. Mas a integridade exige mais: também deve ser vedado ao juiz alcançar indiretamente, por ordem formal, aquilo que seria intolerável se praticado pessoalmente.
4.4. Propriedade, decoro e aparência de correção
Esse princípio é decisivo. A conduta judicial não deve apenas ser legal; deve preservar a aparência de legitimidade do Judiciário.
Mandar crianças para custódia estatal em um conflito de família, como reação a resistência, ausência ou desobediência, projeta imagem de abuso de poder. Ainda que a ordem seja formalmente “judicial”, a aparência pública é de humilhação institucional e coerção desproporcional.
Aqui está o núcleo do problema: a decisão do 8º Circuito protegeu a aparência formal do ato judicial, mas não enfrentou suficientemente a aparência pública de injustiça.
4.5. Igualdade
Crianças são sujeitos de direitos, não objetos de transferência entre adultos nem instrumentos de disciplina judicial. O princípio da igualdade exige tratamento respeitoso a todas as pessoas perante o tribunal, especialmente as vulneráveis.
Quando crianças são tratadas como corpos a serem apreendidos, detidos e deslocados por força estatal, o processo deixa de reconhecer sua dignidade própria. Isso é ainda mais grave porque a assimetria entre juiz e criança é absoluta: a criança não tem poder, não tem compreensão processual plena e depende do sistema para ser protegida.
4.6. Competência e diligência
A competência judicial não é apenas conhecer o rito; é compreender os limites constitucionais do próprio poder. A diligência não é rapidez coercitiva; é cuidado, prudência e proporcionalidade.
Nesse ponto, a decisão do 8º Circuito é vulnerável: ao proteger a segunda conduta porque “expedir ordem” é função judicial típica, ela deixa em segundo plano a pergunta sobre a qualidade constitucional, estatutária e ética da decisão. Um juiz competente e diligente deveria saber que crianças em disputa de custódia não podem ser tratadas como pessoas sujeitas a punição carcerária por resistência emocional ou familiar.
5. O problema da decisão que “deu provimento em parte e negou em parte”
A decisão é juridicamente parcial em dois sentidos.
Ela é correta ao afirmar que o juiz não tinha imunidade quando pessoalmente levou as crianças à prisão. Esse ato é executivo, coercitivo e materialmente incompatível com a função adjudicante. O juiz saiu do papel de magistrado e atuou como agente de custódia.
Mas a decisão é insuficiente ao proteger a ordem posterior. A função judicial não pode ser analisada apenas pela forma externa do ato. Uma ordem judicial pode ser formalmente judicial e, ainda assim, substancialmente abusiva. Se o juiz sabia, ou deveria saber, que havia limites estatutários e constitucionais à sua atuação, a imunidade absoluta funciona como escudo contra responsabilidade por violação grave.
A decisão, portanto, preserva a doutrina tradicional da imunidade, mas não preserva adequadamente a confiança pública na justiça. E é exatamente aí que entra a necessidade de um órgão independente de controle judicial — algo análogo, em termos funcionais, a um Conselho Nacional de Justiça — porque o modelo norte-americano tende a tratar abusos judiciais como questões internas de recurso, disciplina rara ou imunidade civil.
6. Tese para o artigo
A melhor formulação crítica seria:
> O caso Rockett revela a falha central da doutrina norte-americana de imunidade judicial absoluta: ela distingue entre o juiz que executa pessoalmente a coerção e o juiz que ordena a coerção por meio do aparato estatal, mas não enfrenta adequadamente a substância constitucional do abuso. À luz da Constituição dos Estados Unidos e dos Princípios de Bangalore, a autoridade judicial não pode ser convertida em poder pessoal de intimidação, detenção ou humilhação de crianças. A independência judicial protege a função jurisdicional, não a infalibilidade humana do juiz; protege a imparcialidade institucional, não a onipotência individual do magistrado.
E uma frase ainda mais forte:
> A verdadeira pergunta constitucional não é se um juiz tem competência abstrata para expedir ordens. A pergunta é se a Constituição permite que a forma de uma ordem judicial transforme crianças em objetos de coerção estatal, sem proporcionalidade, sem dignidade e sem responsabilidade efetiva do agente público que acionou essa coerção.
7. Conclusão
A conduta do juiz, conforme descrita, viola o núcleo ético dos Princípios de Bangalore: independência sem arbitrariedade, imparcialidade sem intimidação, integridade sem abuso, decoro sem humilhação, igualdade com proteção dos vulneráveis, e competência/diligência com respeito aos limites legais.
A decisão do 8º Circuito acertou ao negar imunidade para o ato físico de levar as crianças à prisão, mas errou — ou ao menos ficou aquém do necessário — ao tratar a segunda ordem como ato judicial protegido apenas porque tinha a forma de ordem judicial. O problema não era apenas quem abriu a porta da cela. O problema era quem usou o poder do Estado para colocar crianças sob custódia.
EU DISSE :
2 coisas:
1- as crianças não estavam na sala de audiência e o juiz não estava togado quando se meteu na discussão das crianças com a mãe e levou-as presas pelo braço para a cadeia, pessoalmente, esse ponto precisa ser destacado
2 - eu não sei o que é UCCJEA
CHATGPT IA DISSE :
Perfeito. Esses dois pontos mudam a força da análise: o primeiro reforça que o ato foi ainda menos “judicial”; o segundo precisa ser explicado em linguagem simples antes de usar a sigla no artigo.
Sim. Esses dois esclarecimentos devem entrar expressamente na análise.
1. Ponto a destacar sobre a primeira conduta do juiz
A primeira conduta é ainda mais grave porque não ocorreu no exercício regular de uma audiência formal.
Pelo trecho do artigo, as crianças estavam no corredor, não dentro da sala de audiência. Elas protestavam contra a decisão de ficar com a mãe por um mês. O juiz então saiu da posição formal de julgador, interveio diretamente na discussão familiar, levou as crianças para uma sala de conferência, falou com elas e, depois, pessoalmente as conduziu para uma cela.
Esse detalhe é essencial:
As crianças não estavam em audiência, não estavam perante o juiz em ato formal, não estavam sendo julgadas por desacato em sala de audiência, e o juiz não estava exercendo uma função adjudicatória regular quando se envolveu pessoalmente na discussão entre as crianças e a mãe.
Ao levá-las fisicamente para a cadeia, pelo braço, o juiz abandonou a posição institucional de magistrado e assumiu função materialmente executiva, policial e carcerária.
Isso reforça que não se tratava de um “ato judicial” protegido pela imunidade. Era um ato físico, coercitivo, pessoal e extrajudicial.
A decisão do 8º Circuito reconheceu algo nessa linha ao dizer que juízes “do not do double duty as jailers” — isto é, juízes não acumulam a função de carcereiros.
Mas a análise pode ser aprofundada: o problema não era apenas ele ter atuado como carcereiro; era ele ter deixado o espaço simbólico e funcional da jurisdição para exercer coerção física direta sobre crianças vulneráveis.
2. O que é UCCJEA
UCCJEA significa:
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
Em português:
Lei Uniforme de Jurisdição e Execução de Custódia de Crianças
É uma lei-modelo adotada pela maioria dos estados norte-americanos para resolver disputas de guarda quando há mais de um estado envolvido. Ela existe para evitar que pais entrem com ações de guarda em vários estados ao mesmo tempo, tentando escolher o tribunal mais favorável.
A ideia central é simples: normalmente, quem deve decidir a guarda é o estado de residência principal da criança, chamado de home state. A Uniform Law Commission explica que a UCCJEA limita a jurisdição de custódia infantil a um só estado, evitando ordens judiciais conflitantes.
Também há uma explicação prática importante: a UCCJEA define qual tribunal deve decidir a disputa de custódia, mas não decide qual pai ou mãe deve ganhar a guarda.
Ou seja, ela é uma lei sobre competência/jurisdição, não sobre o mérito da guarda.
No caso Rockett, a crítica é que o juiz do Missouri teria agido apesar de haver limites decorrentes dessa legislação sobre custódia interestadual.
A discussão, então, é:
> Mesmo que o juiz tivesse jurisdição geral como juiz estadual de família, ele poderia exercer esse poder quando uma lei específica de custódia interestadual restringia ou impedia a atuação do Missouri?
A autora da Missouri Law Review entende que não. Ela argumenta que, quando uma lei clara impede o juiz de agir, a imunidade judicial não deveria protegê-lo como se fosse apenas um erro comum de julgamento.
E, para explicar a UCCJEA:
> A UCCJEA — Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act — é a Lei Uniforme de Jurisdição e Execução de Custódia de Crianças, adotada pelos estados norte-americanos para impedir disputas paralelas de guarda em diferentes estados.
Sua função é definir qual estado tem competência para decidir a custódia, normalmente priorizando o “home state”, isto é, o estado de residência principal da criança.
Portanto, a controvérsia em Rockett não se limitava à existência abstrata de uma vara de família no Missouri; envolvia saber se o juiz podia exercer poder coercitivo quando uma legislação específica de custódia interestadual restringia ou impedia sua atuação.
3. Como inserir isso no artigo
Você pode acrescentar este parágrafo:
> É indispensável destacar que, no primeiro episódio, as crianças não estavam dentro da sala de audiência, nem submetidas a um ato formal de julgamento.
Elas estavam no corredor, reagindo emocionalmente à decisão que as obrigaria a permanecer com a mãe.
O juiz, sem estar no exercício formal de uma audiência e sem atuar dentro do espaço regular da jurisdição, interveio pessoalmente na discussão, conduziu as crianças a uma sala de conferência e depois as levou fisicamente para uma cela.
Esse comportamento não corresponde a uma função normalmente exercida por juiz; corresponde a uma atuação executiva, policial e carcerária.
Por isso, a frase do 8º Circuito — de que juízes não fazem “double duty as jailers” — deve ser compreendida em sua máxima gravidade: o magistrado abandonou a função imparcial de adjudicação e assumiu pessoalmente o papel de agente coercitivo contra crianças.
EU DISSE : Leia o acórdão do 8th circuito
IA CHATGPT DISSE :
1. O acórdão confirma que as crianças estavam no lobby, não na sala de audiência
O trecho essencial é este, em síntese:
2. O acórdão confirma que o juiz estava “unrobed” — sem toga
A formulação correta seria:
3. O acórdão também confirma que elas foram colocadas em celas separadas e tiveram objetos removidos
4. O acórdão não informa as idades das crianças
5. O ponto mais forte do acórdão contra o juiz
1. As crianças não estavam sequer na courtroom.
2. Por isso, ele não podia puni-las por contempt ocorrido durante sessão, na presença imediata do tribunal.
3. Juízes não fazem dupla função como carcereiros — “judges do not do double duty as jailers.”
E o acórdão acrescenta ainda mais:
Esse é o núcleo que você deve usar.
6. A parte fraca/criticável do acórdão: a segunda detenção
A crítica aqui é exatamente a sua: o tribunal separou artificialmente o ato físico do ato jurídico. Disse, em essência:
7. O que é UCCJEA, conforme o acórdão
> A UCCJEA é uma lei uniforme sobre competência em disputas de guarda de crianças entre estados norte-americanos. Ela serve para impedir que dois estados decidam ao mesmo tempo sobre a mesma criança e para evitar que um dos pais procure outro estado mais conveniente para obter decisão favorável.
8. Parágrafo revisado para o seu artigo
Mas a gravidade constitucional é ainda maior: o magistrado não apenas excedeu uma função; ele abandonou a postura de adjudicador imparcial e usou a autoridade estatal, fora da solenidade judicial, para intimidar e subjugar menores de idade.
E sobre a segunda parte:
A pergunta decisiva não deveria ser apenas se uma pick-up order é, em abstrato, uma função judicial.
Deveria ser se a Constituição, a UCCJEA, o devido processo e os princípios internacionais de conduta judicial permitem que um juiz use a forma de uma ordem judicial para transformar resistência infantil em confinamento estatal.
EU DISSE:
CHATGPT AI DISSE:
Trechos relevantes do acórdão do 8º Circuito
1. As crianças estavam no lobby, não na sala de audiência; o juiz estava sem toga
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
2. O juiz levou as crianças à cadeia para mostrar “o que podia fazer”
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
3. As crianças foram colocadas em celas separadas após remoção de roupas e pertences
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
4. O juiz voltou cerca de uma hora depois e ameaçou colocá-las em foster care ( Lar adotivo)
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
5. Segunda detenção: ordem judicial, Miranda warnings e confinamento solitário
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
6. O acórdão reconhece que a ação invocava violações da Primeira, Quarta e Décima Quarta Emendas
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
7. Teste funcional da imunidade judicial
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
8. Atos judiciais têm limites
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
9. O juiz “cruzou a linha”
O trecho mais importante do acórdão:
Tradução:
Coment.ário jurídico:
10. As crianças não estavam na courtroom; não havia contempt em sessão judicial
Tradução:
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
11. Juízes não acumulam função de carcereiros
Tradução:
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
12. As crianças nunca foram partes e nunca pisaram na courtroom
Comentário jurídico:
13. A imunidade foi negada porque a função não era normalmente desempenhada por juiz
Tradução:
Comentário jurídico:
Síntese argumentativa para inserir na petição/artigo
Diante desses trechos, pode-se formular assim:
E, sobre a parte criticável da decisão:
EU DISSE :
Põe entre parênteses que é o pai e quem é a mãe ao lado do nome
CHATGPT AI DISSE :
Exemplo já corrigido:
Tradução:
EU DISSE:
Missouri Law Review
Article
Narrowing Judicial Immunity: Holding Judges Accountable For Exercising Jurisdiction Where They Are Statutorily Barred From Doing So
Published on April 26, 2024
Updated on Dec. 8, 2025
Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, 71 F.4th 665 (8th Cir. 2023).
By: Grace N. Rowden*
I. Introduction
The Rockett family was struggling through the hardships of divorce, and the parents needed help to determine the custody of their children, who had moved between three different states in a short time.[1]. To resolve a custody dispute, they enlisted the help of the judicial system only to be betrayed by one of its most esteemed members.[2] Instead of helping them, Judge Eric Eighmy placed the Rockett children in detainment not once, but twice.[3] Judge Eighmy’s actions only added to the trauma the children were already experiencing, yet he will only face potential liability for one of those actions because of the doctrine of judicial immunity.[4] Absolute judicial immunity is a long-standing doctrine in American jurisprudence.[5] It is necessary to protect judges against personal liability from disgruntled litigants.[6] However, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the doctrine should not extend further than necessary to serve that purpose.[7]
Part II of this Note discusses the facts and holding of Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy.[8] Part III of this Note touches on the relevant legal background of the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity. Part IV lays out the instant decision in Rockett. Part V discusses how judicial immunity can be narrowed to protect people like the Rockett children, and consequently strengthen the public’s perception of the justice system, while still protecting judges from unfounded litigation by disgruntled litigants.
II. Facts and Holding
A. Factual Background
Bart Rockett and Kami Ballard were divorced in Missouri, but moved to California together after their divorce because their children, K.R. and B.R., were aspiring actors.[9] After the divorce, Rockett and Ballard shared custody of the children, but after some time, Ballard brought an action to obtain sole custody.[10] She first brought the action in California but later filed again in Missouri.[11] Judge Eighmy presided over the Missouri custody case.[12] During the initial proceedings, the parties worked out an agreement where the children would stay with Ballard for one month and then return to Rockett.[13]
The children, who had been waiting in the hallway, were upset by this decision and began to protest.[14] Judge Eighmy saw the commotion and took the children into a conference room to discuss the situation.[15] He informed them that, if they did not leave Hollywood, they would not grow up to be “normal.”[16] When they continued to protest, he personally escorted them to a jail cell and left.[17] He returned an hour later to let them out of custody.[18] The children agreed to go with their mother after Eighmy threatened to send them to foster care.[19] Several months later, Eighmy held a hearing on a contempt motion Ballard filed to get the kids returned to her, but Rockett and the children, who were now living in Louisiana, failed to attend.[20] Eighmy issued a pick-up order[21] for the children, who once again found themselves in confinement, this time at a juvenile-detention center in Louisiana.[22] The Missouri Supreme Court issued a writ of prohibition ordering Eighmy to vacate the pick-up order, and the children were released.[23]
B. Procedural Background
After the Missouri Supreme Court vacated the pick-up order, Rockett filed suit against Eighmy in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri alleging that, by twice placing his children in custody, Eighmy had violated their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.[24] Eighmy filed a motion to dismiss, arguing he had absolute immunity from suit, but the district court denied the judge’s motion and allowed the case to proceed.[25] Eighmy immediately appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.[26] The Eighth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to dismiss de novo.[27] Regarding the first act of putting the children in jail, the court held Judge Eighmy was not entitled to absolute immunity because what he did was not “a function normally performed by a judge” because judges “do not do double duty as jailers.”[28] With regard to the second act, the court held Judge Eighmy was entitled to absolute immunity because a pick-up order is a function normally performed by a judge, and he had subject-matter jurisdiction over the issue.[29]
III. Legal Background
A. History and Purpose of Judicial Immunity
Judicial immunity has been rooted in the common law for hundreds of years.[30] The first well-known English case to grant judicial immunity was decided in 1607.[31] The first time the Supreme Court of the United States recognized judicial immunity was in 1868.[32] England primarily recognized this immunity to “eliminate collateral attacks on judgments” and to “confine procedures in error” to the King’s Courts.[33] Today’s appellate system was not yet in place, so the only way to challenge a decision was to make an accusation against the decision-maker.[34] If the litigant successfully challenged the decision, the judgment would be nullified, and the judge would be fined. However, as the appellate system began to form, so did judicial immunity.[35] In comparison, the current purpose of judicial immunity is to allow judges to freely “act upon [their] own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences.”[36] It is believed that a judge cannot properly adjudicate a case if he or she is threatened by personal liability for the decision, so absolute immunity is required, even for erroneous or malicious acts.[37]
B. “Absolute” Immunity
The Supreme Court of the United States [the “Court”] has clarified and expanded its judicial immunity doctrine since its first decision in Randall v. Brigham.[38] In Randall, the Court decided that an action for damages does not lie even when the judge exceeds his or her jurisdiction but made a caveat saying there could be such an action if the judge’s act was done maliciously or corruptly.[39] Today, there is absolute immunity for judicial acts, regardless of malicious intent.[40] In Bradley v. Fisher, the Court found that allowing suits against malicious judges would essentially eradicate the doctrine of judicial immunity because malice is easily pled and cannot be proved or disproved without discovery or a trial.[41]
There are two exceptions to “absolute” immunity.[42] A judge can be held civilly liable for his or her actions when he or she was (1) performing a nonjudicial act or (2) acting in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.[43] In cases where immunity applies, the injured party cannot receive money damages, but he or she can seek a reversal of the judgment and restoral of his or her rights.[44] Therefore, the appellate system acts as a remedy for harmed litigants.[45]
1. Nonjudicial Acts
The Supreme Court has created a “functional approach” to determine when an act is judicial or nonjudicial, which can be difficult to assess.[46] A court must consider the functions that the official has been lawfully entrusted to perform and evaluate how liability would affect the official’s exercise of those functions.[47] Thus, the immunity is defined by the function, not by the person performing the act.[48] When performing this analysis, the court must consider the distinction between acts that are judicial in nature and acts that are administrative, legislative, or executive in nature.[49] Two factors help make the distinction: (1) whether the function is normally performed by a judge and (2) whether the parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity.[50] An act that is performed informally can still be rendered a judicial act.[51] When deciding whether an act was judicial, it is the nature and function of the act that matters, not the act itself, because “an improper or erroneous act cannot be said to be normally performed by a judge.”[52]
The Supreme Court has performed this analysis in several cases, denying judicial immunity in some cases while accepting it in others. For example, in Bradley, the Court had to determine whether a judge was absolutely immune from suit brought by an attorney whom the judge had ordered to be stricken from the list of attorneys practicing in the court.[53] The judge alleged that the attorney had aggressively confronted him and threatened him with personal chastisement.[54] The attorney argued the judge was lying about the threats and had in fact threatened him.[55] He also said the judge had fabricated the order striking his name from the list of practicing attorneys, which the attorney said he did not have jurisdiction to do.[56] The Court ruled judicial immunity protected the judge from suit, regardless of the judge’s motives, reasoning that the order was made “in the lawful exercise and performance of his authority and duty as [the court’s] presiding justice.”[57]
Circuit courts have also dealt with this issue. In Liles v. Reagan, the Eighth Circuit found that absolute judicial immunity protected a judge when he or she is holding litigants in contempt.[58] In McAlester v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit held that the doctrine applied to a judge who, while not in the courtroom nor in his robes, punished a defendant’s parents for contempt.[59] In Gregory v. Thompson, the Ninth Circuit denied judicial immunity to a judge who physically removed an individual from a courtroom.[60] In Gross v. Rell, the Second Circuit granted judicial immunity to a judge who ruled on an involuntary conservatorship action after erroneously concluding that the court had personal jurisdiction over the action.[61]
2. Clear Absence of All Jurisdiction
The second exception to judicial immunity is when a judge acts without jurisdiction.[62] This is notably different from acting in excess of jurisdiction,[63] or acting without statutory authority.[64] This distinction is necessary because the manner or extent of a judge’s jurisdiction is generally a question for the judge, just like other legal questions of the case.[65] Therefore, the jurisdiction’s scope needs to be interpreted broadly in judicial immunity cases.[66] As such, a judge who acts in excess of his or her jurisdiction is still immune, but a judge who acts in absence of any subject-matter jurisdiction is not immune.[67] Thus, the necessary inquiry is whether a judge has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case before him or her.[68]
C. Misconduct of Judges and the Resulting Discipline
There was little judicial oversight prior to the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980.[69] Prior to the enactment of the Act, the only discipline judges faced was the extreme measure of impeachment.[70] Even after the Act was passed, members of the judicial system were in charge of reviewing complaints against other judges, and those members could not act until someone else filed a complaint.[71] Congress realized that, even in high-profile judicial misconduct cases, complaints were not being filed, and those in charge of reviewing complaints had their hands tied.[72] So, in 1990, Congress amended the Act to allow chief circuit judges to investigate on their own based on information brought to them.[73] Since then, Congress has created commissions to address problems with the self-regulating judicial system.[74]
Even with the additional measures, a study on over 1,500 cases of judicial misconduct from 2008 to 2019 shows that judicial misconduct occurs more frequently than one would like to think, and judges rarely face severe consequences for their wrongful behavior.[75] These cases only included those where the judge resigned, retired, or faced public discipline for the misconduct.[76] The study found that nine out of ten judges were allowed to keep their judicial positions after being disciplined for their misconduct.[77]
D. Jurisdiction in Child Custody Cases
Every state except Massachusetts has adopted the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to govern child custody cases.[78] The UCCJEA helps neutralize issues in custody disputes when the parents live in different states, generally by giving jurisdiction to the “home state” of the child.[79] Missouri has codified the UCCJEA.[80] Generally, the “home state” of the child when the proceedings began has jurisdiction.[81] Another state is viable if it was the home state of the child within six months before the proceeding and a parent still lives there.[82] When more than one state is a viable option, no state can exercise jurisdiction unless the others have declined to exercise jurisdiction.[83]
If the other states have declined to exercise jurisdiction, the most appropriate state must meet two qualifications to have jurisdiction: (1) the child and at least one of the child’s parents have a significant connection, other than physical presence, to the state and (2) there is substantial evidence in the state regarding the child’s life.[84] If child custody proceedings are ongoing in one state, another state shall not exercise jurisdiction over the same child custody case.[85] Missouri courts used to treat Section 452.740 as taking away jurisdiction from a court,[86] but the Missouri Supreme Court changed that in Hightower v. Myers.[87] The court held Article V of the Missouri Constitution established the jurisdiction of courts, and jurisdiction is not changed just because a court does not have statutory authority to grant relief in a particular case.[88]
IV. Instant Decision
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s finding that judicial immunity did not apply to Judge Eighmy’s actions, and it remanded for further proceedings.[89] The court affirmed the ruling that judicial immunity did not apply to Judge Eighmy’s first act of putting the children in jail, but it reversed the ruling for the second act, finding that judicial immunity did apply.[90]
The court applied the functionality test to determine whether Judge Eighmy’s acts were judicial in nature.[91] In applying the functionality test, the court found that Judge Eighmy was acting as a bailiff when he personally escorted the children to jail, an act not covered by judicial immunity.[92] The court reasoned that the children were not in the courtroom, so they could not be held in contempt, and even if the judge had authority to order someone else to escort them to jail, he did not have authority to take them himself.[93] However, by issuing a pick-up order, he was performing a standard judicial act.[94]
After establishing that issuing a pick-up order for the children was a judicial act, the court went on to assess whether Judge Eighmy had jurisdiction to issue the order.[95] It found that, despite a statute saying there could not be custody actions ongoing in two states, Judge Eighmy did have jurisdiction.[96] It reasoned that jurisdiction is governed by Article V of the Missouri Constitution, not the statutory authority to grant relief in a particular case.[97] The jurisdictional test for judicial immunity is whether the judge acted in the “complete absence of all jurisdiction,” so the court found that judicial immunity applied because Judge Eighmy’s general jurisdiction gave him jurisdiction to hear the case.[98] He did not have statutory authority to hear it, but the statute did not affect the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court.[99]
V. Comment
Judicial immunity is a necessary evil that may harm particular litigants, but it protects the public by ensuring judges have the ability to decide cases on their own convictions without fear of personal liability.[100] However, while it is important to protect judges, they should not be protected when their decisions fly in the face of statutory authority. When one acts in contention with a statute, they should be held liable for doing so, even when they have general subject-matter jurisdiction. Otherwise, the judges who are not held accountable can taint the perception of the judicial system as a whole.[101]
Allowing suits for violations of statutes will not erode the immunity because a plaintiff must have a statute to back up the allegation that the judge has acted in contention with his or her statutory authority. A court will be able to determine, on the face of the complaint, whether a judge should be subject to civil suit for acting in excess of his or her statutory authority. If the court finds judicial immunity does not apply, the judge can immediately appeal the order without having to go through a burdensome litigation process.[102] Even if the judge is subject to suit, the plaintiff will then have to fully make his or her case before the judge is subject to civil liability. This proposed exception to immunity would be in line with the Supreme Court’s desire not to give immunity where it is not necessary and does not affront Bradley’s concern of meddling in questions of jurisdiction because the legislature has specifically instructed the court not to act.[103]
Narrowing judicial immunity in this way would only affect a subset of cases. Statutes that affect jurisdiction are not common,[104] and the exception could be limited to cases where there is a widely adopted statute controlling the issue, such as the UCCJEA. To narrow the exception even further, denial of immunity could be limited to cases where the judge knows or has reason to know that a statute bars the exercise of his or her jurisdiction, as the UCCJEA did in Rockett.[105]
Currently, judges who perform both minor and egregious misconduct are often given no more than a slap on the wrist.[106] While there are consequences outside of monetary damages, such as impeachment or suspension from the bench, those remedies are rarely used in practice.[107] During the course of this nation’s history, only fifteen federal judges have been impeached, and only eight have been removed from office.[108] State judge impeachment is also rare, with only two in the last twenty-five years.[109] Thus, while judges who perform malicious acts may be overturned on appeal, they rarely suffer consequences that will deter them from performing the same acts in the future.
Furthermore, people affected by judicial misconduct are not vindicated fully by an appeal. Judge Eighmy forced the Rockett children to be detained, not once, but twice. An appeal or, as in this case, a writ of prohibition from the Missouri Supreme Court cannot reverse the violations of constitutional rights nor the emotional damages they faced during that time. Monetary relief may not be able to reverse the damages either, but it would “make them whole” while deterring other judges from making mistakes like the one Judge Eighmy made.[110] Eventually, if this lack of accountability continues, court officials like Judge Eighmy will begin to undermine public trust in the judicial system.
A judge should be on notice as to what he or she can legally do in a case before him or her and should not be able to grant himself or herself more authority than what the legislature has granted. Denying judicial immunity in cases where a statute strips a court of the ability to exercise its jurisdiction is both a reasonable and fair measure towards ensuring public trust in our judiciary.
VI. Conclusion
The Eighth Circuit correctly determined that Judge Eighmy acting as a bailiff was not protected by judicial immunity, but his issuance of a pick-up order was. However, this case provides an opportunity to limit the doctrine of judicial immunity in an important way. The Supreme Court continues to recognize the need for immunity even when a judge acts in excess of authority, but in cases like this one, the judge is not only acting in excess of authority, he or she is violating statutory authority. Judges should not be shielded from liability for this misconduct because the judicial system rests on the competence of judges and lawyers and their ability to know and apply the law.
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*B.S., Truman State University, 2022; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2025; Associate Member, 2023–2024, Missouri Law Review. I would like to thank Adjunct Professor Anthony Meyer for his guidance during the process of writing this Note.
[1] Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, 71 F.4th 665, 667–68 (8th Cir. 2023).
[2] Id.
[3] Id. at 668.
[4] Id. at 672–73.
[5] Jeffrey M. Shaman, Judicial Immunity from Civil and Criminal Liability, 27 San Diego L. Rev. 1, 2–3 (1990).
[6] Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225 (1988).
[7] Id. at 224.
[8] See Rockett, 71 F.4th at 665.
[9] Id. at 667.
[10] Id. at 667–68.
[11] Id. at 667.
[12] Id. at 668.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] Id.
[18] Id.
[19] Id.
[20] Motion for Contempt, Ballard v. Rockett, No. 07AF-CV00944-02 (8th Cir. May 11, 2020); Rockett, 71 F.4th at 668.
[21] A pickup order is a “warrant to take physical custody of a child” that is given by the court during child custody disputes. Carrie Leonetti, Detinue and Replevin: Arresting Children to Enforce Private Parenting Orders, 30 U. Miami Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 74, 117 (2023).
[22] Rockett, 71 F.4th at 668; Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, No. 6:21-CV-03152-MDH, 2021 WL 5855825, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2021).
[23] Rockett, 71 F.4th at 668; Writ of Prohibition, State ex rel. Rockett v. Eighmy, No. SC98716 (8th Cir. Nov. 19, 2020).
[24] Rockett, 71 F.4th at 668.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Id.
[28] Id. at 672.
[29] Id. at 672–73.
[30] Shaman, supra note 5, at 2–3.
[31] See Floyd v. Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (Star Chamber 1607).
[32] J. Randolph Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 Duke L. J. 879, 898–99 (1980); see Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868).
[33] Block, supra note 32, at 880.
[34] Id. at 881.
[35] Shaman, supra note 5, at 3.
[36] Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871).
[37] Id.
[38] See id. at 347–48 (extending judicial immunity to acts that were malicious or erroneous in nature); see also Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 360 (1978) (holding that informality of the action does not make it any less of a judicial act); see also Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 527–28 (1984) (holding that judicial immunity bars monetary relief but not injunctive relief nor a grant of attorney’s fees where Congress has allowed recovery of such fees); see generally Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523 (1868).
[39] Randall, 74 U.S. at 526.
[40] Bradley, 80 U.S. at 336; Stump, 435 U.S. at 355–56.
[41] Bradley, 80 U.S. at 348; Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991).
[42] Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11–12.
[43] Id.
[44] Bradley, 80 U.S. at 353.
[45] See id.
[46] Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224–27 (1988).
[47] Id. at 224.
[48] Id. at 227.
[49] Id.
[50] Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978).
[51] Id. at 360 (holding that the judge’s act was a judicial act even though the petition for sterilization had no docket number, was not filed, and was approved in an ex parte proceeding); see also McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1282 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that a judge was acting in his judicial capacity despite not being in his robes nor in the courtroom itself).
[52] Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12–13 (1991).
[53] Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 337–38 (1871).
[54] Id. at 337.
[55] Id. at 339–40.
[56] Id. at 337–38.
[57] Id. at 346–47.
[58] Liles v. Reagan, 804 F.2d 493, 495 (8th Cir. 1986).
[59] McAlester v. Brown, 469 F.2d 1280, 1281–82 (5th Cir. 972).
[60] Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59, 61, 65 (9th Cir. 1974).
[61] Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 84 (2nd Cir. 2009).
[62] Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11–12 (1991).
[63] Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1871) (“A distinction must be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter.”).
[64] Hightower v. Myers, 304 S.W.3d 727, 733 (Mo. 2010) (en banc) (“The circuit court’s statutory or common law authority to grant relief in a particular case differs from [it]’s constitutionally granted subject[-]matter and personal jurisdiction”).
[65] Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352.
[66] Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
[67] Bradley, 80 U.S. at 352.
[68] Stump, 435 U.S. at 356 (“The Court of Appeals correctly recognized that the necessary inquiry in determining whether a defendant judge is immune from suit is whether at the time he took the challenged action he had jurisdiction over the subject matter before him.”).
[69] David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in Federal Judicial Discipline, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 909, 914 (2009). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364.
[70] Pimentel, supra note 69, at 914.
[71] Id. at 915.
[72] Id. at 916–17.
[73] Id. at 917.
[74] Id. at 918–19.
[75] Michael Berens & John Shiffman, Thousands of U.S. Judges Who Broke Laws or Oaths Remained on the Bench, Reuters Investigates (June 30, 2020) Link to paper here.
[76] Id. Additionally, there were over 3,000 other cases where the discipline was private, so the judge’s name was not publicized. Id.
[77] Id.
[78] Christina Majaski, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, LawInfo (Nov. 26, 2023), https://www.lawinfo.com/resources/child-custody-lawyers/uniform-child-custody-jurisdiction-and-enforcement-act.html.
[79] Id.
[80] See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 452.740.
[81] Id. § 452.740.1(1). There are exceptions to this general rule for emergency situations. See id. § 452.755.
[82] Id. § 452.740.1(1).
[83] Id. § 452.740.1(2). To determine what court is the most appropriate, Section 452.770 and Section 452.775 govern. Id. § 452.740.1(2).
[84] Id. § 452.740.1(2).
[85] Id. § 452.740.1.
[86] See In re Miller, 196 S.W.3d 683, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (“A trial court’s jurisdiction under the UCCJA to hear custody matters is described as ‘subject[-]matter jurisdiction,’ . . . .”). The UCCJA (Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act) was the predecessor to the UCCJEA. Majaski, supra note 78.
[87] 304 S.W.3d 727 (Mo. 2010) (en banc).
[88] Id. at 733.
[89] Rockett ex rel. K.R. v. Eighmy, 71 F.4th 665, 673 (8th Cir. 2023).
[90] Id. at 672–73.
[91] Id. at 671.
[92] Id. at 671–72.
[93] Id. at 671.
[94] Id. at 672.
[95] Id.
[96] Id. at 673.
[97] Id.
[98] Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 12 (1991); Rockett, 71 F.4th at 673.
[99] Rockett, 71 F.4th at 673.
[100] Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10 (“[U]nfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion, ‘it is a general principle of the highest importance . . . that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority bested in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions . . . .’”) (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871)).
[101] Michael Berens & John Shiffman, Thousands of U.S. Judges Who Broke Laws or Oaths Remained on the Bench, Reuters Investigates (June 30, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-judges-misconduct/ (“Judicial misconduct specialists say such behavior has the potential to erode trust in America’s courts and, absent tough consequences, could give judges license to behave with impunity.”); David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale: Closing the Gap in Federal Judicial Discipline, 76 Tenn. L. Rev. 909, 913 (2009) (“Dissatisfaction with the courts. . . has much to do with the public’s confidence in the judiciary.”).
[102] See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742 (1982) (“At least twice before this Court has held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable under the Cohen criteria.”) (citing Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977)).
[103] In Bradley, the court recognized that the amount of jurisdiction a judge has is usually a common question for the judge to decide. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 352 (1871).
[104] See Tara Leigh Grove, The Article II Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 250, 253 (2012) (“Although most jurisdiction-stripping bills have been defeated in the legislative process, some. . . captured sufficient political support to gain the assent of both Congress and the President.”).
[105] See Mo. Rev. Stat. §452.740.1(2).
[106] See Michael Berens & John Shiffman, Thousands of U.S. Judges Who Broke Laws or Oaths Remained on the Bench, Reuters Investigates (June 30, 2020).
[107] See Douglas Keith, Impeachment and Removal of Judges: An Explainer, Brennan Center for Justice (March 23, 2018), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/impeachment-and-removal-judges-explainer#:~:text=Impeachment%20of%20ju dges%20is%20rare,by%20convictions%20in%20the%20Senate.
[108] Id.
[109] Id.
[110] Kincaid Enterprises, Inc. v. Porter, 812 S.W.2d 892, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (“The purpose of an award of damages is to make the injured person whole by money compensation.”).
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